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This research deals with the ways Corporate Social Responsibility is interpreted in a UK Higher 
Education Institution. It evolved from my initial curiosity about Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), especially the way it is taken up in daily practices. Drawing on the 
pragmatic tradition of John Dewey (1859-1952), Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and 
George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), which gives primacy to experience, I am paying attention 
to my daily interactions with others. I explore what is, rather what should be. I also draw on 
analogies from complexity sciences, as well as on insights from sociology, psychology, 
anthropology and philosophy, to reflect on how the everyday practice of CSR is evolving in the 
interactions of interdependent players. 
Reflecting on the assumptions that underpin my thinking about organisations and about 
research, and tracing my evolving beliefs and perceptions, I have become aware of my 
participation in the processes that sustain and at the same time disrupt the ‘community 
engagement’ narrative of my organisation. Iterating my reflective narratives reveals how 
change in practice and in ideas evolves.  
This research was prompted by my introduction to CSR early in my academic career. The idea 
of organisations being responsible to their stakeholders fitted with my personal values. The 
more I read about the topic, the more uncomfortable I became – CSR had usually been presented 
in vague, general and idealised terms. So, when faced with setting up a Unit that would address 
the CSR of my organisation, I was left with no manual for getting on with my work. Reflecting 
on the feeling of helplessness, revealed my assumption that such guidance should exist, and 
that CSR practitioners must know how to practice the generalised idea of CSR. Exposing this 
and other emotions, I demonstrate how assumptions and beliefs arise in society and in the 
individual simultaneously.  
This research contributes to knowledge in this field by establishing CSR not just as an abstract 
idea, but as a practice within an organisation. Many authors have called for exploring CSR at 
the individual level, yet this call seems to remain unanswered. My research addresses this gap 
in literature and explores CSR from my perspective as a practitioner, thus contributing to the 
nascent body of literature that focuses on individual and local practice. Exploring 
interdependence and the emergence of CSR meant understanding that my actions have 
consequences, and at the same time, neither I nor any one individually can control those 
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consequences.  The outcomes of our working together are at times intended and at times 
unintended. But they are inevitably unpredictable, because they arise in complex webs of 
interactions. Thinking reflexively about practising CSR has had a significant impact on my 
practice. I believe that my reflections will resonate with other practitioners, thus contributing 
to their practice.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
I was first introduced to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) while 
redeveloping a corporate governance module at Hertfordshire Business School (HBS). The 
ethics area of that module had the greatest appeal for me. At the time I started hearing about 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility’, which I understood to be linked to ethics, it sounded more 
suitable for a Business School module than ‘just’ ethics. The lack of textbooks in CSR led 
me to extensive reading on the subject. I became aware of the debates on the topic and of the 
works that were considered seminal in this area. My attention was particularly drawn to two 
recurring themes: organizations being discussed as capable of human emotions and 
functions, e.g. caring and responsibility; and CSR understood as a business function, which 
led to a search for a ‘business case’ for CSR. At the time, although intuitively I disagreed 
with those views, I could not justify my objections, nor propose an alternative understanding 
of CSR. The desire to address this dissonance was the main impetus for deciding to explore 
the topic of CSR further. 
The more I read about and discussed the topic with students, the more difficult it became to 
make sense of CSR. So many articles started with introducing CSR as elusive and poorly 
defined (Sarkar and Searcy, 2016, Sheehy, 2015, Schwartz and Saiia, 2012, Lee, 2008, Quazi 
and O'Brien, 2000, Aupperle et al., 1985). Yet very few of them added clarity to the concept 
(cf Crotty, 2016), and I found no papers discussing specific practitioners’ understanding of 
CSR. To explore what practitioners understand by the term, and how they manifest that 
understanding in practice, I began attending events arranged by Business in the Community, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), British Academy of 
Management, and other initiatives. During those seminars and workshops I kept asking myself 
‘Why do the organisers need to convince the participants of the importance of CSR? Why are 
they talking in general terms and do not specify what they mean by CSR? Why are there no 
discussions about CSR practice by practitioners?’ Going back to the literature, it became 
evident that those questions equally apply to the academic discourse on the topic. The answer 
to the first question was straightforward – the best way to convince managers to pay attention 
to an area that is not their core business is to point to that area’s profitability. The second and 
the third questions remain unanswered. The way CSR is addressed in the academic literature is 
still poorly defined (see Grosser, 2016, Sheehy, 2015, Vidal et al., 2015). And the specific 
experiences of CSR practitioners still do not feature in the mainstream CSR literature. Based 
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on these lacunas in the CSR literature, my initial interest in exploring CSR was focused on two 
aspects: 
 Providing an understanding of what it means to practise CSR; 
 Providing a definition of CSR that is more congruent with practitioners’ experience. 
At the beginning of my PhD studies I chose to focus on CSR in the construction industry. Within 
a year this line of inquiry proved to be unsuccessful. Although I gained access to the 
practitioners, I felt I could not gain sufficient insight into their daily practice of CSR in 
interviews. I began understanding that in order to explore experience I had to have experience 
of practising CSR.  
At the same time a new role was created in HBS – Director of the Social Enterprise Unit. I 
wrote my expression of interest in one go. I felt the role was perfect for me, it addressed my 
interest in community engagement, and seemed to offer insight into CSR practice in an 
academic institution. There were other reasons for my interest in the role. I wanted to give up 
the previous administrative role that seemed like a dead end in terms of promotion, and I wanted 
to find a new role that had potential for advancement. The purpose of exposing those very 
instrumental and not-so-idealistic reasons for applying for the role, is to provide a glimpse into 
the method of writing this dissertation.  
It is also important to note that this role is one of many other academic responsibilities I have 
in HBS. In workload terms only 40% of my time is allocated to this role. In this dissertation I 
mainly pay attention to my interactions as Director of the SEU, they are not separate from other 
interactions and inform and are being informed by other aspects of my working with others at 
UH.  
In order to address my research question: ‘How is CSR understood and practised in the UK HEI 
from a practitioner’s perspective?’, I am going to explore my CSR practice through iterative 
reflexive narratives. In reflecting on my narratives, I am paying attention to my participation in 
the processes of working with others. By paying attention to my intentions, behaviours, 
responses, thoughts, emotions and many other aspects of experiencing those interactions, I am 
making sense of those experiences. In relaying those experiences to others in my PhD group, 
in research seminars and conferences, I gain insights into aspects of my interactions that others 
can relate to. By turning to literature and interacting with the ideas of the writers, I make sense 
of my experiences and locate them in the wider body of thought. This critical approach to 
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making sense of CSR is informed by the pragmatist tradition, especially American Pragmatism, 
which emphasises primacy of experience: 
as human beings we can never escape our embeddedness with the world of 
experiencing into which we are thrown as actors. Experiencing itself must here be 
understood as an active process of exploration within an embodied stream of 
experience in which the more cognitive dimensions are just one part (Martela, 2015: 
539).   
This means that we cannot escape our participation in the world which we intend to research, 
and as researchers we are actors in that world, and thinking is just one form of action (Baert, 
2003). Barad (2007), following the thinking of Nobel Prize winning Danish physicist Niels 
Bohr, claims that ‘it is human practices which make the world intelligible to us’ (in Mowles, 
2015b: 155). The world is simultaneously formed and being formed by our studying of the 
world. Researching from the pragmatist perspective means engaging in abductive reasoning. 
Abduction refers to searching for the best hypothesis to describe the phenomenon under 
investigation (Peirce, 2003 [1998]). Through abductive reasoning we aim to demonstrate how 
‘something can be’ rather than proving that ‘something must be in a certain way’ (Meyer and 
Lunnay, 2013). Abductive reasoning means the continuous review of findings, own 
assumptions, secondary data and existing theories to reach the most satisfactory explanation, 
according to one’s standards of enquiry, and practical insights are gained in iterative processes 
(Martela, 2015). In Chapter 3 I will explain in detail the methods I chose to research my 
experience. 
I mentioned above that the concept of CSR was new to me; but the ideas that underpinned it 
were familiar. However, the ideas of complexity and complex responsive processes of relating 
exposed me to a totally unfamiliar, yet exciting way of thinking; ideas of interdependence, 
emergence and unpredictability were liberating. They helped to clarify the unexpected events 
that I felt responsible for, yet was unable to control. Some events seemed minor initially, but 
turned out to be significant; and sometimes seemingly significant incidents, causing me to lose 
sleep, were resolved quickly. For example, while working in the advertising industry, I 
developed a sense of responsibility for creating elaborate scenarios for every possible 
eventuality, and when the unpredicted happened, I would become frustrated with myself for my 
lack of foresight. Drawing on complexity insights I began understanding that no one can think 
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of every possible eventuality. I could not be solely responsible for the outcomes, as any outcome 
depended on interactions with many others. 
I also began understanding that no one can stand outside of the processes of interaction (Stacey 
and Mowles, 2016, Mowles, 2015b, Larsen and Bogers, 2014, Warwick and Board, 2013, 
Griffin and Stacey, 2005). Exploring CSR in the construction industry, as I initially intended, 
could provide me with an overview of the industry. The interviews could give me some insights 
into the work of CSR practitioners in that industry. But speaking with practitioners, I was 
bringing my own ideas into the conversations; by phrasing the questions, I was shaping the 
answers; each interview had an impact on me and my understanding of CSR practice, so I was 
not the same person asking questions in the following interview. Researching the construction 
industry would have been interesting, but it could not be reconciled with my developing 
understanding of research as an emergent exploration of experience (Stacey and Griffin, 2005). 
On this understanding, our experience and its meaning arise in interaction with others. The 
practice of CSR in the construction industry is a theme, a pattern that arises in many interactions 
of many practitioners with many others. Upon developing this understanding of industries, 
concepts, and other social institutions as patterns of interactions, or themes of conversations, 
my interest in the construction industry diminished. I wanted to explore the experience of 
practising CSR from a practitioner’s perspective and being offered the role of Director of the 
Social Enterprise Unit provided me with an opportunity to do so.  
Paying attention to my own experience of CSR, interpretation of the concept, and practising 
CSR in a specific context, requires paying attention to my own assumptions, values and 
ideology. Yet, some CSR writers, based in a positivist camp, prefer to have an objective 
discussion of CSR.  Aupperle et al. (1985), for example, suggest that being ‘value laden and 
susceptible to particular ideological and emotional interpretations’ is a predicament of CSR, 
which should be overcome by designing impartial ‘instruments to measure the degree of 
orientation to social responsibility’ (p.456). This equating of emotional, ideologically based 
interpretations with the inability to eliminate researcher’s bias (Linstead, 1994) and even lack 
of academic rigour is not unusual (Yanow, 2014). However, a growing number of writers (e.g. 
Stokes et al., 2016, Lee and Cassell, 2013, Haynes, 2012, Cunliffe, 2010, Bryman, 2008) 
recognise that interpretive methodologies employed by CSR researchers require us to make 
judgement calls, which are inevitably value laden. The idea of  
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‘Judgement calls’… refers to all of those decisions (some big, some small, but all 
necessary and consequential) that must be made without the benefit of a fixed 
‘objective’ rule that one can apply, with precision, like a template or a pair of 
clippers… We suggest… that a set of rules to replace judgement calls not only would 
be difficult to fashion, but also would be dysfunctional if we had them. (McGrath, 
1982 in Schwartz-Shea, 2014: 142) 
Bourdieu (1990: 190) remarked that 'the body is in the social world, but the social world is also 
in the body'. I understand this observation to mean that all social interactions are value laden, 
susceptible to particular ideological and emotional interpretations. Therefore, exploring values, 
emotions and ideologies is central to researching organisations and practices.  
As a critical researcher, I understand CSR in social terms, not as an object that exists 
independently of human interaction. This dissertation, informed by complex responsive 
processes, draws on a radically social understanding of life in organisations. On this 
understanding, a researcher must tease out and declare her own interests, acknowledge her 
biases (Mowles, 2007). To do so, I take my experience of practising CSR seriously, paying 
attention to what arises for me and others as we work together. 
In exploring my working with others in making sense of my practice, I pay attention to the 
interplay of intentions for the future and ever-changing interpretations of the past, as we come 
together to interpret what CSR means. This means paying attention to everyday, often mundane, 
practice, as I recognise that global patterns (of which CSR is just one example) arise in local 
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CSR at the University of Hertfordshire 
Before I go on to explore my experience of practising CSR, it is important to explain why the 
concept of CSR is applicable to universities, and why I understand my work as part of the 
University of Hertfordshire’s CSR agenda. 
Although the C in CSR stands for ‘Corporate’, it is appropriate to apply this term when 
discussing my work at the university. The word ‘university’ derives from Latin universitas, 
meaning ‘many bodies united into one’. It has a similar meaning to the Latin corporate,  
meaning ‘combined in one body’. As such, the term ‘corporation’ covers not just business 
corporations, but also charities, churches, clubs, foundations, trade associations, trade unions, 
political parties, municipalities, states, international organisations, and of course universities 
(Gindis, 2016). All these are corporations in the sense that they share the feature of being legally 
recognised actors, granted separate legal personality, i.e. they can hold property, enter 
contractual relations, sue and be sued, etc., in their own right, as distinct from any or all of their 
members. It is the unified legal identity and capacity for legally binding actions that can survive 
changes in membership that makes them proper corporate bodies. Corporate bodies with these 
features go back at least to Roman times (Davis, 1897, Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003, 
Gindis, 2009).  
Following Crane et al.  (2014) I will not attempt to add a new definition to the ‘complex jungle 
of CSR definitions’ (p.6), but will focus on the core characteristics of CSR that are present in 
some form in the contemporary debate. Those include: voluntary engagement, which is beyond 
philanthropy, managing externalities, multiple stakeholder orientation, social and economic 
alignment, practices and values (ibid). Many departments in the UH address one or more of 
those areas. The Social Enterprise Unit was set up to ‘engage with local charities’, and under 
my leadership its remit has expanded to engaging with the Third Sector1. This understanding 
of the SEU’s purpose echoes several of the accepted CSR characteristics. 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore the practice of CSR in a UK HEI. This dissertation 
traces my developing understanding of CSR, from the initial search for a clear and precise 
definition to the conviction that such a search is futile. I currently understand CSR as a 
generalised umbrella term for a wide range of community engagement activities that must be 
                                                          
1 The Third Sector is an umbrella term for non-government and non-profit making organisations. These 
include charities, mutuals, cooperatives, and social enterprises. The common feature of all Third Sector 
organisation is their social purpose ANON. 2016. What is the Third Sector and What Does It Do? [Online]. 
Northern Bridge.  [Accessed December 5, 2016]. 
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operationalised in a specific context. This understanding of the concept requires paying 
attention to particular activities in a particular context. This cannot be achieved by modelling 
specific behaviours on abstract formulae, only by reflecting on the actions of practitioners. I’ve 
come to recognise that in choosing a course of action, both in conducting research and in 
practising CSR,   I’ve come to rely on insights drawn from experience, on practical wisdom 
(Flinn and Mowles, 2014). Many authors have acknowledged the need for a practitioner’s 
perspective of CSR, yet there remains a distinct deficiency in practitioners addressing their 
experience in the academic literature (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). In this work I aim to make 
sense of my experience of activities that I understand as fitting into the broad church of CSR. 
In making sense of my experiences, I do not follow a chronological order, but attempt to order 
my thinking, to trace the development of my thought.  
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. 
Dissertation structure 
In Chapter 2 I explain the theoretical underpinnings of this research. The chapter begins with a 
narrative reflecting on my involvement in a pattern of behaviour that I perceive as irresponsible. 
In exploring my narrative, I turn to insights from complexity, as well as from sociology, 
psychology and philosophy. Those insights help me make sense of my behaviour in relation to 
others, of emergence of global patterns of behaviour, of power relations, of external and self-
restraints and the emergence of ethics.  
In Chapter 3 I discuss the implication of those insights for researching CSR practice. I trace the 
development of my thinking about researching. I begin by reflecting on the first academic 
research project, and discuss my evolving understanding of research. Reflecting on the paper I 
wrote following a research project conducted in Ukraine, helps me focus my ideas regarding 
researching and methodology. 
In Chapter 4 I begin thinking about what CSR means to me and what can and cannot be 
considered CSR, and reflect on several incidents that I initially dismissed as non-CSR. 
Reflecting on those incidents I challenge the underpinning assumption of CSR as being the 
responsibility of an organisation, as it is addressed in the mainstream literature.   
In Chapter 5 I continue exploring the difficulties I have had in accepting the significance of my 
work as a contribution to CSR. Critically reviewing CSR literature I reflect on the idealisation 
of this concept and propose an alternative way of understanding CSR.    
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In Chapter 6 I explore my practice of implementing Principles of Responsible Management 
Education (UN PRME) in HBS and reflect on my contribution to sustaining the heroic narrative 
of CSR. I focus on the processes of revealing and concealing when discussing our practising 
CSR.  
In Chapter 7 I reflect on my experience of starting a new CSR initiative – the Social Enterprise 
Unit, and critically review the literature pertaining to planning and entrepreneurship. In 
exploring those experiences I focus on my changing understanding of CSR. 
Measuring CSR and its impact has been a major strand of CSR research. I have been very 
critical of this, as in my opinion this reduced complex human interactions to a set of abstract 
measurements, thereby omitting the human aspect of CSR practice. Yet, I contributed to the 
creation of such measurements when asked to report on the SEU. I reflect on my participation 
in the processes of financialising the work of the SEU in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9 I focus on a theme that emerges throughout the dissertation – struggle. I reflect on 
my struggles with understanding and practising CSR. In focusing on the theme of struggle I 
address a topic that is commonly neglected in CSR literature. 
I conclude this dissertation by summarising my emerging understanding of CSR as a researcher 
practitioner. In this concluding chapter I highlight the contributions of this research to 
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Chapter 2 - My understanding of complex responsive processes of relating and how I think 
about it in relation to my practice 
I am human, and nothing of that which is human is alien to me. (Terence, 2nd century BCE) 
Introduction 
I start this chapter with a phrase attributed to Terence to remind the reader and myself that 
organisations in which we participate cannot be understood without acknowledging that they 
are human organisations. Yet, as March and Olsen (1984: 747) put it, ‘what we observe in the 
world is inconsistent with the way in which contemporary theories ask us to talk’. Many of 
today’s contemporary organisational theories are framed in such a way that the human factor is 
largely absent. To be more precise, individual differences are ignored, and all participants are 
understood as parts in supra-structures that are organisations, which are perceived as 
independent beings, existing outside and independent of human interactions (see Stacey and 
Mowles, 2016 for detailed discussion). Moreover, organisations are reified – considered as real 
sovereign things - and even attributed human behaviours and feelings (see Motamedi, 2008 for 
a poignant critique ). Focusing on CSR literature we find organisations discussed as being 
capable of intending (e.g. Green et al., 2016, Porter, 2008), aiming (e.g. Wagner, 2010), feeling 
(e.g. Ingenhoff and Koelling, 2012) and thinking (Chauhan, 2012).  
Understanding organisations in terms of complex responsive processes of relating provides an 
alternative to mainstream organisational perspectives. In this chapter I explain my 
understanding of complex responsive processes of relating, and how studying this perspective 
provides insights into my practice of CSR. I begin this chapter with a narrative that 
demonstrates how I became dissatisfied with insights from the traditional organisational 
theories, and how my thinking about working in organisations started changing upon being 
introduced to complexity. 
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Emergence of responsibility and lack of responsibility in working together in 
organisations  
Upon graduating with a Bachelor’s degree in 1992 I embarked on a career in advertising and 
marketing, and within a few years became marketing manager for a utilities provider. Until then 
I had not been involved in ‘strategic’ marketing decisions, and getting my first ‘proper’ 
management job, I felt I could finally put my degree to good use. My first task was to review 
their current marketing mix and to make recommendations regarding our positioning in the 
market. I was brushing up on marketing theory in the evenings and conducting marketing 
research during the day. When I decided I had collected enough data, I prepared a report, which 
included Ansoff  (1957) and BCG (Henderson 1970, 1973) matrices, SWOT and PEST 
analyses, careful analysis of all 4 Ps2, and a recommendation based on Porter’s (1980) generic 
strategies. One of the conclusions reached from the analyses was that we should expand our 
commercial activities in the north of the country.  
The VP for marketing and sales praised my report, stating that it was very professional. And 
then he asked me to restate my recommendations, removing the northern expansion. When I 
asked why, he evaded the direct answer, saying something about my not knowing everything. 
I felt ashamed - how had I missed some crucial information that affected the recommendation? 
I was not told what that information was, what it was that I did not know, but I blamed myself 
for not having found out. So that recommendation was removed, leaving me in fear of being 
found out for not seeing the obvious (after all, the analyses pointed out the north was the way 
to go). But the report was accepted by the board. I was confused, but so happy with my report 
being well received – after all, this was what I was hoping for – and I did not give it much 
thought.  
One day I joined a sales representative for a client visit. As we were driving north I asked him 
why he was not trying to generate more commercial business in that area. He replied that he 
was not allowed. When I pressed I was shocked to learn that the major utility companies divided 
the country between themselves. They agreed that private customers were ‘fair game’, but when 
a commercial customer of a certain size asked for a quote the price had to be agreed among the 
bidders. This was a textbook cartel. Allegedly it was agreed upon between the VPs, and the 
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President and other board members were unaware of this. I had my doubts about this so-called 
ignorance but did not say anything.  
At the time, that revelation had one positive effect on me. It meant I had not missed anything 
in my report, it was solid, and ‘market imperfection’ was to blame. I left the company several 
months later. I would have liked to present this move as a matter of principle, but I was offered 
a more interesting job. Although considering what I had heard as wrong, I was too involved in 
my own survival and in establishing myself as a marketing professional, I continued with my 
job, without even considering blowing the whistle or resigning on ethical grounds. Being told 
the ‘secret’ also contributed to my feeling of belonging, of importance. I was accepted as part 
of an inner circle of those ‘in the know’. 
So what is the relevance of this short reflection to this dissertation? For years I’d worked with 
a firm belief that the theory I was taught in my degree was the best way to practice. In the course 
of my career, I utilised the techniques I learned at the university.  The 2x2 diagrams and 
impressive charts I’d used in my presentations were well received.  
Even when shaken, my belief was quickly restored, as I could explain away the glitch by 
‘imperfect markets’ or ‘imperfect information’. As I started my MBA I was taught more models 
and theories, and the case studies demonstrated those theories perfectly. I enjoyed analysing 
those case studies. Thinking about my experience of working in organisations, I could explain 
what happened in that and other organisations as lack of CSR, unethical organisational 
behaviour, or institutionalisation of irresponsible practices.  
But reflecting on that experience more than two decades later, I cannot explain away the 
feelings of shame, of frustration with being complicit in blatant acts of irresponsibility, that I 
feel today. Reflecting on the narrative would be pointless if I continued ignoring the feeling of 
shame about my much younger self. I’m ashamed of not being ashamed at the time. These 
strong emotions are impetus to more careful reflection on that incident. My sense of self was 
dependent on the report being accepted by the managers. Their acceptance validated my value 
– I was recognised as a marketing professional. This recognition was so important to me that 
all else, including my awareness of irresponsible behaviour, was dismissed.  
Taking the ‘Managing in Complexity’ module, I realised that not only do I not have to dismiss 
strong feelings evoked by experience, but paying more attention to my experience is important 
for making sense of working with others. I could no longer dismiss the ‘glitches’ I experienced 
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in my work. I did not need to disregard my intuition and bury my relationships under reams of 
tables and data.  The module introduced me to a different way of understanding my experience 
in organisations. Introduced to complexity and specifically complex responsive processes of 
relating I felt liberated. My experience counted. Drawing on understandings from complexity 
sciences helped me make sense of the previously disregarded ‘externalities’ (Helbling, 2010), 
the ‘shadow themes’ (Larsen and Bogers, 2014) encountered in my work. I allowed myself to 
acknowledge that many documents I’d produced (the one discussed above, for example) were 
often a product of not just impartial deliberation and objective investigation, but also reflected 
behind-the-scenes interactions, expectations and hopes of all participants, their personal 
histories and ambitions. I realised that the exclusion of personal and ‘subjective’ from the 
traditional management theories, left me anxious and frustrated with the lack of control I’d 
experienced when I was supposed to be in charge. 
I tried to incorporate my newly found fascination with what I called at the time ‘CRP theory’, 
into my MBA dissertation. At the time, I was eager to ‘apply CRP theory’ to the data I collected 
in the interviews. Soon it became obvious that my understanding of the perspective was very 
limited. The perspective could not be summarised in a table, nor could it be ‘applied’ in the way 
I applied traditional management theories. I needed to study complexity in-depth. Paying 
attention to one’s own experience is central to the perspective of complex responsive processes 
of relating. Making sense of experience is a continuous iterative process. I became fascinated, 
I had to learn more, to explore more, to understand how complex responsive processes of 
relating inform my practice – lecturing, managing SEU, and researching. 
In the next section I will introduce the ideas that I found so illuminating, ideas that helped me 
make sense of my experience.    
Influences on complex responsive processes of relating 
Reflecting on the topic of this dissertation, it is ironic that the first narrative I chose to introduce 
deals with lack of responsibility. I had not thought in those terms at the time the incident took 
place. But initial exposure to social complexity highlighted the importance of embracing 
paradox and dialectical thinking (Stacey et al., 2000, Larsen, 2005, Mowles, 2015c).  This 
thinking is based on the philosophy of Heraclitus, emphasising continuous change and the 
principle of negativity (Kahn, 1979). On this thinking knowing and understanding arise in 
appreciation of the opposites. Our awareness of justice depends on the existence of injustice; 
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we can only appreciate health because we know disease, abundance because of scarcity – 
nothing in human existence is exclusively good or bad (Williams, 1989).  
the doctrine of opposites is, among other things, an attempt to attain a larger vision by 
recognizing the life-enhancing function of the negative term, and hence of 
comprehending the positive value of the antithesis itself (Kahn, 1979:189)    
Exploring what I mean by responsibility involves understanding how I, in working with others, 
contributed to socially irresponsible behaviour.  
The concepts and ideas embraced by the perspective of complex responsive processes (Stacey 
et al., 2000, Stacey, 2001, Stacey and Griffin, 2005, Mowles et al., 2008) are not arranged neatly 
in a linear form but are interrelated, interlinked and interdependent. Responsive, reflexive, 
iterative ways of thinking are central to this perspective. Expressing this in writing proves 
remarkably difficult, as the only way to write is linear, word after word, line after line, 
paragraph after paragraph. To address this challenge, I will first provide a brief summary of my 
understanding of the perspective and then explain how this understanding provides a different 
focus which helped me make sense of earlier experience.  
Complex responsive processes proponents do not claim to create a wholly new organisational 
theory, but acknowledge integrating many influences on their thinking (Mowles, 2015a). In the 
following section I will highlight the main influences that I found resonant with my experiences.   
Complexity sciences 
A major influence on the development of the complex responsive processes perspective are the 
insights from complexity sciences. The title ‘complexity sciences’ is an umbrella term for 
various theories in natural sciences that have been developed since the second half of the last 
century (Waldrop, 1992). Complexity scientists from many disciplines suggest that nature can 
be understood as a system, emphasising the importance of the interaction of its parts, and not 
just the parts themselves. On this thinking, in order to understand the system one cannot 
concentrate on researching just one part of it.  Natural systems - the weather, the human brain, 
or the bee hive, are just a few examples - are non-linear (there is no efficient, ‘if X… then Y’, 
causality between cause and effect), non-deterministic (the outcomes of interaction are not 
prescribed), and are not reductionist (simple systems may give rise to immense and 
unpredictable consequences) (Holland, 2014).  
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In a variety of branches of the natural sciences, scientists have developed computer models 
using non-linear equations (Campbell, 1987). Such equations have no solutions, but take the 
output of one iteration as the input of the next. Those non-linear models have been used to 
simulate behaviour in nature, such as flocking birds or evolution of landscape, even to model 
synapses in the brain (Holland, 1992, Gell-Mann, 1994). The most interesting models for the 
purposes of thinking about human behaviour are Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) (Mowles, 
2015a). The study of CAS has been aided by the development of sophisticated computers, 
allowing simulations which are too complicated to be conducted by hand.  CAS comprises large 
populations of bit-strings of code – ‘agents’ - which interact with each other according to a set 
of rules initially specified by a programmer (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). Yet there are 
limitations to understanding human organisations as complex adaptive systems (see Appendix 
1). Complex responsive processes of relating is another perspective which explores insights 
from complexity sciences in relation to human interaction. In doing so, the researchers turn to 
complexity but also to social sciences – sociology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, 
politics – to make sense of our working together. In their work researchers use complexity 
sciences as a source domain for analogy with complex systems (Stacey et al., 2000, Griffin and 
Stacey, 2005, Mowles et al., 2008, Warwick and Board, 2013, Norman et al., 2015) and use 
terminology utilised by other complexity scientists. I will briefly expound on my understanding 
of these terms, which will be used throughout this dissertation. 
Complexity arises in multiple interactions of many interdependent parts (Waldrop, 1992). 
Interdependence means each agent’s action is affected by and affecting the action of other 
agents. Each agent is enabled and constrained by other agents. Central to the notion of 
complexity is emergence. Scientists, using computer models with non-linear equations, have 
demonstrated that even a set of simple rules for homogenous agents produces emergent 
behaviour. When agents are diverse and some randomness is introduced into the system, 
complex unpredicted evolutionary patterns emerge. To reiterate, emergence does not mean 
creating something out of nothing. Emergence is a property of complex systems that arises in 
the interaction of multiple interdependent agents. Complex systems are self-organising. This 
means emergence of coherent patterns of behaviour without blueprint or direction. In a 
computer model, agents interact with a (relatively) limited number of other agents. The order – 
coherent structure - emerges in the local interaction of agents, rather than being pre-planned, 
commanded or managed by an external source3. Interactions between agents produce nothing 
                                                          
3 In computer simulations, the programmer only programs initial rules for interactions. 
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more but further interactions, and each interaction results from previous interactions; this means 
that behaviours of complex systems are non-replicable. As a result of many local interactions 
between agents, minor changes in the action of one agent can potentially be amplified to a great 
extent in the iterative processes. There is no possibility of reverting to the ‘beginning’ of the 
simulation to replicate the iterations. Each new simulation with the same set of rules will 
produce a different pattern. This is referred to as the butterfly effect (Gleick, 1988) in the 
general literature, which is based on the title of Edward Lorenz’s  lecture ‘Does the flap of a 
butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas’ (Palmer, 2009). In complexity sciences 
terms this property of complex systems is referred to as sensitivity to initial conditions (Lorenz, 
1993).  
To summarise, global patterns in complex systems emerge because of the interdependence of 
its agents. No agent acts independently of others, and any action by any agent is affected by 
others and at the same time affects them. The remarkable feature of the interaction between 
agents is that it produces coherent global patterns that change over time. The global pattern 
emerges simply and only because of the interaction of agents locally with other agents, 
meanwhile it constrains the way that this local interaction can be conducted.  
Implications for human interactions: the emergence of social control and self-restraint, 
power relations, social self and ethics 
Analogous to complex adaptive systems, organisations are self-organising, there is no blueprint 
for their emergence. In CAS, order arises as agents interact according to initial rules specified 
by the programmer (Waldrop, 1992). There is no external programmer in organisations. As 
people interact, the outcomes of their interactions cannot be predicted or prescribed by any of 
them (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). In CAS, each agent is restricted and enabled by other agents 
it interacts with. Members of organisations too are enabled and constrained by other members. 
Coherent patterns and order emerge as people interact, but, unlike a computer simulation, power 
relations are a feature of all human interactions (ibid). Social control and self-restraint also 
emerge in their interactions. They emerge because of the ability to reflect, a uniquely human 
quality, which I understand as the awareness of self in relation to others, the ability to see 
ourselves as others might see us, both in our immediate environment and in the wider 
community. 
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Human interactions, all human interactions, imply ethical choices. Our interdependence with 
each other means that in making our decisions we are weighing up our options and perceived 
potential consequences of our actions, in relation to others. Although our awareness of all 
consequences is impossible, we assess the perceived possibilities, and act upon those 
assessments. Whatever we do has ethical implications – in our interactions with others we 
constantly consider what is right, a consideration that is continuously negotiated and evolving. 
These unique features of our interactions, all human interactions, will be discussed in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
Parallels between social and complexity sciences 
Human organisations arise in the interactions of people, of human bodies. As such, all human 
interactions cannot be devoid of feelings, thoughts and emotions (Stacey, 2005). As no one can 
step outside of the interaction to control it, no one can step outside of the body to control 
emotions and thoughts.4  Emotions cannot be denied in analysing human behaviour. Computer-
based agents’ interactions are responsive, while human interactions are also purposeful. The 
patterns of behaviour emerge in the interdependence of intentions, beliefs, and past experiences 
of human participants. Being interdependent with others, our actions are always constrained 
and enabled by others, and we are enabled and constrained not just by the actions of others, but 
by our perception and interpretations of those actions. Before I expand on the discussion about 
the unique nature of all human interactions, I would like to draw attention to parallels in thinking 
between sociologists and complexity scientists.  
In the first half of the 20th century, two sociologists, working independently of each other, 
discussed the interconnectedness of individual and social behaviours. George Herbert Mead 
(1863-1931), an American Pragmatist, provided important insight into the emergence of self 
and society as simultaneous processes. A German sociologist, Norbert Elias (1897-1990), who 
fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s and worked in the UK, studied the evolution of Western 
civilisation by exploring the evolution of manners over centuries. In ‘The Civilizing Process’ 
he attempts to answer the following question ‘How did this change, this “civilizing” of the 
West, actually happen?.. And what were its “causes” or “motive forces”?’ (Elias, 1939 [2000] 
: ix-x).  Both Mead’s exploration of emergence, especially the emergence of self and society, 
and Elias’s ‘The Civilizing Process’ predate the development of complexity sciences. Yet, 
                                                          
4 I do not mean we are incapable of having some ways of controlling our emotional reactions; rather I draw 
attention to the fact that we cannot decide not to have them. 
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Mead’s concept of ‘emergence’ (Mead, 2007) is analogous to the way emergence is understood 
by the complexity scientist. Elias’ notion of ‘figuration’ (Elias, 1939 [2000] , 1978, 1991) refers 
to interdependence of individuals in society.  
Related to this is the analogy between Mead’s pragmatism and Elias’s figuration sociology, and 
between complexity sciences are the ideas of self-similarity and scaling (Holland, 2014), which 
in complexity sciences refer to the property of the complex system (see Appendix 2). In human 
interaction, self-similarity and scaling means that there is no separation to macro and micro. 
Elias ‘dispensed with false oppositions that result from dualistic thinking’ (Layder, 2005: 141). 
Elias (1939 [2000]) demonstrated the development of a separation between the individual and 
society as part of the historical process of ‘civilizing’, as people gradually exercised more self-
control and needed less external restraints. Mead (1934), in establishing that self and society 
arise in the same processes of interaction, also rejects the Cartesian distinction between 
individual and society.  
In human complexity terms, there are no levels of analysis, but different scale and contexts of 
self-similar behaviours. In complexity, local and global are not special terms. Rather, local 
means ‘that each of us, however important in the world, can still only interact physically with 
a relatively few people - hence “local” interaction; we can only hold and sustain a limited range 
of relationships’ (Noble, 2012). All local interactions are self-similar, because in our 
interdependence with others, similar possibilities and limitations exist, thus generating similar 
patterning of interaction. Of course, differences in power chances impact the significance of 
communicative interacting, affecting how and the number of people paying attention and 
responding, as well as the outcome. But from our experience of relating we can have a general 
understanding of what goes on for people in their local situation. Global patterns, or ‘social 
objects’ (Mead, 1934), emerge in local interactions. ‘Local’ and ‘global’ refer to the scale of 
interaction. I will discuss the interdependence between local and global in detail in the next 
sections.    
Stacey and Mowles (2016) draw attention to the parallels between Elias’s and Mead’s ideas of 
the emergence of social order and complexity scientists’ ideas of self-organisation, 
interdependence  and emergence. I am drawing attention to the emergent and interdependent 
nature of various branches of sciences.  
Social control and self-restraint 
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Engaging with the emerging ideas of evolution theory and relativity (Shalin, 2008), Mead saw 
humans as having evolved with a particular ability of stimulating  in themselves a response that 
is similar to the response that is stimulated in those with whom they are communicating. This 
ability of taking on both verbal and non-verbal communication by one person are gestures that 
call out responses in another. It is important to emphasise that this ‘conversation of gestures’ is 
ongoing, and no single gesture is to be understood as the ‘original’ one, as each gesture is also 
a response to previous gestures. The individual joins the web of ongoing conversations as soon 
as she is aware of her environment and her environment becomes aware of her. From a very 
early age, well before we learn to speak, we are able to communicate with our carers, anticipate 
their responses to our gestures, and respond to their gestures.  
Mead (1934) argues that conversations of gestures are not deterministic. Although we are able 
to anticipate the response of others, there is always the possibility of an unexpected response, 
of shared understanding and misunderstanding at the same time.  Even a simple gesture can 
elicit multiple responses. A raised hand can be a gesture of friendship or an act of aggression. 
As individuals interact with each other, taking the attitude of the other, they assess the possible 
responses and consequences a gesture may evoke. The more interactions we experience, the 
wider the range of responses we are able to conceive of, and we are able to take the attitude of 
many others. This ability to take the attitude of others is called ‘the generalized other’ (Mead, 
1934: 154). The generalised other is our belief about how we are being perceived by ‘others’. 
We do not have any specific ‘other’ in mind, but an abstract idea about the world-view of our 
social environments. The generalised other is our tendency to act in a way we expect is 
anticipated by others in our community. 
The illustration used was of a person playing baseball. Each one of his own acts is 
determined by his assumption of the others who are playing the game. What he does 
is controlled by his being everyone else on that team, at least in so far as those attitudes 
affect his own particular response. We then get ‘other’ which is an organization of the 
attitudes involved in the same process. 
The organized community or the social group which gives to the individual his unity 
of self may be called ‘the generalized other’. The attitude of the generalized other is 
the attitude of the whole community’ (Mead, 1934: 154)  
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‘The generalised other’ is not a monolith speaking to us in unison, providing a unified guide 
for action. As we encounter multiple ‘generalised others’, there arise pressures and conflicts of 
often contradictory ‘generalised others’. In my earlier narrative several generalised others are 
evident. I was responding to the perceived attitudes of my colleagues, my managers, my family. 
Although it is obvious that attitudes of individual people within those groups vary, it is what 
we perceive as the attitude of the group in general which becomes a ‘generalised other’. I could 
not know what each of my colleagues thought about the practice of price-fixing in the company, 
or how each of them would react to whistle-blowing on this practice, but it was my perception 
that they – a generalised ‘they’- would frown upon my jeopardizing their workplace by speaking 
up. Our expectation of the generalised other’s responses guides our actions, enabling and 
restricting them. Yet, the generalised other is our own perception, so the social controls are 
simultaneously self-controls. I was never instructed to be quiet about the unethical behaviour, 
which I discussed in the narrative. I refrained from reporting those actions, because I was 
expecting retaliation from my manager had I done so. Retaining that job was important, and I 
did what I thought was expected of me to keep it. In order to act, we prioritise ‘the generalised 
others’. When  I worked for that utility company, ‘the generalised others’, that for me 
represented the expectations of managers, were more prominent.   
This understanding of social and self-control is echoed in Elias’s interlinking of societal and 
self-restraint:  
The social standard to which the individual was first made to conform by external 
restraint is finally reproduced more or less smoothly within him, through a self-
restraint. (Elias, 1939 [2000] : 109) 
This argument follows from the idea that we are always interdependent with others: 
It is as if first thousands, then millions, then more and more millions walked through 
this world their hands and feet chained together by invisible ties. No one is in charge. 
No one stands outside. … No one can regulate the movements of the whole unless a 
great part of them are able to understand, to see, as it were, from outside, the whole 
patterns they form together. … They can only look at whatever happens to them from 
their narrow location within the system. They are too deeply involved to look at 
themselves from without. Thus what is formed of nothing but human beings acts upon 
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each of them, and is experienced by many as an alien external force not unlike the 
forces of nature. (Elias, 1956: 322) 
So, while no one is in control, we experience control which arises in this interdependence. For 
many millennia we have depended on others for our existence. We are not self-sufficient, but 
specialise in specific areas and procure everything else we need from others. The increase in 
the division of labour results in growing interdependence, and the more interdependent we are, 
the more we are enabled and also restrained by others.  
According to Elias, the processes of self-control are long term and are not always results of 
‘conscious self-regulation’ (Mennell, 1992: 96). Born into a specific social environment, we 
are compelled to behave in certain ways in order not to risk being rejected by that environment. 
At times, we are aware of these compulsions; often, we follow the norms without being aware 
of them. The societal restraint becomes ‘second nature’, and is perceived by us ‘as highly 
personal, something “inward”, implanted in [us] by nature’ (Elias, 1939 [2000] : 127-8).  
The web of actions grows so complex and extensive, the effort required to behave 
‘correctly’ within it becomes so great, that beside the individual’s conscious self-control 
an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is firmly established. This 
seeks to prevent offences to socially accepted behaviour by a wall of deep-rooted fears, 
but, just because it operates blindly and by habit, it frequently indirectly produces such 
collisions with social reality (Elias, 1939 [2000] : 367-8). 
Our perception of what is ‘correct’, what might be acceptable in our society, is what guides us 
in our behaviour. By complying with what we think is ‘correct’ we maintain the norms, by 
acting against what is ‘correct’, we undermine those norms. To emphasize each person, in local 
interactions, plays a role in the evolving norms of society. Social controls can only act as self-
restrictions as long as we contribute to them. This understanding of social and self-control is 
echoed in Elias’s interlinking of societal and self-restraint. As we are socialised into our 
environment, initially we are required to conform to the norms (external restrains), that are 
eventually reproduced in our thinking and behaviour as self-restraint (Elias, 1939 [2000] : 109). 
 This process of the societal becoming the individual, is what Elias referred to as habitus:  
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By ‘habitus’ – a word which he used long before its popularization by Pierre Bourdieu 
– Elias basically means ‘second nature’ or ‘embodied social learning’. (Dunning and 
Mennell in Preface to Elias, 1996: ix)  
The perceived attitude of others is general and abstract, and it must be particularized in every 
interaction. We are taking not just an attitude of the generalised other, but the attitudes of many 
generalised others. Moreover, as we belong to various social groups, at times those attitudes are 
incompatible and conflicting. Although I thought of the collusion described in the narrative as 
wrong and unethical (as it is perceived in modern Western society), I perceived that it was an 
acceptable practice in that organisation. Not exposing it was violating my values of fair 
competition, but exposing it would violate my values of supporting my family. Later in this 
dissertation I will expand on our negotiating these sometimes conflicting generalised others.  In 
this chapter I continue to focus on the interrelatedness of social and self control.  
Power relations 
Interrelated with societal controls and self-regulation is the concept of power. Most 
organization theorists tend to take their point of departure from the definition of power offered 
by American political scientist Robert Dahl (Ailon, 2006), who offered ‘A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not do otherwise’ (Dahl, 1957: 202-
3). On this understanding power is a zero-sum game, in which A’s ‘power credit’ is equal to B’s 
‘power deficit’ (Pels, 1998: 28). This understanding of power suggests that power is a ‘thing’ 
that can be had. Sociologists have conceptualised power as a relational phenomenon, rather 
than a possession (e.g. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950, Easton, 1953).  
Unfortunately, power lacks a common verb form, which in part accounts for frequent 
tendency to see it as a mysterious property or agency resident in the person or group 
to whom it is attributed. (Wrong, 1979: 6)  
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Elias offers an alternative, social understanding of power 
We say that a person possesses a great power, as if power were a thing that he carried 
about in his pocket. This use of the word is a relic of magico-mythical ideas. Power is 
not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another, it is a structural 
characteristic of human relationships – of all human relationships. (Elias, 1978: 80 
emphasis in original) 
Power arises in the processes of human interaction. Reifying power, ‘one is inclined to personify 
or reify interdependence’ (Elias, 1978: 94). Interdependence means that we are dependent on 
others, and others are dependent on us at the same time. But ‘[p]eople who are interdependent 
are not necessarily equally interdependent’ (Mennell, 1992: 95 emphasis in original). If A is 
less dependent on B than B on A, then A has more power chances than B. The idea of ‘power 
chances’ emphasises the dynamic nature of power relations. Power is not ‘an isolated object in 
a state of rest’ (Elias, 1978: 115), so rather than talking about ‘having power’, it is more 
appropriate to speak about changes in power dynamics. No one is totally independent from 
others. Being intertwined in our relationships means that one can have more power chances, 
yet no one has absolute power.  
This has implications for thinking about our participation in organisations. One is never 
completely powerless. In the situation described in my narrative, I was not powerless. In the 
relationships between my managers and myself, they had more power chances than I did. I was 
dependent on them for my job, but they were also dependent on others and myself to sustain 
collusion by avoiding reporting or by actively engaging in it. 
Often the differences in power chances are not great. In a situation when many people are 
interdependent, and most have similar power chances (as is the case of colleagues in a 
workplace, for example), an individual might be inclined to act as if under compulsion (Elias, 
1978). In such cases, we tend to think of ‘society’ or ‘organisation’ as having power. But what 
we experience are constraints that emerge in our relationships with others. I felt my future 
professional prospects were dependent on my turning a blind eye to what I had learned. I was 
taking my cues from my colleagues, who never spoke up against it, and from my managers, 
who were keeping it a secret. I felt totally powerless to go against the ‘company’. 
Elias argues that individuals always act in relation to others. As we pursue our plans, we are 
intertwined with others’ pursuing theirs, and in doing so we respond to each other. No one 
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individual can determine what is happening in an organisation. ‘It is the order of interweaving 
human impulses and striving, the social order, which determines the course of historical 
change’ (1956: 365 emphasis in original). Organisations are not objects that exist independently 
outside human interactions.  Organisations are better understood as global patterns of 
interactions that arise in myriad local interactions of purposeful, feeling, cooperating and 
competing individuals (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). Those patterns evolve and continuously 
emerge over time, are always imbued with power relations, and are sustained through the means 
of social control and self-restraints.  
Interlinked with the idea of power as an essential characteristic of any human relationship is 
Elias’s idea of a game. In his discussion of game models, Elias (1978) describes various 
scenarios of human interactions using the metaphor of the game. He does not use the word 
‘game’ pejoratively, as in ‘children’s game’. He uses the term to describe how the individuals 
participate in interactions and experience those interactions as if guided by an external force 
‘the game itself has power over the behaviour and thought of the individual players’ (ibid: 96). 
The ‘game’ for Elias is a way to express the interdependence and interrelatedness of people, 
and the ‘relational characteristic of power’ (ibid: 75).  Power ratios arise in this 
interdependence. By referring to the ‘game’, Elias focuses our thinking on power relations that 
are shifting in relation to other players, and to the game we are playing. In a game of football, 
a team from the Premier League has more power chances when they are playing a team from 
League Two, and the outcome of the game may be predicted. However, facing another Premier 
League team the power chances are more equal, and the outcomes are more unpredictable. 
Similarly, if a Premier League football team faced a lower division basketball team in a game 
of basketball, the power ratio may shift in favour of the basketball team. 
In referring to working in organisations as a game, I follow Elias in paying attention to the way 
the game is played, i.e. how we interact with each other. I also pay attention to the ways the 
rules, i.e. social and self-constraints, arise, and to the way the ‘relative strength of the players’ 
(ibid: 75) is continually changing.    
The idea of human action always taking place in relation to others is also explored by Mead 
(1925, 1934). In the next section I will focus on another important aspect of social complexity 
– a thoroughly social understanding of the individual. 
The social self 
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Earlier in this chapter I referred to the idea of ‘communication of gestures’ introduced by Mead. 
He described the communication of gestures as a ‘social act’ (Stacey, 2011). By ‘social act’ I 
understand an act between conscious individuals.  
We are conscious of our attitudes because they are responsible for the changes in the 
conduct of other individuals. A man’s reaction towards weather conditions has no 
influence upon the weather itself. (Mead, 1910: 403) 
Meaning, according to Mead, arises in the social act. This is radically different from the 
understanding of interaction as a linear process, in which meaning is independent of that process 
and ‘resides’ within an individual.   
Our consciousness, our ‘self’, also arises in the social act. For Mead (1934) ‘self’ is not a final 
state, but the ongoing social processes of ‘I-me’ conversations of gestures. These processes are 
not linear with rational causality. There is no ‘if I act in this way, then I will become that’.  
Using the complex adaptive systems terminology, the ‘self’, as an ‘output’ of previous 
interactions, becomes the ‘input’ in the following interactions. We are always acting in the 
‘living present’ (Stacey, 2001), in a complex web of interactions in which our past is being 
continuously reinterpreted and impacting our actions, which are at the same time influenced by 
our expectations of future possibilities. Although there is no rational causality to our actions, 
there is always fear – ‘unless I act like this… the outcome will be…’. I feared that in speaking 
out against collusion, I would be rejected by my colleagues and my employers. Based both on 
previous experiences (reading about whistle-blowers, being brought up in an atmosphere of 
distrust of government authorities, and in my late teens establishing the view of cooperation 
with authorities as tantamount to betrayal), and on future expectations (of establishing myself 
as a marketing professional, of promotion, of secured employment), I feared that exposing the 
alleged collusion would jeopardise my prospects in this and any potential workplace. Our ‘self’ 
is always impacted by both our perception of the past and our anticipation of the future at the 
same time. I could not attribute my reluctance to blow the whistle to any single event in the 
past, nor could I single out any event in my biography to explain my expectations of the future. 
No single interaction is the sole source of ‘self’, and every interaction in the living present is 
reinforcing and challenging, affirming and disrupting our ‘self’. The ‘self’ is always becoming, 
never becomes.  
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For Mead the processes of interaction with others are similar to the processes of individual 
thinking 
But only by taking the attitude of the generalized other towards himself … can he think 
at all; for only thus can thinking – or the internalized conversation of gestures which 
constitutes thinking – occur. (Mead, 1934: 154)  
Therefore, the emergence of self is a continuous conversation of gestures between ‘I’ and ‘me’. 
‘I’ and ‘me’ are processes of gestures and responses; the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ are inseparable, as 
only through ‘I-me’ interaction the social act of the emergence of self exists. Mead’s idea of 
self is inherently social, ‘for selves exist only in relation to other selves’  (Mead, 1925: 262). 
Therefore any social act is an act of ‘cooperation of more than one individual, and whose object 
is defined by the act...’ (ibid: 263). A social object is a type of social act.  
I mean by a social object one that answers to all the parts of the complex act, though 
these parts are found in the conduct of different individuals. (ibid: 263-4)    
Social objects, therefore, are not physical things, but communicative purposeful acts of many 
individuals addressing the same objective (each in their own way, locally), and can only be 
understood through social acts. Social objects are generalised tendencies to act in similar ways 
in similar situations (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). Human organisations – families, universities, 
hospitals, factories, the church, football clubs, and many others - are social objects. This 
resonates with Elias’s (Elias, 1978) understanding of organisations as emerging patterns of 
human interactions. On this understanding, organisations are both stable and changing acts of 
communicative interaction.   
Mead argued that society and self arise in the same communicative processes. Therefore, as 
argued earlier, social control and self-control arise simultaneously and are inseparable. Social 
control is linked to the social object – a general tendency to act in a specific situation - so social 
and self-control arise in the individual particularising the social object. In other words, self-
restraint depends on the individual’s need to conform, or to take the attitude of the generalised 
other. Our belonging to different social groups may lead to difficulty in particularising the 
conflicting attitudes of others. By making choices how to respond to the generalised others and 
enacting those choices our ‘self’ arises. As Mead puts it, the ‘self’ arises in those processes of 
‘me’ - the perceived attitude of the generalised other - being particularized by the ‘I’. This 
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understanding of social and self-control is echoed in Elias’ (1939 [2000]) interlinking of 
societal and self-restraint.  
I believe a major influence on my not reporting the collusion when I had become aware of it, 
was the social norms of that environment at that time. Whistleblowing was frowned upon not 
just by employers, but by society in general. This social attitude had been so deeply embedded 
in my attitude that I was barely aware of it. Not even considering reporting, was how this social 
norm was manifested in my behaviour. 
To summarise this section, social control and self-restraint are impacting individual action, and 
at the same time the individual acting into these constrains influences them. These controls 
cannot be eliminated; arising in human interaction, they are a feature of all interactions, but 
they are constantly changing. We are becoming who we are in the social acts, the interaction 
with other conscious selves. Social objects, a tendency to act in a similar way in similar 
situations, arise in social acts. But no two situations are the same and our interactions are always 
(if even in a minor way) different. No situation can be exactly replicated. Each interaction is 
evolving as a result of previous interactions of the participants that had evolved in even earlier 
interactions with many others. We can never know which interaction may become significant 
in the future to which participant. The significance of the outcomes only becomes clear as they 
emerge. Therefore, any present event, interaction or situation is heavily dependent on numerous 
previous interactions of many individuals. History never repeats itself.  
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The emergence of ethics 
One of the main limitations of thinking about organisations as complex adaptive systems, is 
that systems thinking leads to reification or personification of organisations. Addressing an 
organisation as a system, we endow it with human capabilities of thinking and feeling. In 
organisational literature this personification is taken for granted, and expressions like 
‘organisational aims’, ‘organisational behaviour’ or ‘organisational values’ are rarely 
questioned. The term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ itself is a manifestation of such 
personification. Today social responsibility is ascribed to organisations almost unopposed. 
Even critical management writers who challenge the motives for and the outcomes of social 
responsibility (e.g. Kuhn and Deetz, 2008, Shamir, 2008, Banerjee, 2008) rarely question the 
capability for responsibility ascribed to organisations. Yet this has not always been the case. 
Friedman (1962, 1970) was the most vocal challenger to organizations accepting ‘social 
responsibilities’. His opposition to corporate responsibility was based on the premise that only 
people can be responsible. His opponents mostly disregard his view of responsibility being 
vested in individuals, not in organisations, and address the economic arguments he voiced (e.g. 
Schwartz and Saiia, 2012, Ahlstrom, 2010). 
A debate regarding the nature of organisation developed in the 1980s on the fringe of the CSR 
discourse between philosophers, who discussed the moral agency of organisations (e.g. 
Goodpaster and Matthews Jr, 1982, French, 1977).  This debate was short-lived, and was 
concluded by overwhelming acceptance of an organisation as a morally capable entity 
(Velasquez, 2003), a personification of an organisation. As a result, we see social responsibility 
of organisations being understood as separate from individual social responsibility. This 
separation is inconsistent with an understanding of an organisation as coherent patterns of 
interaction (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). In practical terms, this may lead to what de Colle et al. 
(2014) refer to as erosion of individual responsibility. Imbuing organisation with moral 
personhood raises a question of individual responsibility. If an organisation is a morally capable 
entity, why does any individual have to worry about his or her responsibility in an organisational 
setting? This is not just a theoretical musing. As a CSR practitioner and an educator I grapple 
with it daily. In Chapter 4 I discuss how my thinking about individual responsibility in practice 
has evolved.   
An additional limitation of conceptualising organisations in systemic terms is in perceiving 
ethics as a separate system, independent of human interaction. From this perspective, it is 
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unproblematic to produce a system of organisational norms and values that members of an 
organisation should adopt. This thinking is based in the Kantian system of the categorical 
imperative, which conceives universal moral laws that are independent of any social context 
(Campbell and Christopher, 1996). Yet, by introducing ‘organisational ethics’, systems thinkers 
contradict Kant’s caveat that autonomous individuals’ minds are not ‘governed by the laws of 
nature’ (Stacey, 2010: 33). Applying the notion of organisations as wholes to human interaction, 
we are required to conceptualise individuals as being parts of that whole and to adopt that 
whole’s values. On this thinking individuals are, contrary to Kant’s argument, not autonomous, 
but must submit to the ethics of the whole. 
Griffin (2002) proposes an alternative way of thinking about ethics that reflects a profoundly 
social understanding of human experience. In our working together we are not interacting with 
and within some imaginary whole, but are interacting with each other. Interacting directly with 
each other, we are impacted by others and impacting them at the same time. In those interactions 
we are continually negotiating together the meaning of good, the ethics of our actions. Every 
decision, every action (not doing anything is an act in itself) has an impact on others. Therefore, 
every action has ethical implications. Whether in public conversations with others or private 
(silent) conversations with ourselves, we are always making choices and negotiating possible 
actions. The ethics of those negotiated choices is not some sort of prescribed set of ideas, that 
is independent of our interaction. The ethics of our actions arise in our highly contextualised 
interactions with others, which always involve individual desires and societal constraints.  
In my opening narrative I discuss the wrongness of the practices with which I found myself 
associated. Pausing to think about those practices, I also recognise them as being understood as 
acceptable by those involved. Otherwise they could not have been sustained. In the way I 
justified my actions (or rather inactions) to myself, I presume others justified theirs. A 
commonly accepted pattern of behaviour evolved. We may dismiss this behaviour as ‘honour 
among thieves’. But it must have been considered acceptable, or justified (and therefore, 
ethical) in their group, although insisting on secrecy suggests their awareness of wider society 
rejecting it.  
Ethics, as consideration of what is good, is fluid, contextual and temporal. This is not to be 
misconstrued as justification of any behaviour, but to draw attention to ethics not being just a 
prescribed set of rules. I am also not trying to defend the practice of collusion described in my 
narrative, or to suggest it was ethical. Rather, I am drawing attention to how everyone involved 
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- some in minor ways and others significantly - contributed to promulgating this behaviour. 
What is important to recognise is that people usually do not engage in acts that they consider 
wrong without some consideration. Behaving otherwise would be consistent with psychopathy 
or sociopathy – an antisocial personality disorder (NLB, 2010).  At times, we engage in 
behaviours that we consider wrong, which we need to justify to ourselves and our social group. 
Often, only in interaction with others do we become aware of the moral implications of our 
behaviour.    
This understanding of ethics follows Mead’s (1938) understanding of social act and meaning, 
detailed above. We cannot know the meaning of our action before we act. The ethical 
implications of action arise in the conversation of gestures. Ethics and morality, on this 
understanding, are not static, but evolving and ‘constantly reconstructing and recreating the 
world as individuals evolve’ (Stacey and Mowles, 2016: 386). 
To reiterate, the aspects of social interaction, although described in three separate sections, are 
interrelated and cannot be examined separately.  
As social structures, organizations may be understood as the patterning of complex 
responsive processes of relating. These processes, as with every social interaction, 
have three fundamentally and inextricably interlinked aspects, the first being 
communicative interaction, the second power relating, and the third the evaluative 
choices people make.’ (Stacey, 2005: 93-94)     
In the previous sections I explained how insights from social sciences contribute to a more 
realistic account of life in organisations. Analogies from complexity sciences help 
understanding social interaction as emergent, unpredictable, arising in the interaction of 
numerous people, where even a minor event can potentially be amplified to result in major 
consequences. Stacey and colleagues (Stacey, 2003, Stacey, 2001, Stacey and Mowles, 2016, 
Griffin and Stacey, 2005) also point out that social organisations cannot be seen as complex 
adaptive systems. Human communication, unlike the interaction of agents in computer 
simulations, is always an interaction of human bodies, which inevitably involves feelings and 
thoughts, and is always contextualised. No-one stands ‘outside’ of interaction to manage it. 
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Summary 
Returning to one of the early narratives about my practising of CSR, I examine how analogies 
from complexity sciences help make sense of my practice. Turning to complex responsive 
processes of relating that draw on complexity, as well as on philosophy, sociology, and other 
social sciences, I begin to understand my interaction with others differently. This changing 
understanding, this taking my experience seriously, has been liberating. Distinct features of 
human interaction no longer need to be excluded, or explained away. This understanding opens 
the possibility of thinking about my practice without being stuck in the dualisms of individual 
and society, objective and subjective, stability and change and many others. I also do not have 
to keep agonising and taking sole responsibility for failed initiatives, and at the same time I am 
not absolved from acting (or choosing not to act) into set behaviours. I am no longer a ‘victim 
of the system’; I am not to blame myself for failures of some actions, nor am I a lone hero when 
other actions are successful.  
In the following chapters I will examine how my practice of and thinking about CSR have 
developed, and focus on how working together we continuously reinterpret the meaning of 
corporate social responsibility. Before I turn to my practice of CSR, I will discuss how different 
understanding of working in organisations impacts my research.   
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Chapter 3 - Implications of taking my experiences seriously for researching CSR 
Yesterday I did not do anything ‘researchy’, so I’ll go back to my thoughts about my work   (JF 
diary entry from August 2011) 
Introduction 
The purpose of a methodology chapter is to explain and justify the way one conducts a research 
project. To remain true to research informed by complexity, it is important to trace my evolving 
understanding of research, rather than just introduce the reader to my current thinking. 
In the previous chapter I introduced the concept of reflection – awareness of ourselves in 
relation to others. Closely related to this is the idea of reflexivity -  our awareness that ‘any 
explanation [we] produce are the products of  who [we] are, as determined by [our] histories’ 
(Stacey and Mowles, 2016: 33). People are always members of communities, so our histories 
are never individual and independent of others. Our thinking is never independent but is always 
embedded in the histories and traditions of thought of our communities. In this chapter I explore 
the development of my thinking about researching in relation to different traditions of thought.   
Evolution of my thinking about research 
The complexity of human interaction means that there is no direct cause and effect relationship 
between two events, but each event emerges in many interactions. It also means that no single 
event can be understood as the root for present thinking. There is no clear beginning of my 
current understanding of researching. As a starting point for the purpose of this dissertation I 
am introducing the incident when I became aware of thinking about researching and research 
methods.   
The first time I was required to conduct significant academic research was for my MBA 
dissertation. As mentioned earlier, while studying for the MBA, I was first introduced to ideas 
on complexity in general, and to complex responsive processes specifically.  This perspective 
was refreshing; my experience finally made sense. That experience involved confusion, 
unintended consequences of any detailed plans and often no apparent link between cause and 
effect, and I did not have to fit it into the earlier learned models. However, at that time, it 
remained just that for me, another perspective introduced on the MBA. Complexity was 
interesting, but I did not understand how it could be ‘applied’ to my research. So when I 
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approached my dissertation, it was not surprisingly conducted by researching a remote (literally 
and metaphorically) entity, conducting surveys and interviews, while I remained a detached 
outside observer, unaware and not paying attention to the way I was involved in what I was 
doing. Complex responsive processes of relating remained another ‘research method’ that I 
chose not to ‘use’.  
That project resembled other research that I had conducted or commissioned previously at work. 
As a marketing director for a TV station, I was very comfortable with the results of the 
quantitative statistical analysis conducted by the operators of the ‘people-meter’.  As I write 
those words, and see them black on white, I recognise their absurdity. Yes, they were claiming 
they were measuring people (number of people watching a specific television channel at a 
specific time) accurately. And they might have. But I, based on the figures delivered to my desk 
each morning, was making far-reaching assumptions about the reasons, and mental and 
emotional states that underpinned those figures, and based on those assumptions I was making 
decisions regarding our marketing strategy. I hardly recognised the fact that for those viewers, 
the act of being ‘measured’ (there was a box attached to their TV set), i.e. my research, was 
affecting their behaviour. I also never considered that my world view and emotions affected my 
interpretations.  
Not considering my involvement, the research and I, the research commissioner, always 
remained separate, and removed from the research subjects. Working on my MBA dissertation, 
therefore, was naturally continuing my detached researcher stance. Cassell et al. (2009) 
recognise that qualitative research is difficult for MBA students, as well as managers, who are 
used to ‘producing formulaic accounts in their workplace based on the use of figures’ (ibid: 
522), and that new researchers are overly reliant on prescribed procedures for research. 
Complex responsive processes did not offer any standardised techniques, and I could not find 
a way to engage with this perspective in my research. 
A few years later I applied for PhD studies. During the in-between years, while working in HBS 
alongside colleagues whose work has been informed by critical and complexity perspectives, 
discussing these approaches, attending seminars and masterclasses and continuing reading on 
this perspective, I became more familiar with complexity theories. I no longer saw complex 
responsive processes as a ‘research method’, but understood it as an alternative for 
understanding human interaction. Before enrolling on a PhD programme, I was invited to join 
a group of PhD students and their supervisors who were approaching their research from a 
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perspective of complex responsive processes. I felt peripheral at those meetings. Other students 
were writing and sharing their work, which made me feel like an intruder. I was not convinced 
I could or should expose myself in my research. I was uncomfortable with writing reflective 
narratives; I did not feel that reflecting on my experiences was as legitimate a research method 
as conducting interviews, nor was I convinced that my practice was interesting or important 
enough to be researched. So for my PhD I was going to ‘utilise’ complex responsive processes 
in researching the UK construction industry. I was going to do it by ‘presenting my 
interpretations of interviews with industry practitioners’. Several years later, this approach 
seems naïve. But today I also understand that this was a stage in developing my understanding 
of research. 
When I was applying for PhD studies, I was interested in researching the topic of Corporate 
Social Responsibility. The initial context for my research was supposed to be the UK 
construction industry. So initially I was still hoping to take a somewhat detached, observer 
stance, albeit recognising my involvement. I kept attending the PhD group meetings, becoming 
more involved in the group, feeling less of an outsider. I still believed, though, that researching 
an industry of which I was not part was compatible with a reflexive approach. Although my 
supervisors kept bringing to my attention the inconsistency between reflexive methodology and 
researching the practice of others, I insisted on continuing with my approach. This insistence 
highlights the inadequate understanding I had of complex responsive processes and of 
reflexivity as a method of researching those processes. In Chapter 2 I drew attention to all 
human interactions being complex responsive processes. On this understanding engaging with 
organisations we are impacted by them and impact them at the same time. There is no position 
of outside observer; a manager is not a programmer of a simulation, but a participant in 
interactions. All interventions we make, we make from the inside and cannot step outside. 
Researching too is complex responsive processes; and there is no position of an outsider 
researcher. Yet, in the beginning of my PhD research, this is what I intended to do – take a 
position of an outsider researcher, while intending to reflect on my involvement with CSR if 
and when I chose.   
In the second year of my studies I was appointed as Director of the Social Enterprise Unit. 
Several months later, when asked by my supervisor whether my appointment was impacting 
the way I was researching, my immediate reaction was ‘yes’. I was surprised by the question. 
Later I understood that this question was raised because my writing at the time did not reflect 
this. 
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In the first progression examination, a question of this compatibility was raised by the examiner. 
Only then did I stop to think about this seriously. Now I recognise that the group discussions, 
the conversations with my supervisors, my readings, the discussions about my PhD with 
practitioners in the construction industry – all led to my (what at the time seemed sudden) 
understanding that my initial approach was not sustainable. I could research the construction 
industry, or I could engage in reflecting on my own practice – but I could not meaningfully 
combine the two. 
As I am writing this chapter, I recognise that the way I describe the events of the past is very 
much influenced by my current understanding of research. I keep referring to a ‘reflexive’ 
method, but I do not recall thinking in that way at the time. I am also writing this with 
expectations of potential readers and the purpose of this writing – my hopes for the future. This 
brings the understanding of ‘living present’ (Stacey, 2001) into focus – there is no way for me 
to write neatly separating the past, the present and the future. They are intertwined in my writing 
and in ongoing understanding of my practice and research, which are also intertwined and 
inseparable.   
Accepting the logic of the progression stipulations, I still tried to hold on to the idea of 
researching the construction industry. Letting go of the idea I held for several years was too 
difficult. Researching the construction industry became part of how I perceived myself; 
abandoning this idea was to undermine my identity. I decided to apply to several construction 
companies with the hope of gaining a role in their CSR department. To my surprise, although I 
offered my services for free, which I expected would encourage positive responses, there were 
no takers for my offer. Even more surprising at the time was that I was offered access as a 
researcher, but not as an unpaid practitioner. In trying to make sense of this situation, I thought 
that this was an example of how reluctant companies are to exposing their CSR activities. I was 
aware that access as a researcher would be limited and I would be allowed to observe and 
discuss only the aspects that the company was willing to expose. Today I can suggest another 
reason for this reluctance (in addition to the simplest and most obvious one, that they were just 
not interested) – they could not understand what it was that I was trying to do. This way of 
researching was not familiar and might have made the recipients of my letter suspicious of my 
‘true’ intentions. 
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Understanding my initial assumptions about researching  
The tension between my interest in reflexive practice and my perceived need to remain an 
objective researcher, which I experienced in the early stages of researching, was paralyzing. I 
lacked the confidence to reflect on my experience, but I could no longer ignore the new insights 
gained from engaging with complexity. Denzin and Lincoln (2013) suggest that qualitative 
researchers face a disconnect between a belief in objective observation of social reality, and the 
acknowledgement of a researcher who is ‘present’ in the world. They suggest that resolving 
this tension could potentially lead to a method, in which a researcher should be able to ‘blend 
own observations with the self-reports provided by subjects’ (ibid: 24 emphasis added). This 
recommendation suggests reverting to Kantian dualism, as described in the previous chapter. 
Researchers can reflect on their own observations and analyse the reports of others. To me this 
approach resonates with the approach I was trying to take when thinking about researching CSR 
in the construction industry - blending the reflection on my experience with analysing the 
experience of others. Now I recognise two major inconsistencies. 
Firstly, the inconsistency between the assumptions underlying the two research positions. While 
paying attention to and making sense of my experience from an interpretivist position, 
‘characterised by taking human interpretation as a starting point for any analysis, with a concern 
for how we construct social reality’ (Cassell et al., 2009: 516)), I was hanging on to positivist 
beliefs in researching as an observer (or a participant observer) of the CSR practice of others.  
Secondly, the belief that the ‘reflection on others’ is inconsistent with what I now understand 
as reflective practice. Reflection has been discussed from various theoretical perspectives 
(Brannick and Coghlan, 2006, Hatton and Smith, 1995, Cassell et al., 2009, Haynes, 2012). 
Yet, most researchers agree that it involves bending on oneself (for example see Oren, 2014), 
which to me means recognising one’s own beliefs, motives, assumptions, and actions. To 
attempt to reflect on the experience of others is to attempt to stand outside of that experience. 
Yet, the moment we enter, through research, into a relationship with others, the experience is 
ours, and ‘we can never claim to stand outside of our own experience, outside the web of 
relationship that we are a part of’ (Stacey and Mowles, 2016: 35-36). And ‘reflecting on others’ 
is trying to do exactly that – experiencing researching while standing outside of that experience. 
This understanding has developed over time, with my continuous engagement with others and 
with practice, with critical perspectives, and with complexity sciences and their social 
  44 
 
analogies. In the early stages it was difficult to abandon the need for what I perceived as more 
accepted research methods. My reservations about reflecting on my own practice can be 
understood in light of the contemporary research literature. Despite the proclaimed importance 
of reflection in management research (Vanharanta et al., 2014, Elbanna, 2015, Schneider, 
2015), reflective research is still in the minority. A growing body of research (Van der Stede, 
2011, Ford et al., 2010), especially in the critical management studies tradition, is seen to be 
adopting reflective research. Yet their approach adopts the definition of Alvesson and 
Scöldberg  (2009), who suggest that reflective methodology  
has two basic characteristics: careful interpretation and reflection. The first implies 
that all references … to empirical data are the results of interpretation … The second 
element, reflection, turns attention ‘inwards’, towards the person of the researcher, the 
relevant research community, society as a whole, intellectual and cultural 
traditions…Reflection can, in the context of empirical research, be defined as the 
interpretation of interpretation (ibid: 9, emphasis in original).  
As a result, we see more papers acknowledging researchers’ predispositions and assumptions, 
problematising the taken-for-granted beliefs and traditions. However, the assumption that 
reflective research can be conducted ‘while maintaining the belief that the study of suitable … 
excerpts from this reality’ (ibid), suggests that it is possible for the researchers to objectively 
choose, after careful consideration, the ‘reality’ that is ‘out there’, which is ‘suitable’ for 
reflecting on. As a result, the majority of critical management research is still conducted based 
on the experiences of others (e.g. Alvesson and Spicer, 2016, Chaudhri, 2016, Zutshi et al., 
2016). While being reflective about their own involvement in their research (i.e. not attempting 
to step outside of their research), those scholars separate themselves from their research 
subjects. This understanding of reflection (and reflexivity)5 is rooted in the views of Pierre 
Bourdieu, who suggested that ‘the primary target of [reflexive analysis] is not the individual 
analysis but the social and intellectual unconscious embedded in analytical tools and 
categories’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 36, emphasis in original). Thus, research and 
methods of analysis must by subjected to systematic critique and critical historical exploration 
(Swartz, 1997). The experience of the researcher is not, therefore, the subject of reflection. 
                                                          
5 Following Alvesson (Alvesson and Ashcraft, 2009; Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009) in this section I will use 
the two terms interchangeably 
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The type of research I was drawn to, examining my own practice, was (and still is) rare in 
organisational literature (e.g. Menzies, 1960, Haynes, 2006b, Adler, 2008, Cunliffe, 2009, 
Yassour-Borochowitz, 2012, Norman et al., 2015). Although this method was taken up on the 
DMan programme at the UH, and other scholars have begun engaging with it (e.g. Zhu, 2007, 
Stanley, 2009, De Zilwa, 2010, Eyben, 2010, Marais, 2014), I believed that it would not be 
accepted by the wider academic community, and by the CSR research community in particular. 
At the time I believed all research had to have ‘analysable’ data. Being interested in CSR, I’d 
read extensively both theoretical and empirical articles on CSR. I had not come across any paper 
that analysed a researcher’s own practice of CSR. Aguinis and Glavas (2012) analysed ‘588 
journal articles and 102 books and book chapters’ (p. 934) and found that only 4% of the articles 
focused on an individual level of analysis. But even this small minority discussed employees 
and managers as subjects of research, not the researchers’ own practice.   
Another aspect that concerned me was the significance of my work. I could understand how my 
work might have some impact on those in my immediate community, and I believed that the 
outcomes of my work could be justifiably considered CSR. Yet I was unconvinced that my 
daily practice would be of any interest to the wider academic or CSR community. In chapters 
4 and 5 I discuss in depth the evolving thinking about CSR, and how I found it difficult to 
consider my daily practice as CSR. I feared that focusing on the daily and the mundane would 
not yield ‘proper’ research. Reflecting on this concern, I wonder if this was one of the reasons 
I was unable to gain access to the daily work of CSR practitioners in construction companies – 
is it possible they too were not sure of the value of their daily work?  
As the latest attempt to reconcile researching my practice and the construction industry failed, 
I found myself in the same position I had been in several months prior – needing to decide on 
the focus of my dissertation: the construction industry or my own practice. A progression report 
stipulated that I was required to focus my research. Although it felt daunting to let go of the 
idea of researching the construction industry, the idea I’d been clinging to for several years, I 
decided to follow what felt more congruent with my developing understanding of complexity 
and explore my practice. 
Nonetheless, moving on from the first progression was not easy. Writing reflective narratives 
and showing them to others beyond the PhD group was a daunting prospect. One such attempt 
is reflected on in the next narrative. Written in 2010, it explores the experience of attempting to 
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engage with a traditional research method, and the insights gained by reflecting on that 
experience. My current reflections on what I wrote back in 2010 are inserted in italics 
Changing understanding of research: the Ukrainian Project  
Preamble 
After completing my first progression I decided that it was time to try and get a paper published 
in a peer-reviewed journal.  
I recognise now that the anxiety following the first progression was largely due to my choice of 
methodology. There was a tension between the need to adhere to what I perceived to be 
accepted research methods - interviews, observations, surveys - and being drawn to complexity. 
This tension caused me to question my previous beliefs about what was the legitimate approach 
to ‘legitimate’ research. Although I’d begun recognising that there is more than one way of 
researching, I had doubts about my ability to convince the academic community of the validity 
of reflective narratives. The desire to publish was my way to test the need to be recognised as 
belonging to the research community. Publications have become proxy for academic legitimacy 
(Parker, 2014, Martin, 2016), so I had hoped that publishing in an academic journal would 
establish my credibility. 
Having met Vladislav Kolinko, a Ukrainian CSR practitioner, at one of the CSR conferences a 
few months earlier, I saw an opportunity for very interesting research. At that stage I had no 
clear idea about the exact topic, all I knew was that I was interested in looking into CSR in 
Ukraine. I also felt it might be of interest to journals. I lacked confidence to proceed on my 
own, and was looking for an established researcher to advise me. Greg Hill was suggested as a 
possible mentor; he agreed this was an interesting topic and said he would like to work with me 
when I obtained sufficient funding. When a call for applications for seedcorn funding was 
advertised shortly afterward, I decided to seize the chance to carry out that research. The 
research is now completed and I have already presented a paper at an international conference.  
Writing up the paper and presenting at a conference was seen as the ‘completion’ of that 
research. Yet, I kept thinking about it, and reflection on it is part of this dissertation, which 
supports the view that there is no definitive point of ending a research project. 
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Writing that paper I was mindful of its final destination, and, at Greg’s suggestion, was 
modelling it on what is being published in the journals I might target. The paper was a 
straightforward description of research, but lacks the details that might be rejected by traditional 
academic journals. It lacked soul; I was missing from it.  
This paper picks up where that paper left off. I will tell my story of taking part in that research. 
My discussions with Greg following our visits to Ukraine and in the process of writing the 
paper, revealed that our perceptions of interviews, the seminar we attended, the conference 
where I presented and our general impressions of Ukraine were so dissimilar, that at times I 
wondered whether he and I were present at the same events. We definitely experienced those 
events differently. This should not be a surprise, as Greg and I approached this research with 
different motivations, different understanding of CSR and of research in general, and with 
different emotional engagement with Ukraine. Being brought up in Soviet era Ukraine, my 
practice of CSR in the Business School, and my disillusion with CSR orthodoxy, played a great 
part in my perception of this project, and coloured my experience in hues that could not be 
perceptible to Greg. Yet, the paper, which we agreed would be co-authored, had to present a 
unified, objective and authoritative stance. As I was writing that paper, I felt that it was a 
compromise; it caused me discomfort and I started noticing physical signs of unrest. At that 
time I decided to write a ‘shadow paper’ which was effectively a diary of writing that 
conference paper. In that shadow paper I was paying attention to themes that were arising in 
the diary I was keeping throughout what I came to call ‘the Ukrainian project’, themes that were 
left unexplored in my conference paper. In this narrative I will explore those themes and locate 
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The shadow paper 
From the very beginning, when Vladislav and I first discussed the possibility of researching 
CSR in Ukraine, I was apprehensive, worrying that such a project might distract me from 
working on my PhD. I now understand this concern as being closely linked to my understanding 
of my PhD work. It was as if researching CSR for me was only limited to working on my PhD, 
which in itself is only a research apprenticeship. This concern highlighted my lack of 
confidence as a researcher. It also highlighted my delegitimising of approaches to CSR research 
that were different from my PhD research. This paper aims to demonstrate my changing 
understanding of my engagement with various aspects of CSR. 
The Ukrainian project demonstrated to me that there are many ways of practising and 
researching CSR, rather than a single ‘correct’ way, that can be known prior to the engagement 
with the project. I took that project on against the advice of my supervisors, but it felt right at 
the time. That project provided a great opportunity to explore different ways of researching, 
and how it affects and is being affected by practising of CSR. But I recognise this post ante, 
having the benefit of knowing the outcomes of the project. There was no way of knowing whether 
it would have been beneficial before embarking on it.   
The funding awarded for conducting research in Ukraine was ‘to begin investigating CSR in 
Ukraine by looking into what drives CSR in that country’ (from application form). Initially 
there was no pre-set hypothesis; I had no clear ideas of how to progress with this research; I 
envisaged open-ended discussions, rather than interviews, as the data collection method; I had 
no specific respondents in mind; I was going to proceed in the spirit of my PhD research – 
paying attention to how I was to interact with the interviewees and the emerging themes. Greg 
seemed to have supported this approach (later I realised that this was not so much an agreement 
with my approach, but his laid-back approach in general). Vladislav was arranging the 
interviews and was more anxious – he wanted to know who we’d like to interview, the length 
of each interview and the interview questions.  
The parallel between Vladislav’s approach and the responses I got from the contacts in the 
construction industry – the need to know before the action – is evident to me today. Drawing 
on the similarities between the responses from the different potential research partners; and 
between my need to cling to the familiar research methods, I suggest that those responses 
signify the need for feeling in control and the anxiety arising with the lack of control.  
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I later got to know him as quite an anxious person, but he was also the one with the most to lose 
at that stage – he was using his contacts, and he was hoping that participating in this project 
would propel his CSR practice to the top stratum of CSR consultancies in Ukraine. What I’m 
drawing attention to is not simply the difference in personalities and agendas, but how these 
differences that had been instrumental in starting this research, later became an impediment to 
it. 
Vladislav was beginning to put boundaries around what we could investigate. He cautioned us 
not to bring up corruption in our interviews, warning that talking about it was a taboo in 
Ukraine. According to him, the interviewees wanted to know what we were going to ask. 
Reluctantly, we provided general guidelines, but no questions yet. Two days before our flight 
we had to cancel the trip for personal reasons. Vladislav was hesitant to cancel the scheduled 
meetings and, after brief discussion, Greg and I decided that he should go ahead with the 
interviews. This meant that our unstructured conversations were to become ‘semi-structured 
interviews’. Reluctantly I produced interview guides, being aware that the interviewees’ 
responses would be explored differently by a proxy researcher, compared with if they had been 
done by me.  
Vladislav conducted over 10 interviews. When the translated transcripts started arriving, I 
realised that my apprehensions about having the interviews conducted by someone else were 
justified. It was obvious that Vladislav had a specific agenda for the interviews. He asked a 
wide range of questions, as if intending to produce some generalisable responses. In contrast to 
his approach, I thought I would have probed deep into the interviewees’ general statements. It 
became clear we had to conduct some follow-up interviews. Vladislav scheduled one new and 
four follow-up interviews to be conducted in two days in Kiev in the following month. In 
preparation I read the transcripts with those interviewees so many times, I felt I knew them by 
heart. I knew exactly what areas I wanted to expand on with which interviewee. I was ready. 
[I was also extremely nervous. I’d never been back to Ukraine after leaving as a young girl 
some 30 years prior. I was ambivalent about Ukraine – my memories were a mix of happy 
childhood and an experience of belonging to a rejected and marginalised ethnic minority. When 
my family decided to emigrate, we were branded as ‘traitors of the people’ and were stripped 
of our citizenship. How would I be received by my former motherland? Was I motivated by the 
need to prove something to the state that discarded me so easily? I am not seeking answers to 
those questions. What I intend to do is to emphasise my mental state at the time. By allowing 
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myself to raise those questions, I am also led to ask another question: how important was my 
upbringing in the former Soviet Union to my interest in CSR?] 
Today I understand the above paragraph as pertinent to that paper. Recognising my own mental 
state is vital for reflection. At the time, though, I put it in brackets, unsure of the importance of 
those insights. 
Upon landing in Ukraine we were informed of changes in plans. Two of the four follow-up 
interviewees cancelled. Vladislav was expecting confirmation from two other contacts. 
Unexpectedly, and without consulting us, he also arranged a dinner with the UN Global 
Compact Network Coordinator for Ukraine. We were then told that the next day he had to go 
to a CSR seminar in Cherkassy (180-km from Kiev), and we were invited, but not required, to 
join him. Although we were unable to proceed according to the original schedule, we were still 
able to continue researching CSR in Ukraine, albeit not according to the original design, which 
to me was an achievement.  
The following two days were a flurry of travelling and meetings. Throughout the hectic activity 
I was becoming aware of my mixed feelings - I was shifting from sadness to satisfaction, 
bordering on Schadenfreude, to surprise, to annoyance and anger. What I experienced in 
practice was the inability to ‘keep an open mind’.  Although I had earlier claimed that I had no 
preconceived notions about my research, it was evident that I was too emotionally involved to 
claim open-mindedness. Although I tried not to fence my thinking about this project into 
specific research categories, I did not arrive in Kiev without preconceived ideas about Ukraine. 
There is no unbiased position. I had certain expectations from this visit. The two days were 
filled with the expositions of my initial position. I relaxed at the sight of decay because I was 
expecting to see dilapidation. And what surprised me were the sights and situations that proved 
me wrong. I was surprised at the excellent level of English of many of our Ukrainian 
interviewees. I was surprised at the signs of wealth and even luxury in the centre of Kiev. I was 
sad, but not shocked, to see outdoor toilets in the villages on the outskirts of Kiev, where the 
size of the cemetery was twice the size of the area populated by houses. There is no view from 
nowhere. I came to Kiev expecting to find a third-world, poor country, as an expert in CSR, 
almost like an anthropologist going to research a jungle tribe.  
These observations of life in Ukraine were shared by Greg and me, as we discussed them 
throughout the trip. I had an additional agenda. At the sight of peeling sanatorium-green paint 
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on the walls of the largest and most prestigious university in Ukraine, I could not ignore the 
pangs of gloating at the thought that the institution that would never have admitted me as a 
student because of my ‘pyataya grapha’6 now welcomed me as a respected researcher. The 
country that spewed me out without a second thought, now was to become thesubject of my 
research. The power relations have definitely shifted. But all these emotions that were 
influencing my research had to be ignored when I was writing the conference paper. 
I also felt compelled to ignore my impressions during the interviews. And I feel that those 
nuances were more telling about the interviewee and his/her approach to CSR and our 
researching CSR in Ukraine. It was obvious that one interviewee who agreed with Vladislav to 
a follow-up meeting on short notice did not realise that he was bringing UK researchers with 
him. When we entered her office, she was just finishing a phone call. She was wearing suit 
trousers and a turtle-neck sweater, she was laughing at what was said on the other end of the 
phone. She was still smiling when we were introduced. And then her demeanour changed. She 
became serious, almost unfriendly. She put on her suit jacket and buttoned it, and I felt at that 
moment as if a wall was erected between us. Her answers were short and laconic. She kept 
referring us to the company website. I felt she could not wait for the meeting to end. Since the 
meeting was unplanned, I had not read the transcript of the initial interview with her prior to it. 
When I was comparing the transcripts from the meeting with us with the transcript of the initial 
interview, I could find very little deviation, in specific phrasings and in content in general, 
which was almost identical to the company CSR report on their website. What it exemplified 
to me was the limitations of interviews. For whatever reason, this manager wore armour and 
our interviews could not penetrate it. In light of this, what was the value of that interview?  
I recognise now that the visit to Ukraine and writing the conference paper was a momentous 
occasion in finding a research method I would be comfortable with. This was the first time I 
openly questioned the value of interviews. To emphasise, I do not suggest that interviews are 
never useful, but instead want to draw attention to the change in my previous perception of 
interviews as indispensable for valid research.     
During that visit we were introduced to academics from two universities, and were invited to 
present the findings of our research at a local conference organised by one of them several 
                                                          
6 In the former Soviet Union ID (called ‘passport’), the fifth rubric (in Russian ‘pyataya grapha’) was 
‘nationality’ which meant ethnicity. The expression ‘pyataya grapha’ has become synonymous with 
discrimination against Jews and other ‘undesirable’ ethnic minorities.  
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months later. On the way back from Ukraine, Greg and I started discussing possible directions 
for developing the paper, an abstract for which had been accepted for an international 
conference. By that time I was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the abstract 
(Appendix 2). I felt the proposed framework (Garriga and Mele, 2004) would require forcing 
our findings into limited categories, rather than allowing us to follow whither the findings take 
us. But when I suggested to Greg that I would like to explore why we suggested the framework 
in the first place, he seemed to ignore my suggestion, and kept talking about which categories 
he thought our findings would fall into. He also seemed to interpret the interviews differently 
from my understanding. I stopped short of arguing with him, and instead I tried to focus on 
completing the conference paper. I was beginning to think that the very reasons that led me to 
ask him to mentor me with this project were the reasons that would make writing a joint paper 
increasingly difficult. Was his experience stopping him from taking risks?  
Was I more willing to let go of what seemed safe, while he was holding on to the more certain 
approach? Discarding our abstract, we risked rejection by the conference conveners, which 
posed more risk to him, the experienced researcher, than to me, the novice. 
I was anxious, the deadlines were tight, and I did not know how to overcome my frustration 
with the way I structured the abstract and at the same time how to write a conference paper that 
would be acceptable to my co-author. Sometimes I managed to ‘sneak’ a personal reflection 
into the conference paper; the fact that this slotted smoothly into the paper and was not rejected 
by Greg surprised me.  
I started writing the ‘shadow paper’ as a way to voice my reservations about the conference 
paper, as I could not stifle them any longer, and initially I had not intended to show it to anyone 
outside of the PhD group. In the conference paper I included details about my personal 
experience of growing up in Soviet Ukraine as a background for our research context. What I 
now find interesting is that I was surprised that a personal experience was unquestionably 
accepted as a legitimate part of the research paper. This demonstrates that at that stage I was 
still thinking in dualisms - ‘reflection vs. traditional research methods’, ‘conference vs. shadow 
paper’. 
It was easier to grind my teeth and keep working on finishing the conference paper.   
This experience reminds me of a recent conversation I had with an experienced researcher. He 
forwarded me the freshly accepted authored chapter for an edited book, with a caveat, that the 
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chapter does not really reflect his understanding of the subject. He openly acknowledged that 
by the time he had made several revisions, as suggested by the editors, he was no longer happy 
with the chapter. But he had already invested too much time and effort to back out from that 
project. Likewise, I had too much investment in the conference paper; I could not jeopardise it 
by deviating too much from the accepted abstract.  
I seemed to be able to produce a conference paper that followed a traditional structure, keeping 
the appearance of objectivity. At the same time, I had an outlet – the shadow paper - to express 
my feelings, my thoughts, my confusions.   
As the conference paper was progressing, my dissatisfaction with it diminished. I found several 
areas of discussion very interesting. But just when I started developing those areas, I stopped 
to think that this was my subjective observation which could not be included. I was still feeling 
frustrated with the need to stick to the transcript of the interviews, with my inability to write 
about nuances of our experiences of interviewing that I found more important than what was 
reflected in the transcripts. What frustrated me most was the awareness that restrictions were 
self-inflicted. I was censoring my writing, and although the shadow paper allowed some outlet 
to my frustrations, I could not avoid the feeling that at some stage I’d like to bring the shadow 
paper into full light.  
Researching this tactic later, I  found this approach being taken up by others, especially PhD 
candidates, who publish a reflective narrative of their experience of conducting research, after 
successfully defending their PhD (see Daigneault et al., 2014, Doloreirt and Sambrook, 2009, 
Lopez and Medina, 2015)  
But, at that stage, an emotion, which I had experienced faintly since the start of the project, 
intensified, and I felt that I needed to pay attention to it; I had a hunch that making sense of it 
would help me make sense of other aspects of my research. When I talked with the PhD group 
about the experience of writing these papers, I voiced my nagging feeling of cheating, of 
infidelity. I felt I was being unfaithful to my PhD supervisors by working on a project with 
Greg, and at the same time I felt disloyal to Greg for talking about the Ukrainian project with 
the PhD group. It was suggested that I might want to try and make sense of this sentiment by 
reflecting on my understanding of research and what I perceive as legitimate. This shed light 
on my thinking throughout the project and the writing. Several questions come to the fore: what 
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is my understanding of research in general? Where does this understanding originate? Where, 
in light of this understanding, do I see my research fitting?  
In the remainder of this chapter I will address those questions. 
My current understanding of research 
The previous section highlights my struggle to make sense of research, of its boundaries and of 
various approaches as I have been developing as a researcher.  At the start I adopted a very 
rigid, positivist view. This was affected by my previous schooling and experience at work. 
When my experience did not fit with that approach, I dismissed the experience as being ‘faulty’, 
as statistical error. I believed I could remain an objective researcher. Being introduced to 
complex responsive processes of relating led to a shift from perceiving myself as a passive 
observer to an involved researcher. I became aware of the paradoxical nature of the position I 
attempted to take. By aiming at being an objective researcher, I was seemingly in control of 
research, but I was not involved with it. By taking a detached position, I condemned myself to 
a passive acceptance of the findings. Understanding research as complex responsive processes, 
highlights to me that any decision on my part impacts me and at the same time is impacting 
others with whom I interact. Therefore, any decision has ethical implications. This shift was 
anxiety-provoking, as I was questioning my deep beliefs about researching.      
Definitions of research are abundant. Some are broad and inclusive, embracing any 
investigation that contributes to new insights (e.g. REF, 2011). Others are more detailed and 
include specific steps of a research process (Creswell, 2002). One’s understanding of the nature 
of being (ontology) and the nature of knowledge (epistemology) will determine one’s definition 
of research. Influenced by the ‘unity of opposites’ embraced by Heraclitus and Hegel (Kahn, 
1979, Williams, 1989, Beiser, 2005), the pragmatic philosophy of Mead and Dewey, the 
processual sociological theories of Elias and Bourdieu,  and complexity sciences, I understand 
being and knowing as interdependent and inseparable social processes. In these processes our 
being in the world is informing and being informed by our knowing. The way we understand 
social interaction is informing and being informed by the way we study it. According to this 
understanding, knowledge is not an objective product of investigating, rather knowing arises in 
these processes of continuous becoming. On this understanding objectivity in research is 
impossible. Therefore, researching CSR means researching a socially constructed, evolving and 
changing phenomenon, a social object, and the processes of researching impact and are being 
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impacted by that social object. Researching CSR involves making sense of CSR. In taking this 
approach, I draw on Holland (a professor of engineering, computer science, and psychology), 
who stated that ‘[t]he essence [of science] is comprehension and explanation’ (in Waldrop 
1992: 255). Following this, I understand my research as exploring experience in order to gain 
insights and expand understanding of the practice of CSR. 
I was initially drawn to complex responsive processes of relating because it offered insights 
through which I could make sense of my experience. The perspective emphasises participation 
and reflexive understanding (Stacey and Mowles, 2016). This means understanding from within 
the experience, taking experience as a starting point. Clough (2004 in Cassell et al., 2009) raises 
the question of the ways of researching when ‘the boundaries between subjects and objects are 
opaque and fuzzy’ (ibid: 515). Taken a step further, rejecting the subject-object dualism, one 
becomes the subject and the object of the research.   
Many writers have alluded to the need for more CSR research at the ‘individual level of 
analysis’ (e.g. Frynas and Yamahaki, 2016, Aguinis and Glavas, 2012, Den Hond et al., 2007, 
Wood, 2007). This usually means examining causal (mainly of the efficient ‘if… then…’ kind) 
relationships between managers or employees and some proxy for measuring CSR engagement 
(Alt et al., 2015, Boddy, 2015, Boesso et al., 2015, Madsen and Bingham, 2014, Santhosh and 
Baral, 2015, Shaukat et al., 2016). From a perspective informed by complexity sciences there 
are no different levels of analysis as global patterns emerge in local interactions, which become 
the focus of research. There can also be no search for efficient causality (direct link between 
cause and effect); because people always interact locally with other people, what arises is 
continuously iterated patterns of interaction that are potentially stable and changing at the same 
time (Stacey and Mowles, 2016).  
If we understand organisations and institutions as ongoing patterns of interactions, or 
generalised tendencies to act in similar ways by a large number of people (see Chapter 2), it is 
important to understand how those norms of conduct are interpreted by an individual, and how 
generalised patterns of behaviour are particularised locally. In the ‘shadow paper’ I draw 
attention to the ways I particularised the social act of research. I explore how my understanding 
of research was changing throughout the project and how in different interactions I had to 
reinterpret the meaning of research, at times in collaboration and at times in conflict with others. 
This understanding of institutions has specific implications for research. How one participates 
in local interactions and paying attention to one’s subjective experience becomes central.  
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Our (intra) actions matter – each one reconfigures the world in its becoming – and yet 
they never leave us; they are sediment in our becoming, they become us. And even in 
our becoming there is no ‘I’ separate from the intra-active becoming of the world. 
Causality is an entangled affair… (Barad, 2007: 394). 
This ‘entanglement’ means that there is no objective world that is out there, separate from our 
‘intra-actions’. This is consistent with the ideas of Dewey (1925 [1997]) and James (1909 
[1996]), who suggest we form objective understanding of the world by paying attention to our 
subjective experience in the world. Our objective experience is subjectively formed. In this 
dissertation, the method of exploring CSR is paying attention to my participation in the local 
interactions that I understand as CSR. 
Examining and reflecting on my own experience, which is always both social and individual at 
the same time, is paying attention to how I interact with others when we come to recognise our 
practice as CSR. My experience of CSR is always in relation to others, and at the same time it 
is embodied, involving thinking and feeling, as well as acting. Making sense of that embodied 
experience involves constructing narratives (Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012). Researching one’s 
experience means creating a narrative of thinking, feeling, acting and making sense. Therefore, 
the research method in this dissertation is writing and iterating reflexive narratives of my 
interacting with others while particularising CSR.  
The narratives that I’m writing are reflexive, and this particular feature distinguishes narratives 
as research from works of literature. The initial narratives are written as a diary, in which I 
record activities that may or may not become significant to my understanding of CSR. Each 
separate diary entry in itself is usually unremarkable. However, reflecting on those entries, I 
recognise certain patterns of interaction that are significant to my sense-making. Exploring 
those patterns further, I write narratives about particular experiences that spark my interest, 
unsettle me, which make me feel compelled to probe the experience further. Tracing the 
development of the heroic nature of CSR (Chapter 4), for example, was prompted by rereading 
several consecutive entries, which started by me dismissing my work as non-CSR, getting angry 
at that dismissal in the following entry, which led me to think about why such strong feelings 
arose in the first place.     
The narratives are abstracted from my experience, providing some simplification of that 
experience, what Stacey refers to as ‘first-order abstracting’ (2013, Stacey and Mowles, 2016). 
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This brings me to another significant feature of reflective narratives as my research method. 
Narratives are used in other methodologies to analyse behaviour (e.g. Karaman, 2014, 
Daigneault et al., 2014, Baden and Parkes, 2013). The purpose is usually to generalise from 
those narratives, to create some sort of categorising, measurement, identify regularities, or, in 
short, to abstract further from the experience, which Stacey (2013, Stacey and Mowles, 2016) 
calls ‘second-order abstracting’. Paying closer attention to my experience, I do not intend to 
generalise in that sense (I will discuss generalisability of my research later in this chapter). The 
aim is to explore the interaction, to understand the motives and thinking that contributed to the 
way I relate to others. In this respect, the reflective narratives are individual, as I can only reflect 
on my own thinking, feeling and participating in interactions. I can explore my biases and the 
reasons for choosing a particular focus. Yet, my narratives are also social, because I am trying 
to locate my thinking in the scholarly literature, ‘in the traditions of thought of [my] society, 
differentiating between these traditions in a critically aware manner’ (Stacey and Mowles 2016: 
510). Reflexive narratives explicate my interpretation of the experience and my ideology. Yet, 
these always arise in the social context, in relation to others (Cassell et al., 2009).  
Researching in this tradition requires awareness of ‘involved detachment’ (Elias, 1956). Elias 
claims that we are never fully involved with or completely detached from our experience. There 
are always degrees of involvement and detachment, at the same time, in anything we do, 
including researching. Abstracting from our experience, having a more detached understanding 
of it, provides different insights: ‘the research process is a process of estrangement, which 
creates an orientation in which some things come into view that had previously been obscured’ 
Ahmed (2012: 10). 
To summarise the methodology so far, I’m paying attention to my experience, and write 
reflective narratives to make sense of it. Another important feature of my research method is 
the iterative nature of those narratives. Reading the narratives always brings up questions: why 
did I behave in a certain way? What were my assumptions? Am I still understanding the 
situation the way I did when it happened or when I initially wrote my narrative? Yet, reading 
my own narratives is of only limited value, so the narratives are shared with my PhD group, 
which consists of several current and past PhD students and supervisors. We meet regularly, 
every 6-8 weeks. Prior to the meetings we share the narratives with other group members and 
discuss them during the meetings. The colleagues call attention to the points that need 
clarifying, question inclusion of some aspects and exclusion of others, and comment on the 
literature we draw on, and the way we make sense of the experience on which we reflect. As 
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each of us comes with ‘social baggage’ (the social context on which we draw in our sense-
making), the iterations of our narratives inevitably reflect wider social contexts and deeper 
understanding of the narrative. This resonates with the method of researching on the DMan 
programme, as described by Stacey and Griffin (2005), and bears similarity to action research 
as defined by Reason and Bradbury (2001, cited in Reason, 2002: 169): ‘It [action research] 
seeks to bring together action and reflection, theory and practice, in participation with others’.   
The strength of this method is in the richness of the detail, in evoking emotions, in insight that 
can only be gained from reflecting from ‘within’. Its limitation maybe seen in its focus – one 
person’s experience. This focus is usually not taken in CSR research and, therefore, is 
innovative.  
Although the process of writing is individual, and even sometimes described as lonely (Gannon-
Leary et al., 2011, Bendemra, 2013), as a researcher I always relate to others, either by 
communicating with others, or by silently communicating with myself. I also write with the 
reader(s) in mind. From the perspective of complex responsive processes individual and social 
are not separate, but arise simultaneously in human interaction and are features of human 
interdependence (Mead, 1934). Following this understanding, the research is both individual 
and social at the same time.  
Reflection, reflexivity and generalisability in my research  
The terms ‘reflective’ and ‘reflexive’ are sometimes used interchangeably (Alvesson and 
Ashcraft, 2009, Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009). In this dissertation, I refer to 
‘reflection/reflective’ and ‘reflexivity/reflexive’ as related, but distinct terms.  Haynes (2012) 
makes a useful distinction between the two, which resonates with the approach taken by Stacey 
and colleagues (Stacey et al., 2000, Stacey, 2007a). ‘Reflective’ refers to the narratives of the 
‘first-level abstraction’ (see Stacey and Mowles, 2016). By this I mean thinking about my 
experience, asking what happened and why. I use ‘reflexive’ to signify thinking about my 
thinking, asking questions, such as: why I was thinking that? In what tradition of thought can I 
locate my understanding? So the early iterations of my narratives were reflective. Making sense 
of those narratives, relating the narratives to the relevant literature, I become reflexive.    
In this sense reflexive narratives are not ‘a form of autobiographical self-study in which the 
private experience of the self can engage and illuminate the experience of others who share the 
same practice setting’ (Daigneault et al., 2014: 270). My reflexive narratives are not forms of 
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‘self-study’. If I were to label them as ‘studies’ I would say they are studies of interactions. 
Rather than learning a lesson that can be applied in a similar ‘practice setting’, my narrative can 
be relevant to others (generalisable) in so far as they recognise the themes arising in their own 
experience. Although my personal reflections cannot be generalised into wider populations, the 
feelings evoked may be recognisable. I intend to achieve reliability, by others in my community 
of research and practice finding my interpretations plausible (Brower et al., 2000).   
The rigour in my research is achieved by my reflective narratives making sense to others. My 
research must capture the interest of others, resonating with their experience. A personal 
account of my experience must relate to general aspects of their experience of life in 
organisations, by highlighting the uncertainty and emotions of everyday practice. In addition, 
my narratives must make sense to others in the way I relate them to the wider traditions of 
thought. Stacey and Mowles (2016: 511) claim that the value of this kind of research is in being 
more ‘reality congruent’. I understand this as better reflecting the experience of the reader. By 
providing contextualised narratives of my experience of practising CSR, including uncertainty, 
anxiety and power struggles, I hope to engage the reader, to connect to some aspects of his or 
her experience. I also hope that the reader finds my engagement with the literature ‘persuasive, 
or at least plausible or convincing’ (ibid). 
My understanding of research is affected by complexity writers, who acknowledge that ‘at 
heart, … research is about the telling of stories – stories that explain what the world is, and how 
the world came to be what it is’ (Doyne Farmer in Waldrop, 1992: 318). Reflective narrative as 
a research methodology is part and parcel of understanding the aim of research in these terms 
– making sense of the social world, specifically of the social object of CSR. A complexity- 
informed perspective emphasises social interaction, paying attention to individual experience. 
To make sense of the way I, in interaction with others, contribute to the ever-evolving meaning 
of CSR, I interpret and reinterpret in the living present my reflections on my experience, based 
on value judgements. As such, there can be no claim to objectivity.  
This does not render my research lacking in rigour, ‘so long as the analyst makes explicit her 
or his reasoning and the standards being used for judgement and interpretation’ (Schmidt, 2014: 
335). I understand this quote as an appeal to engage reflexively with my narratives. Reflexive 
engagement with the narratives, explicating my theoretical biases and affiliations, is central to 
this dissertation. The rigour in my research is also achieved by being credible (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985), by remaining true to my original narratives, often at the cost of revealing my 
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vulnerabilities. Although iterating the narrative inevitably means making changes, introducing 
different understandings, and editing the work, sometimes I reproduce excerpts from my diary 
verbatim. Below is an example of such a passage 
Thinking about the analogy between therapy and PhD group discussions. I am quite 
aware of myself. In therapy I often find myself saying that I know what such-and-such 
means, but the other part of my behaviour or reaction remains unclear. I see the role of 
my therapist as raising a mirror to the part in my thinking that remains opaque to me. 
Therefore I find it important to be honest with her, as it allows her to hear what I’m not 
saying. In the same way in the PhD group, discussing my writing, I am being asked 
questions that illuminate areas of my writing that I am not aware of. And the importance 
of being honest in my writing is clear, because the value of the comments I am receiving 
from my colleagues, depends on the honesty of my writing. In other words, I receive 
what I give. If my writing is honest, their comments will be on that honest narrative, 
which in turn can be developed and the obscure (to me) aspects can become clearer. 
Lack of honesty, on the other hand, will probably lead to flat one-dimensional responses. 
And even if somehow the comments are rich and multi-dimensional, their value would 
be questionable. To return to the analogy with therapy, in one of the sessions I told Nina 
about my dream, which was disturbing, but I could understand the underlying meaning 
of many aspects of it. To allow me to work through the obscure aspect she asked me a 
question I could not ask myself, as at the time I could not see the importance of a small 
detail. Had I concealed that detail, which was quite unflattering to me, I probably would 
not have got the response from Nina that helped me work through a very uncomfortable, 
but important issue.  If I’m trying to make sense of my experience, I need to expose my 
experience, even when some aspects of it I’d like to keep hidden, because my colleagues 
can only help me to make sense of what I’m writing (From research diary on 15.12.13). 
This excerpt is an example of the sense-making processes in which I engage. It demonstrates 
that those passages are often confused, muddled, disordered and, more often than not, lack 
coherence and consistency. I resist editing, as the raw material reflects the rawness of my 
experience. By leaving those passages unedited, I hope to reproduce that intensity of feelings 
and thoughts in my reflective narratives.   
Qualitative researchers agree that a single set of evaluative criteria is inconsistent with the 
uniquely specific and contextualised nature of interpretivist research. Yet, all research must be 
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evaluated. I agree with Schwartz-Shea (2014: 142) that ‘giving reasons for our judgements to 
the members of our epistemic communities is the best that we can do’. In this chapter I have 
explained the reasons for choosing the research method to explore my research question ‘How 
is CSR understood and practiced at the UK HEI from a practitioner’s perspective?’ 
Ethics of reflecting on own experience 
Often when I describe my research method, I am asked about the ethics of writing reflective 
narratives. Do I obtain consent from people to be included in my research? How do I write 
about the people with whom I interact, preserving their anonymity and integrity? Writing about 
my practice, I cannot know which interaction I will find significant and, therefore, cannot 
inform every person I interact with every time about the possibility of writing about him or her 
in my final narrative. To address this issue, I initially informed my colleagues about my research 
method. I continually remind my colleagues about the possibility of reflecting on our 
conversation. The purpose of the narratives is not to assess or analyse the behaviour of others, 
but to explore how I relate to others and why. Power relations are inevitable in our interactions, 
and exploring them provides insights into our working together in organisations.  
Having said that, whenever appropriate, individuals are anonymised to preserve their privacy. 
Often full anonymity cannot be ensured. It is clear that in reflecting about my practice, there 
cannot be organisational anonymity. Parker (2014) is very disparaging of his former employer, 
but giving it a fictitious title (Euro University) did not prevent others in his community from 
identifying the university he is criticising. Today’s technology can link me to my workplace in 
a matter of seconds. And since mentioning some roles is imperative to emphasising a specific 
issue (e.g. in Chapter 6 I refer to a comment made by the Dean. The fact that it was the Dean 
who made the comment is of great importance as it explains my strong reaction), mentioning 
the specific person, even by his or her role, is essential for preserving the integrity of the 
narrative. My dissertation spans the tenure of three Deans and by keeping the narratives related 
to the Dean gender-neutral and by anonymising the name, I trust the anonymity of the Deans 
has been preserved. Another example is the inclusion of my correspondence with a senior 
manager from the university (Chapter 5). Initially I kept the title explicit. Upon rereading the 
narrative, I concluded that the specific title was not germane to the story, and identifying the 
individual as a senior manager was sufficient.  
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To emphasise, I cannot make the decision about the ethics of a narrative before I write and 
iterate it. From complex responsive processes perspective there can be no one single ethical 
guide to follow in order to achieve this. It is impossible to pre-empt every possible ethical 
dilemma ‘in the sense of thought before action’ (Stacey and Griffin 2005: 26). I judge the ethics 
of every situation as it arises. In making choices about our behaviour, we constantly make 
choices regarding what is appropriate at that time; we assess how our decisions impact ourselves 
and others. Those are ethical choices, even if we do not refer to them as such. Ethics is not a set 
of rules that one must adhere to. Ethics continuously evolves in our enacting together in local 
interactions the norms of our society and our values. Ethics is an emerging and continuously 
evolving negotiation with those with whom I interact and with myself (Griffin, 2002).  
Relating my research method to autoethnography and micro-foundations  
Often following a presentation about my research, I am asked to explain how my method relates 
to autoethnography. Autoethnography encompasses awide range of approaches, whose purpose 
is to ‘describe and systematically analyse (graphy) personal experience (auto) in order to 
understand cultural experience (ethno) (Ellis et al., 2010: 273). Like autoethnographers I write 
stories of my experience. I too problematise often uncritically accepted ideas (Alvesson, 2009). 
There are many other similarities: reflective narrative writers, similar to autoethnographic 
researchers, give a voice to the practitioners and engage reflexively with their own practice, 
focusing on the everyday experiences (Ellis et al., 2010). Reflexivity, recognising one’s own 
beliefs and assumptions, is a central tenet in autoethnographic research (Cunliffe, 2003). Those 
researchers recognise that there is no position from nowhere (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). Like 
autoethnographers, I produce a ‘thick description’ of experience (Greetz, 1973: 10), and as I 
am reflexively making sense of my experiences, I find the experience of writing my narrative 
therapeutic (Kiesinger, 2002). The ethical questions I raised in the previous section, have also 
been raised in relation to autoethnography (Doloriert and Sambrook, 2012). 
Researchers adopting the reflective narrative methodology have faced similar criticism to 
autoethnographers. Both methodologies have sometimes been criticised for a lack of academic 
rigour, subjectivity and even have been accused of navel-gazing (Ellis et al., 2010). These 
criticisms have been addressed elsewhere (in the above section for reflective narratives,  and by 
autoethnographers (e.g. Bochner, 2000)), and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss 
them. The purpose of mentioning them is to highlight major similarities between the two 
research methods. 
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There are, however, differences between the two approaches. One major difference is in the 
purpose of the research, and the other is in the way researchers approach the idea of individual 
and society. One of the aims of autoethnographic research is to give a voice to ‘experiences 
shrouded in silence’ (Ellis et al., 2010), to topics that are often taboo, such as sexual harassment  
(Parry and Boyle, 2009) or expressing breast milk at work (van Amsterdam, 2015), or to the 
often unheard voices in organisations, such as immigrant women of colour in leadership 
(Ngunjiri and Hernandez, 2017), Muslim women in football (Cox et al., 2017), or asylum 
seekers (Kynsilehto and Puumala, 2015). I, however, approach my research from a fairly 
privileged position – as a Director and a Principal Lecturer. In my work, I do not intend to 
expose the unmentioned. Both the context and the topic of my research are mainstream – CSR 
in a HEI. The purpose of my reflective narratives is to explore and to make sense of my 
everyday experience, thus explore what it means to practise CSR.    
Another major difference is the approach to the general and the particular. Autoethnography 
aims to explore personal experiences in order to understand the cultural practices (Ellis et al., 
2010),  ‘directly linking the micro level with the macro cultural and structural levels’ (Allen-
Collinson, 2013: 281). This points to autoethnographic research being embedded in the systems 
thinking, separating between the micro and the macro. Being informed by complex responsive 
processes, reflective narrative researchers reject this dualism (see previous chapter), adopting 
Elias’s concept of figuration (Elias, 1978). In this dissertation I demonstrate how a general idea 
(CSR) is being particularised by a specific player (me), in a specific context (HEI) at a specific 
time. I argue that my work demonstrates how global patterns arise and are sustained in local 
interactions, both impacting and being impacted by each other at the same time.  
Similarly, I have been asked to clarify how researching my own practice – local interactions - 
relates to micro-foundations. The concept of micro-foundations originated in economics, as an 
attempt to provide a better understanding of the role of individual firms within the economy 
(Eichner, 1983, Eichner, 1976). The concept has been adopted by scholars from other 
disciplines, and specifically it has become a major theme in strategic management, with an aim 
to improve understanding of  ‘exploratory mechanisms located at the “micro-level”, that is the 
level of individual action and (strategic) interaction’ (Abell et al., 2008: 489).  
The idea that ‘micro’ is the basis for ‘macro’ is firmly embedded in systems thinking, where 
micro systems are parts of a larger system, and an output of micro-processes contributes to the 
behaviour of the system. As Eichner (1983: 136) states, ‘if that macroeconomic behaviour… is 
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to be adequately explained, it is necessary that macro model rest [sic] on a solid micro 
foundation’. Based on this approach, the macro and the micro are linked, but still separate. This 
thinking has permeated CSR research as well, and in a recent study Hafenbradl and Waeger 
(2017: 1582) attempt to isolate the reasons for executives’ commitment to CSR in order to  
‘advance knowledge about the micro-foundations of CSR’. This suggests that the macro system 
(CSR), rests on micro-foundations (executives’ beliefs). 
As described above, informed by Elias’s concept of figuration (Elias, 1978), I do not make a 
distinction between macro and micro. Rejecting the macro - micro dichotomy, I suggest that 
there is no global CSR being built on a multitude of CSR micro-interactions. Instead, I 
understand CSR as a social object, a global pattern of interactions. As any social object, CSR 
arises and is being particularised in many interdependent players’ interactions, impacting and 
being impacted by local interactions at the same time.   
 Summary 
In this chapter I detailed my research method. It spans many years of my evolving thinking 
about research. I started the chapter with a quote from my research diary from the early days of 
my PhD, when I was still thinking that only collecting or analysing data, or at least specific 
reading, can be considered ‘researchy’. What I had not realised at the time was that what I did 
next, ‘go back to my thoughts about my work’, was as much part of research as other activities, 
that I recognised as ‘researchy’. This chapter traced my developing thinking about research and 
research methods, from the early understanding of research as a detached objective enterprise, 
to my current understanding of research as complex responsive processes of relating. 
Researching is highly personal and social at the same time. Reflecting on the narratives requires 
a high level of exposure. So why do I do this? To me it is important, as it demonstrates that my 
thinking has not been straightforward and logical, but messy and confused. Muddling through 
confusion, with and in relation to others, trying to make sense of my experience, is my method.   
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Chapter  4 - Making sense of my practice; what is and what is not perceived as CSR?  




The aim of this dissertation is to explore CSR practice from a practitioner’s perspective. Yet, 
every time I think about my daily practice, I find the prospect of discussing actually ‘doing’ 
CSR paralizing. A coffee-room chat in 2015 triggered a different way of thinking about my 
work. My colleague and I were gossiping about possible candidates for the Dean’s role. When 
Martin’s name was mentioned, I expressed my dissatisfaction with his ‘narrow focus’ and ‘lack 
of imagination’. I mentioned how in the process of writing the current HBS strategic plan, his 
suggestion for community engagement was adopting a charity. In telling this my sense of 
disappointment and indignation resurfaced. I do not disagree with adopting a charity as part of 
our community engagement, but I believe so much more can be done to meaningfully engage 
with the local community. In relaying this I uttered ‘this disregards all my hard work in trying 
to come up with imaginative ways to bring CSR into what we do’. As I was saying this, I 
realised I have worked hard and I did find some creative ways to make sure that our community 
engagement fits with what we do at HBS. What was it that I did to achieve this? 
In order to clarify how my work relates to the general understanding of CSR I started searching 
for descriptions of CSR engagement in academic writings and practitioners’ accounts. I raked 
through recruitment websites for ‘CSR executive’ job descriptions; I read the guidelines for 
industry standards, searching for resonance with my work. The more I read, the more frustrated 
I became with myself, for not being able to identify my work in the hundreds of pages in front 
of me, and for not being able to articulate my practice. After all, when asked by others about 
my role, I come up with a long list of ‘CSR engagements’. So the next step for me was to turn 
to the interviews in which I was asked about my role, and to revisit the documents I’ve 
submitted in the last nine years to various management meetings, reports, presentations and 
committees.  
Pages and pages of documents in front of me gave me some sense of security, but not enough 
confidence to start writing about my practice. Reflecting on my own work is the hardest thing 
I have had to do in relation to my role so far. Anything presented to others, whether in a formal 
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document or a more relaxed interview, has been directed for the consumption of others. This is 
not to say it is not true or embellished. It does not conceal the truth, as I perceive it, but also 
does not reveal all of my truth. It is presented from a detached perspective, talking about my 
work in a third person – ‘The unit’ - or in the plural ‘we’. Reflecting, on the other hand, requires 
relinquishing the protecting, safe detached stance. Reflecting carries the danger of exposing 
aspects of practice that I would rather were obscure.  
And then I thought I had found a way to start my describing of a practitioner’s perspective. In 
April I received the following e-mail from the Office of the Vice Chancellor 
Dear All, 
Following on from the new strategic plan it is proposed to set up a group as part of the 
Community and Partners strand to discuss and promote the University’s engagement 
with the local community. This group will meet twice yearly to give an opportunity to 
discuss the current and planned projects being undertaken across the University and the 
Students Union. The group will primarily focus on work undertaken in and around 
Hatfield and will aim to create a greater awareness of the projects the University is 
undertaking within the town. 
 
If your School is involved in undertaking any projects in and around Hatfield, or you 
plan to be involved in the future, could you please suggest a suitable representative to 
attend this group? (Lambert, 2015) 
 
I thought that by reproducing the slide that was forwarded to the participants in that meeting 
(Figure 1), and by discussing the specifics of some of the items, I would be able to overcome 
my writer’s block.   
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Figure 1. Presentation slides for the Community Engagement Forum 27.5.15  
The need to fill my desk with copious documents, bringing in the presentation slide, and reading 
the transcripts of the interviews I had given, was a way of dealing with my anxiety about 
exposing my self, about contemplating my practice in CSR terms. Even now, reflecting on my 
experience of approaching the writing about my practice, I feel my heartrate increasing. But 
throughout the process of writing this dissertation I learned to accept anxiety as an inseparable 
part of practice and researching.  Nonetheless, I find that I have a lot to say, that I would like to 
make sense of yet more narratives. Perhaps I should abandon the quest for ‘discussing the daily 
CSR practice’, and focus on what attracts my curiosity.  
Is this CSR? 
The enormous interest in CSR in the past few decades produced consensus about the nebulous 
nature of the definition of CSR (see Chapter 1). Attempts to analyse existing definitions led to 
sets of equally vague dimensions of CSR. For example, Sarkar and Searchy (2016) revisited 
110 definitions and found there were ‘six recurrent, enduring dimensions that underpin the CSR 
concept. These dimensions are economic, social, ethical, stakeholders, sustainability and 
voluntary’ (ibid: 1423). The main difference between these and Carroll’s four responsibilities 
– economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic – is the explicit recognition of the voluntary 
dimension. Most scholars agree that CSR is about organisational undetermined duties to 
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unspecified society (Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008). At first glance the following two 
narratives do not fit even the broadest definition of CSR. The first narrative describes a situation 
that occurred several years ago; the second occurred more recently. First, I will present them as 
they were written in my research diary, following which I will draw parallels between the two. 
In March 2012 I wrote the following entry: 
A seemingly minor incident sticks in my mind so I might as well spend some time 
thinking about it. On my way to work early one Saturday several weeks ago, I was 
disgusted with a vista of bottles and cans strewn on the lawn just in front of the main 
entrance. I have no idea who did this, but it was clear that the place had been a venue 
for a serious drinking party. I was thinking that the maintenance department ought to 
take care of it immediately, not to wait until Monday to clear the mess.  As I entered 
the car park, seeing several families walking towards the building, I asked the security 
guard whether it was an Open Day. It was. I felt ashamed that the first impression of 
the potential students of MY university is that of alcohol-infused mess (on second 
thought, some potential students might be attracted by this).  After visiting several 
universities with Dana (my daughter ) recently, I’m quite sensitive to first impressions, 
and I assume other parents are as well. As I entered the kitchen to make tea, I met 
Rachel, a very young colleague from the study abroad office. We exchanged our 
indignation about the state of the front lawn. And then Rachel surprised me by saying 
that she thought that everyone driving in noticed the rubbish, and many probably felt 
that ‘someone’ ought to do something. But no one reported this to Estates. So she did. 
And I thought – well done, girl; I told her as much, without the ‘girl’. I consider myself 
to be a responsible employee; I’m sure others feel the same about themselves. I am 
also supposed to be paying attention to ‘responsibility’, but somehow I did not think it 
was my responsibility to phone Estates to make sure they are aware of the need to 
clean the entrance. I definitely do not think this was beneath me; I have phoned them 
complaining about other maintenance issues. But perhaps those issues had been 
directly relating to me and my convenience. And the lawn strewn with evidence of last 
night’s activity did not directly impact my ability to write a paper in my clean(ish) 
office.  This incident, as insignificant as it might seem at first, raised questions about 
responsibility – what am I responsible for and who am I responsible to? Do I perceive 
my role as director of SEU and, more recently, PRME champion as the full extent of 
my responsibility and, as a result, the boundaries of my research? I do not feel upset 
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with myself, this is not another attempt at self-criticism. But this does raise more 
questions than I have answers for at this stage. 
And then in 2013: 
Another project that I had not intended to take on, but felt compelled to undertake, was 
my participation in the Green Impact awards. When an e-mail arrived from a 
University Sustainability Manager stating 
I am writing to you as you were named in the Business School’s planning round 
submission as the member of the management team within the SBU who would take 
responsibility for sustainability activities (appendix 6 – sustainability). The submission 
noted that in order to develop at least one Green Impact Team within the SBU during 
2013/14 that it would be useful to have discussions with a member of the Environment 
and Sustainability Team. (Mayfield, 2013) 
I was very surprised. Who suggested that I was the person to take this responsibility? 
Why was I not consulted? The dean confirmed I was indeed tasked with this in my 
absence, and asked me to ‘take a look at it’.  I met with the Environment and 
Sustainability managers and, having my dissertation in mind, agreed to sign for the 
Green Impact. I was interested to see what this entails, how this (environmental) side 
of CSR works at the University. I also thought it would be much easier to sign myself, 
than trying to convince my colleagues to form a team. [In retrospect I was right in that 
respect. At the end of the year I presented the scheme at the HBS away day. The 
comments were encouraging; some colleagues said how they might be interested to 
sign. Getting them to sign was more difficult. It was getting PRME7 embedding all 
over again, and I had to concentrate my efforts on projects that I felt were more 
consistent with the remit of SEU, so I stopped nagging. Interestingly, I myself have 
never participated since, justifying this by saying ‘we do all this anyway’, ‘we do not 
have time to engage with the bureaucracy of it’]. Getting my roommates to sign was 
easy; I promised to deal with the paperwork myself. I was surprised to realise that we 
would tick many boxes by just continuing doing what we’d been doing in the office, 
and just recording this in the official diary. To tick other boxes we were becoming 
somewhat creative. Car-sharing, for example, would give us extra points. At the 
                                                          
7 In Chapter 6 I discuss this in detail.  
  70 
 
auditing meeting, my roommate and I remembered that she often offered a ride to our 
supervisor for the PhD meeting. We mentioned this to the auditor, and duly got our 
extra points. By phrasing our team’s engagement in the ‘Green Impact’ terms, we 
achieved the Bronze Award. The delicate web woven by many demands and intents, 
conveniences and necessities, remains obscure.  
Reviewing my notes, I keep coming back to these two seemingly unrelated narratives that I 
initially tagged as ‘non-SEU’. Since becoming the director of the SEU, I’ve come to equate 
CSR practice with my work in SEU and later also with PRME. As a result, the two narratives 
had been put aside; for me non-SEU became non-CSR. Yet, my attention kept being drawn to 
them, and rereading them for yet another time, I’ve come to realise they ARE about CSR. 
Further consideration reveals that these narratives are about my own participation in and 
contribution to the university’s CSR agenda. These narratives also draw attention to how I am 
becoming identified with CSR in UH, and how the contacts I am receiving reveal what others 
see as constituting CSR, and how their definition of themselves and of others are evolving. By 
paying attention to these incidents I am able to explore how and why individuals get involved 
in and contribute to the evolving institution-wide patterns. They are about individual actions 
that in conjunction with many individual actions of many others emerge as the University CSR 
engagement.   
Motives for CSR 
As C in CSR stands for ‘Corporate’, it is not surprising that the vast majority of CSR literature 
addresses organisations’ engagement with CSR (Aguinis and Glavas, 2012). The writers talk 
about a ‘firm’s engagement’ and ‘firm’s motivation’ as if a firm is an entity capable of these 
distinctly human activities and emotions. Elsewhere I’ve explored the limitations of this 
approach; I highlight it here to demonstrate that this approach also leads to neglecting the 
individual motivation in CSR literature. In this chapter I explore what motivates individuals to 
engage in CSR projects. According to Dhanesh (2012) very little research has focused on 
employees. Within this limited body of research, the consensus is that the employee attitude to 
CSR is mainly influenced by the ‘tone at the top’ (Collier and Esteban, 2007). Some authors 
state unequivocally that ‘ethical leadership contributes to the success of CSR initiatives’ 
(Godkin, 2015: 15), producing models of harnessing the managers’ attitudes and behaviours in 
order to influence employee behaviour (Maon et al., 2009). Those who pay attention to 
employee motivations (e.g. Blackman et al., 2013, Aguilera et al., 2007), link individual 
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motives to an organisation’s CSR engagement, exploring how an organisation’s attitudes to 
CSR impact individual employee’s CSR engagement. 
The main merit of this strand of literature is that it addresses individual motivation. My critique 
of it is based on the way the authors approach this subject matter. Although they talk about ‘the 
individual’, they are not addressing a specific individual, but an individual as a level of analysis, 
aggregating the findings about all individuals in their research into one rubric. But each 
individual has a different understanding of and responds differently to the managers’ attitudes.  
This seems like a truism; nevertheless, this simple assumption is being disregarded when all 
employees are seen as a single unit. For example, Ditlev-Simonsen (2015) conducted an 
empirical study, performing a statistically robust analysis of her data,  into the links between a 
firm’s CSR and employee commitment, and found a positive correlation between the two. An 
often-quoted Greening and Turban (2000) paper presents seemingly strong evidence of a firm’s 
CSR performance affecting its attractiveness to a potential employee. But we must not be 
swayed by statistics, as sophisticated as they might be; statistical analysis can only test a 
population of incidents, not a specific incident. So despite the conclusion that overall employees 
care about a company’s CSR, we are no wiser about individual employee X’s attitude towards 
her company’s CSR. I do not dispute the robustness of statistics in these specific research 
articles, but I wish to raise the limitation of statistics when trying to understand individual 
motivations.  
Throughout this dissertation I come across as critical of my organisation’s managers’ approach 
to CSR, questioning their commitment, sincerity and motivations. There is no question that my 
perception of their approach has impacted my motivation for engaging in CSR projects. 
However, the impact has not been as straightforward as the literature would lead us to believe. 
At times my motivation has been tested, but I remain strongly committed to practising CSR. It 
is clear that not all employees at UH feel the same about CSR. Again, mentioning this might 
seem redundant, but relying on the empirical findings we may think that the commitment of all 
employees has been shifting according to the managers’ interest in and engagement with CSR.  
Aguilera et al. (2007) propose three distinct types of employees’ motives for adopting CSR 
projects: instrumental, relational and morality-based. I agree that a combination of these three 
motives influenced my decision to undertake a specific project and my attitude to CSR. I 
suggest, however, that we must understand that those motives are not distinct, but 
interconnected. My motives to get involved with ‘Green Impact’ or Rachel’s motives to call 
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estates, were not ‘ordered in an upward hierarchy such that employees will exert the most 
pressure on organizations to engage in CSR when their needs for meaningful existence are 
paramount, followed by belongingness and control’, as suggested by Aguilera et al. (2007: 843). 
I can only attest to my motives, and I certainly did not get involved in ‘Green Impact’ because 
of morality-based motives. Thinking about other projects I initiated and got involved with, I 
cannot agree with the claim by Aguilera et al. there is some sort of hierarchy of motives. The 
narratives presented in this dissertation demonstrate a less neat arrangement – intermingled, 
often confused and sometimes unrecognised motives that led me to adopting or rejecting any 
project. 
Emerging CSR    
Moreover, our individual interconnected motives also interlink with those of others. Ditlev-
Simonsen (2015) claims that decisions about CSR are usually taken by the senior managers of 
organisations. I agree that CSR policies are often made by senior managers, but those policies 
are implemented employees regardless of their seniority. In this section I draw attention to how 
(what in retrospect is seen as) CSR arises in individual actions and interactions of different 
employees, not just the managers, of an organisation. Although the university’s strategic 
objectives include ‘Positively improving our impact on the environment’ and ‘Investing 
resources to develop a vibrant university town’ (UH, 2015), yet it was Rachel’s initiative that 
ultimately resulted in a cleaner environment.  
My decision to include a ‘community project’ in one of the modules I teach was not original; I 
was inspired by participating in a similar project while on a non-academic course run by another 
colleague. I am aware of at least two colleagues who incorporated charity projects into their 
modules long before SEU was established. Yet, these initiatives were not recognised as CSR or 
community engagement, nor were they perceived as CSR by those colleagues, until I started 
producing reports, articles and presentations gathering them under the SEU/PRME umbrella. I 
wonder how many other ‘CSR engagements’ have been initiated by non-managers in my 
workplace and in other organisations, but are not recognised as CSR until they find their way 
into some management report?  
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Implications of understanding CSR as the organisations’ responsibility 
Baden and Harwood (2012) highlight the impact CSR terminology has on behaviour, and 
especially ethical behaviour in business. I suggest that the terminology also has an impact on 
us, the researchers, when we come to analyse that behaviour, and perhaps using CSR 
terminology leads to most researchers focusing on organisations’ responsibilities and 
behaviour. This emphasis has implications for the individual’s understanding of   
I am very fortunate to be able to deliver lectures on CSR to a large number of students, in my 
role as PRME champion. The widespread assumption about CSR being an organisational rather 
than individual issue that underpins the CSR definitions, such as the one by the European 
Commission (EC, 2011), is evident when I discuss the issue with the students. When talking to 
the final year students, I find they are able to cite CSR initiatives, such as outreach programmes, 
energy conservation or volunteering. Most of them are familiar with Carroll’s pyramid, and 
understand, or at least claim to understand, that to be considered responsible the organisations 
must fulfil four responsibilities: economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic (Carroll, 1991). I 
then show them a picture of a group of students standing under the big ‘no smoking’ sign at the 
main entrance, some smoking and others chatting to the smokers. When I ask about the smokers 
most agree that they are wrong; if smoking is illegal in that area, they should move. Yet, when 
I draw their attention to the non-smokers and ask what is their responsibility, many say that 
they have no responsibility; it is university’s responsibility to enforce the regulations. Even 
when I point out that by standing next to the smokers and not moving to where smoking is 
permitted the friends are enabling irresponsible behaviour, the majority of students always 
continue to say that it is not the non-smokers’ responsibility. I am always perplexed by this; 
how do they not see what is so obvious to me, that it is all of our responsibility not to enable 
breaking the law. Yet, perhaps I should not be surprised. Their response resembles my 
approach, when I was greeted by mess on the Open Day – calling the estates was not my 
responsibility.  These attitudes are consistent with the approach taken in the literature – CSR is 
the organisation’s business. 
I keep repeating this ‘exercise’ hoping this might contribute, albeit in a minor way, to a different 
understanding of CSR. I hope the students will start understanding that the University cannot 
do anything - only people, employees, students, and others who associate themselves with the 
University, can act. Rachel did; she did not wait for ‘the university’ to take responsibility. My 
friend does, by turning the lights off every time she leaves her office. I have noticed myself and 
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other colleagues have started doing the same. Many of us have been recycling printer cartridges 
since the facility became available, regardless of ‘Green Impact’. In conducting a review of the 
HBS modules, I found many more colleagues introducing the topics of responsibility, ethics 
and sustainability into their teaching. The examples are too many to mention. The point I am 
making is that all these ‘small acts of responsibility’ in interaction with other acts are performed 
by embodied, rather than just legal, persons. And in those many interrelated acts of 
responsibility my university’s CSR has been emerging.     
It is conceivable that using the terminology of CSR the researchers and the practitioners focus 
on major and measurable outcomes, while losing sight of those ‘small acts of responsibility’ in 
which CSR is emerging.   
Small acts of sensemaking 
The aim of this research is to make sense of my practice.  It might have been expected that in a 
work that centres on sensemaking I would make links to Weick (1995). Yet, there is no 
reference to his seminal book in this dissertation.  In this section I suggest a reason for focusing 
on the ways the concept of ‘sensemaking’ has been taken up by organisational scholars. 
In organisational literature the term ‘sensemaking’ has become associated with the work of  
Karl Weick (1995). ‘Sensemaking in Organizations’ has been cited in over 21,000 published 
works. A comprehensive review of the concept is beyond the scope of this work. I would, 
however, draw attention to the way sensemaking has been appropriated by various writers and 
how it has been elevated to a special status of desired behaviours that help to achieve 
organisational goals.  
In my reference to making sense I follow the basic definition of the term - ‘find meaning or 
coherence’ (Oxford, 2017). When I say I try to make sense, I mean creating a plausible narrative 
of my interacting with others. In this case, making sense is a continual process in which we, as 
human beings, engage habitually. In the mainstream organisational literature sensemaking is 
regarded as a goal (Holt and Cornelissen, 2014), a tool (e.g. Battles et al., 2006), a framework 
(e.g. Vickers, 2007), and a model (Weick, 2010). There are sensemaking studies and 
sensemaking theories. Many of those studies tend to focus on extraordinary events (Maitlis and 
Sonenshein, 2010), studying senior executives and ‘ignoring or discounting experiences of 
sensemaking in ordinary organizational life’ (Holt and Cornelissen, 2014: 526).  
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Critics also argue that sensemaking scholars’ assumptions of sensemaking as being desirable, 
a tool that can ‘tame’ flux and uncertainty, remains unchallenged (Holt and Cornelissen, 2014). 
This dissertation does not intend to contribute to sensemaking theory, as initiated by Weick 
(1995). Instead I aim to tease out how I am involved in practising CSR. I do not wish to 
demonstrate how making sense of my experience follows (or does not follow) a specific model. 
Rather than using sensemaking instrumentally, as a way of taming opacity and instability (Holt 
and Cornelissen, 2014). I continually and iteratively make sense. Although my sensemaking is 
always in and about interaction with others, it is not a ‘shared sensemaking’ (Balogun et al., 
2015, Palus et al., 2003), but an examination of my contribution to the evolving meaning of 
CSR. Taking a complexity perspective, I suggest that similar to CSR emerging in ‘small acts 
of responsibility’, sense arises in small acts of making sense.  
Summary 
Having reflected on the narratives I had not initially intended to explore in this dissertation, I 
began discussing my daily practice of CSR. In their seminal article ‘Managers Doing 
Leadership: The Extra-ordinarization of the Mundane’, Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003: 25) 
dispel the myth of leadership as encompassing 
grand ideas, visions and engaging speeches that encourage people to take part in great 
missions. Leadership is connected to radical change and inspiring ideas that facilitate 
people to rethink old ideas, there’s a revolutionary, heroic and romantic epic figuring 
in contemporary leadership. 
Instead, they claim, leadership is often performed in ‘listening and informal-talking’ (ibid). In 
this chapter I have demonstrated that CSR engagement is conducted in the acts of talking and 
listening. The grand gestures of CSR arise in those mundane interactions of individuals, with 
often less-than-grand motives and intentions. At times those interactions are purposefully 
directed at achieving CSR goals; at other times, we ascribe them CSR meaning post factum.  
In the next chapter I will explore in depth my reticence to think about mundane everyday 
activities as CSR, situating my thinking in the broader organisational and CSR literature.   
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Chapter 5 - Heroic narrative of CSR  
He took what they handed him and made it into an idol cast in the shape of a calf, 
fashioning it with a tool. Then they said, "This is your god, O Israel, who brought you up 
out of Egypt’ (Exodus 32:4) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I started thinking about the difficulty of considering my practice as 
CSR. I discussed how some of the practices I initially discarded as ‘non-CSR’ are on 
reflection recognised as contributing to the emerging understanding of CSR in the context 
of UH.  
In this chapter I reflect on my changing understanding of CSR, exploring my reluctance to 
embrace my work as CSR in relation to the current CSR orthodoxy. I begin by focusing on 
the way CSR is discussed in the mainstream organisational literature and reflect on how 
my understanding has been impacted by that literature. In the latter part of the chapter I 
propose a different way of understanding CSR; I suggest that understanding CSR as a 
social object is more congruent with my experience and practice. 
Taking my experience seriously: impetus for rethinking CSR 
The narrative below was written in 2014. In some ways it still resonates with me today.  
It’s been over five years since I undertook a role as the director of SEU, and three years 
since becoming business school PRME champion. Although I have written many 
reports about adopting, embedding, practising CSR, I still struggle with the very 
concept of CSR. After nine years of teaching and researching CSR, the idea remains 
as elusive to me as it was when I began working on this dissertation. To clarify, I could 
recite the key definitions, name the main contributors, discuss the latest research with 
confidence. What I lack is conviction in my work being considered CSR. I experience 
dissonance presenting my work as an example of CSR. I find it difficult to reconcile 
my practice with the dominant CSR discourse. Taking my experience seriously means 
recognising that not fitting the theory does not invalidate that experience. I also 
recognise the great impact many years of studying theory had on my perception of 
CSR. I also start recognising the difficulty of challenging my own assumptions, which 
have been developed in engaging with those theories.  
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In 2011, while reading my research diary, I was shocked to realise that for nearly a 
year, much of my work and my research had not been addressed in it at all. In this 
narrative I attempt to understand why. What were the reasons that prevented me from 
doing exactly what I request of my students – paying close attention to my experience?  
To trace my changing perceptions of my work and my understanding of CSR, I will 
introduce excerpts from my diary verbatim8  
August the 22, 2011: 
What I find interesting while having a brief review of the last year is that: 
 I’ve gone through my first progression and nothing from this diary was included 
in it. 
 I had a year with an admin assistant, whose behaviour drove me crazy, and yet 
I did not want to write about it. 
 I’ve applied and won a seedcorn fund grant for a CSR research, and this too did 
not push me to write. 
 PRME seems to be happening! And… no writing about it. 
 I’ve read a lot about methodology, and some of it I found useful. Have not 
written a word. 
 The SEU won the VC Awards in the category of ‘Community Engagement’ – and  
guess what? 
But re-reading the diary of last year I found another recurring theme – although I keep 
doing my job as a Director of SEU, and keep very busy, I still find it difficult to say 
what I do in my role. And it is time to face the question – why? Reflecting back on the 
last year’s diary, it seems that there are two main reasons for it. 
Firstly, although intellectually I know that whatever happens in the every-day it is 
always a small addition to the work done previously and major events are rare, I keep 
on cultivating the fantasy that engaging in CSR means doing something big, important. 
So what is the point in writing about another meeting, another discussion? They are 
never earth shattering   experiences. And yet, even as I write this, I remember the 
feeling that something exciting has happened, that I was a witness to a change 
                                                          
8 In Chapter 3 I explained the reason for introducing verbatim excerpts 
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happening in a meeting with Sharon Bramford, Chief Executive of AMBA9. So big 
things do happen, but they are very infrequent. And in my mind, CSR is still about big 
gestures, plans, strategic reviews. This view is reinforced by my discussions with CSR 
executives from other companies. For example, Andy mentioned that they were 
embarking on a project of ‘mapping their activities against GRI principles’; Caroline 
mentioned that this year they were concentrating on ‘environmental management 
issues’ – wow, that sounds big, important! In comparison, meeting with a 
representative from a local charity, seems to pale into insignificance.  
And secondly, most of the time when I think about my role, I have a nagging feeling of 
being a fraud. Because I know minor details of what is happening in my role, and most 
of the time they are that – minor. For example, although the SEU was nominated for, 
and subsequently won, the VC Award for community engagement, I found it very 
difficult to summon the required excitement. After all, what do I do? I meet with people 
and talk to them. So the seemingly important accolade becomes a farce, and Zahira’s 
and my portrait hanging proudly in the Atrium becomes an embarrassment.  So to try 
and justify my role to myself and to avoid being ‘found out’ I write reports, proposals, 
‘big up’ my role while discussing it with others. But in the process of ‘bigging it up’ I 
also realise – I am not a fraud! I have achieved. I did not make up those figures in the 
last year’s report – but they were achieved in very small steps, and while taking those 
steps, I was unable to see what they would lead to.     
I still remember feeling somewhat disappointed with myself after writing that entry. 
Yet, at the same time, I felt that something important was happening. Coming back to 
the diary the next day, I continued exploring that feeling. 
23 August 2011   
As I was finishing writing yesterday’s entry, I became really angry with myself. This 
feeling intensified the more I thought about what I wrote. But upon rereading it today, 
my indignation is being replaced with curiosity. Why have I been thinking that my work 
is insignificant, meaningless, not worth mentioning? Reflecting on the previous entry, 
I can identify two main reasons for denigrating my work. Firstly, I can see the 
                                                          
9 As this is a verbatim passage from my research diary, I decided not to change my entry and leave this 
sentence unchanged and unexplained in this section. I will explore this in later chapters. 
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recurring pattern of behaviour – I see what I do is not good enough, my achievements 
become insignificant the moment I accomplish them, and I see myself as deceiving the 
people around me by presenting an image of a confident and high-achieving 
professional. And secondly, I think I fell victim to the dominant CSR paradigm – that 
CSR has to fall into one of the recognised categories or fit into one of the frameworks. 
Unfortunately, what I do does not fit Carroll’s CSR pyramid (1979) nor can it slide 
neatly into any of the theories proposed by the big names of CSR. Brief reminder of 
Garriga and Melé (2008) mapping highlights that my experience does not fit with any 
of the 4 proposed categories. So it seems to me that I forgot to follow my own 
preaching, I did not take my experience seriously. This also demonstrates the strength 
of the influence of the dominant discourse – although for years I’ve been criticising 
the dominant CSR theories as not fitting with everyday experience, when it comes to 
thinking about my own experience I tend to dismiss my experience because it does not 
fit those theories. What are the implications for my research?  
Reflecting on my writing I began identifying what it was that made me feel 
uncomfortable. I started paying attention to my experience and recognising patterns of 
acting10. My inability to accept that I was doing an important job seemed to make 
sense, as I recognised it as part of my recurring pattern of thought, not just relating to 
my work in SEU.  Rereading my diary I start recognising that the enormous amount 
of work I had put into the Unit was probably in part the need to alleviate this feeling. 
Reflecting on my work I recognise how my past experiences informed my 
understanding of the current role. 
Feeling a fraud was further intensified by my frustration of not doing anything that 
could fit into the CSR category in the literature. I tried to explore further my thinking 
about CSR. The belief that CSR refers to something outstanding was being crystallized 
through writing, discussing the diary with the PhD group, and reflecting on what I’d 
written   
 
                                                          
10 In the methodology chapter I argue that thinking and acting are inseparable. To be more precise thinking 
IS acting. Here I use ‘acting’ to highlight the difference between the understandings at the time of writing 
the research diary and now.  
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25 August 2011 
... falling into the CSR paradigm, I think of CSR as something big, important, with 
grand implications, with positive outcomes. This understanding is supported by how I 
perceived, and previously described,   what I have done – the decision to adopt PRME, 
or the winning of the VC award – a grand achievement, demonstrating an external 
recognition of the importance of what I do. Since most things I do are not on such a 
grand scale, how can they be seen as CSR activities?  
As the above passages are fragments of the diary, and are not necessarily as clear to the reader 
as they are to me or to those familiar with my work, it is important to reiterate the 
understandings that had started to develop during that time.  
Firstly, I recognised that previous patterns of thought were recurring in my work. ‘Suffering’ 
from the ‘impostor syndrome’11 and having a tendency to denigrate my achievements impeded 
my ability to recognise the significance of the work I’d been doing.  
Secondly, I recognised that despite lecturing on the importance of a critical review of models 
and frameworks, I accepted the same models and frameworks as a norm. Deviating from this 
norm became difficult to perceive as CSR. The more I read the more critical I became of the 
mainstream literature. Yet, at the same time, the ‘damage’ had been done, I’d absorbed the 
sanitised version of CSR presented in the mainstream CSR literature. 
Lastly, the ‘grand narrative of CSR’ had an immense impact on my perception of what can and 
what cannot be considered CSR. The need for my actions to conform to that perception, 
impeded my ability to recognise that in my daily interactions with others, in those ‘smalls act 
of responsibility’, my sense-making of our responsibility to the community has been evolving.   
  
                                                          
11 Assessing a university leadership development programme, I came across many colleagues describing 
similar emotions, feeling like a fraud. Having read those reflections, I went on to read some literature on 
the ‘impostor syndrome’ or IP (Clance and Imes 1978; Clance 1985; Clance et al. 1995). The scope of this 
dissertation does not allow discussion of this aspect in detail.  
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Evolving CSR idealisation 
Producing yet another review of the development of the CSR concept would be of little value. 
Carroll’s excellent historical reviews of the concept (Carroll, 2008, Carroll, 1999); Melé’s 
(2008) and Garriga and Melé’s (2004) useful classification of CSR theories, and Lee’s 
insightful retrospection (2008) have become cornerstones of the CSR literature and have been 
cited in numerous CSR publications. The aim of this review is to trace the process of CSR 
idealisation, to understand how ‘CSR has swept across the world and has become one of the 
buzzwords of the new millennium’ (Pedersen, 2006: 137) 
Before Bowen 
Interest in our responsibilities to the environment, both social and ecological, can be traced as 
far back in history as biblical times. The Hebrew Bible (believed to have been written during a 
millennium between 1200 and 100 BCE  (Das et al., 2014)), particularly the Torah (Pentateuch) 
provides practical guidance for conducting business. It addresses many areas that today are 
being included in the CSR construct – fair treatment of  employees and suppliers, caring for the 
poor, maintaining honest prices, and environmental concerns (Friedman, 2000). The 
theological-philosophical questions regarding morality and responsibility have been addressed 
throughout the ages. From Plato and Aristotle, to John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant and G. W. 
F. Hegel, philosophers have written on justice, economic matters and morality.   
In Ancient Greece ‘captains of industry’ were held to account for failing to adhere to 
contemporary codes of morality, or if they did not demonstrate using their wealth for ‘the 
greater good’. In medieval times the Church became the main guardian of business morality, 
and businessmen were required to uphold biblical ethical standards. Accumulating wealth 
through business was seen as positive only if it was the means to his own and his neighbours’ 
wellbeing (Bauer and Fenn, 1972).  
During the mercantile era (16-19th centuries), as the power of the Catholic Church diminished, 
and businessmen became more respected and more influential, the state ensured that business 
behaved responsibly (Eberstadt, 1973). People of Germany for example, were benefitting from 
social security provided by the state and local districts, as well as wealthy citizens, guilds and 
churches. The main example of this was the contribution by Jacob Fugger II, a wealthy 
merchant, who established an endowment in Augsburg to build social housing for poor people, 
which became known as Fuggerei. Critics of Fugger were quick to remind us that his support 
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was a rational business decision, rather than an expression of charitable spirit. His family were 
at the centre of the debate about usury, monopoly and speculative trading, so the establishment 
of the endowment can be seen as an attempt to refute the critique (Waldkirch et al., 2009). 
Philanthropy prevailed during that period, but it existed mostly as local activity (Van Leeuwen, 
2012).  
The industrial age saw the rise of the corporation. With it the balance of power tilted towards 
business owners. Although the corporate charter was given only to companies who were to 
perform some public duty, governments were unable to control corporate heads, who drove 
down wages and were not concerned with workplace safety, or fair competition. They engaged 
in monopolistic practices and price-fixing, e.g. ‘Representatives of the various coal companies 
met at the house of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan this Week and informally decided to limit coal 
production and maintain prices’ (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 27 1886, quoted 
in Cantillo, 2007: 24). Cornelius Vanderbilt was involved in corruption, ‘stock watering’ and 
corporate collusion. Andrew Carnegie effectively broke the Unions and the Homestead Lockout 
led to several deaths (Shanker, 1992). John D. Rockefeller Sr was notorious for his anti-
competition and other questionable practices (Chernow, 1998). In England the Cadbury 
brothers continued to purchase cocoa from the Gulf of Guinea islands, although William 
Cadbury had been aware of the use of slave labour by the Portuguese for many years 
(Killingray, 2006).  
The idea that companies have responsibilities to society were commonly accepted during the 
process of industrialisation in Europe (Berthoin Antal et al., 2009). In the growing Swedish 
industry the responsibility for workers’ welfare was mainly with the employer (De Geer et al., 
2009). Caja de Pensiones para la Vejez y de Ahorros (la Caixa) is an example of ‘financial 
institution with a profound social sense’ (Argandoña et al., 2009a: 336) and its establishment 
can be seen as ‘an exercise in social responsibility’ (Argandoña et al., 2009b: 327). In Japan the 
responsibility between employee and employer was based on the sense of duty. Nonetheless, 
government began regulating working conditions and environmental pollution in the 1880s. 
Indian merchants contributed to the community, through what was called ‘merchant charity’. 
With industrialisation of India in the mid-19th century, leading industrialist families participated 
in social development of the country, largely through foundations that supported health, 
educational and cultural aims (Husted, 2015).   
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The industrial age was also the beginning of grand-scale philanthropy in the USA. The same 
people who engaged in ethically questionable (even by contemporary standards), and at times 
illegal, business practices donated some proportion of their at times ill-gained fortunes to 
charitable causes. Today they are mostly remembered for their benevolence, rather than 
ruthlessness, and hailed as great businessmen and leaders (Pomerantz, 2013). As their economic 
clout increased, so did discontent with corporate practices, and the Populists and the 
Progressives in the USA were able to make some progress in ‘forcing the large corporations 
into compliance with standards of common honesty’ (Eberstadt, 1973: 81).  
World War I halted those reforms, and as the war ended and business was booming again, 
wealth creation became revered and an image of a wealthy businessman was elevated to an 
almost religious status. As President Coolidge stated, ‘The man who builds a factory builds a 
temple. The man who works there worships there’ (Leuchtenburg, 1958/1993: 188). This 
megalomaniac expansion of business culminated in the collapse of the economy in 1929. Some 
attribute this collapse to corporate irresponsibility (e.g. Eberstadt, 1973), which demonstrates 
cultivation of a certain fantasy about what responsible business ought to be.  
In the period between 1929 and the beginning of WWII cartelisation, price fixing and 
production limitations – antithetic to the currently accepted CSR actions – were advocated by 
captains of industry, like Gerard Swope, president of GE, in an attempt to revive the economy 
(McQuaid, 1978). The struggles of the Great Depression overshadowed ideas of responsibility. 
The post-WWII economic boom was paralleled in the expansion of the corporation. However, 
during the Cold War, being responsible meant merely taking an anti-Communist stance 
(Eberstadt, 1973); and since any social movement had to support the anti-Communist purges, 
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The beginning of CSR idealisation  
The watershed for CSR was in the 1940s. Until WWII any mention of responsibility referred to 
individuals and not to corporations. From Biblical times through to the Industrial Age, it was 
the businessman (a businesswoman was never mentioned) who was supposed to be responsible, 
and later who was the benevolent philanthropist12, and they were (supposed to be) responsible 
as individuals. Following increases in the size and relative power of corporations since the Great 
Depression, academics and business leaders began discussing responsibility in terms of the 
social responsibility of organisations. And those who were still referring to businessmen (e.g. 
Flanders, 1945, Bowen, 2013/1953) were discussing their responsibility on behalf of business. 
Spector (2008) traces the roots of the ‘CSR movement’ to the early Cold War period, when 
D.K. David (1949), the dean of Harvard Business School began urging business people and 
graduates to consider the responsibilities of business. However, glimmers of shifting 
responsibility towards business had begun appearing even earlier. Reference to chain shops as 
citizens appears in 1943 (Converse and Beattie, 1943). Ballaine (1947) argues that business 
(note, not business people) should participate in community forums. Francis (1948) and Jones 
(1949) referred to social responsibility of business and industry.  
The 1940s also marked the beginning of the idealisation of social responsibility. Up until then 
people in business behaved responsibly because such behaviour was prescribed by religious or 
social norms. Since the 1940s we can witness justification of responsibility as a means for 
achieving some lofty goals, and as such it began to be idealised. For example, Spector (2008: 
314) notes that corporate responsibility started gaining momentum ‘as a means of aligning 
business interests with the defense of free-market capitalism against what was depicted as the 
clear-and-present danger of Soviet Communism’. In the grand style of the 1940s Clarence 
Francis, chairman of the board of General Foods, in his speech to Harvard Business School 
graduates, claimed that the superiority of American industry rests in its motivation to be 
responsible (Francis, 1948). Jones, addressing the Society for Advancement of Management, 
claimed: 
                                                          
12 Although the famous case of Dodge vs. Ford Motor Company reveals that Henry Ford intended to invest 
in social causes on behalf of the corporation, this was an exception to the zeitgeist of the early 20th century 
in the USA.  
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If industry accepts its economic and social responsibilities and tells its story honestly 
and completely we are prepared to meet any change. We will be masters of our fate. 
Not slaves (Jones, 1949: 254). 
Dempsey (1949:399) compared business to family, providing an unrealistic description of both 
institutions: 
The union of economic factors in efficient cooperation has a strong analogy to the 
family. The firm like the family is a union of equal persons with different but essential 
contributions. 
According to Dempsey, Social Responsibility is a manifestation of this ‘efficient cooperation’. 
Following this logic, questioning SR would be akin to questioning family values. 
The advocates of Social Responsibilities did not go as far as specifying what those 
responsibilities were, or how the ‘business’ should go about being ‘responsible’. Nevertheless, 
the seeds of aggrandising CSR were sown by those speeches. Bowen provided one of the first 
definitions of those responsibilities: 
It refers to the obligation of businessmen to pursue those policies, to make those 
decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the 
objectives and values of our society (2013/1953: 6).  
Defined in such a way, who could object to Social Responsibility? Objecting to it, would be 
objecting to ‘objectives and values of our society’. Bowen (ibid) proceeded to define the 
doctrine of social responsibility as referring 
to the idea, now widely expressed, that voluntary assumption of social responsibility 
by businessmen is, or might be, a practicable means toward ameliorating economic 
problems. 
It is therefore little wonder that Eberstadt (1973) suggested that the Great Depression was 
caused by irresponsibility of business, and that CSR could have prevented it. Later, others (e.g. 
Herzig and Moon, 2013, Curran, 2015) followed this reasoning to blame the latest (2007-9) 
financial crisis on business irresponsibility. 
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Bowen warns that the doctrine is no panacea, ‘no cure-all’, but ‘it contains important truth’ 
(2013/1953:7). In the ensuing years since the publication of the book this qualification seems 
to have been ignored, and CSR is often proposed, if not as a cure for all societal disorders, but 
definitely as a remedy for most ailments. 
Current discourse 
The 20 years after the publication of Social Responsibility of Businessmen were mostly devoted 
to defining CSR, with little empirical research or significant change in practice, i.e. there was 
‘more talk than action’ (Carroll, 2008: 28). In an attempt to persuade the executive to adopt 
CSR, the writers presented various arguments. Davis (Davis, 1897) (1973: 313) claims that 
paying attention to the social needs of the community would lead to magnificent results: 
Labor recruiting will be easier, and labor will be of a higher quality. Turnover and 
absenteeism will be reduced. As a result of social improvements, crime will decrease 
with the consequence that less money will be spent to protect property, and less taxes 
will have to be paid to support police forces. 
In short, CSR will lead to a better society and the business will benefit from this. Davis accepts 
that some of these points have limited theoretical underpinning, and numerous studies that have 
been conducted to confirm Davis’s premise remain inconclusive (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Yet, 
the argument of ‘doing well by doing good’ remains prevalent among academics, public 
officials and executives (Karnani, 2011). The first group in Garriga and Melé’s classification 
(2004), instrumental theories, are largely concerned with trying to convince us of that.  
Other authors kept idealising CSR and its potential. For example, Frederick (1960) claims that 
organisations’ resources must be used for broad social ends. Votaw (1972: 28) suggests that 
‘there may be more to the doctrine of social responsibility than we had first thought. It may be 
one of the building blocks for new social, political and economic structures in our society’. 
Drucker (1984) proposed nothing less than the idea that  
the proper social responsibility of business is to tame the dragon, that is to turn a social 
problem into economic opportunity and economic benefit, into productive capacity, 
into human competence into well-paid jobs, into wealth.  
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Russell (cited in Kraus and Brtitzelmaier, 2012: 284) recognised this glamorising of CSR and 
pointed out that 
social responsibility, according to these definitions, refers to idealistic views on 
organisations performing activities that protect and improve society’s wellbeing. 
By 1972 the glamorising of CSR had spread to business leaders, politicians and other opinion 
shapers. As illustrated by Votaw (1972: 25) 
Corporation presidents and chairmen of the board rarely make public statements 
without giving it [Social Responsibility] prominence. The editors of Fortune and other 
business periodicals devote whole issues to it. Politicians are enchanted by its broad 
appeal.   
Given the political atmosphere of anti-communism and McCarthyism in the US, CSR was seen 
as a way to defend the American capitalist ideology from the assault of socialism (Bowen, 
2013/1953). This required cloaking CSR in strong, emotive and heroic rhetoric.  
In the previous section I mentioned that the practices, which are currently addressed as CSR, 
existed in the US and Europe long before the term CSR was introduced. Wealthy benefactors 
(sometimes) invested in social security of their fellow citizens. Yet the development of those 
practices has taken different forms on the two continents. From a complexity perspective, this 
divergence is not surprising; very different backgrounds, social norms, religious interpretations, 
political systems, and numerous other factors could only result in different practices of 
responsibility. The issue of responsibility ‘is viewed mainly as voluntary and unregulated in the 
US, as intertwined with laws and government policies in Europe’ (Argandona and Hoivik, 
2009: 227) . Of course there is no unified ‘European’ CSR, but there are some traditions that 
are common to European, especially Central European, countries, which are significantly 
different from the US 
Because of its tradition of individualism, legalism and pragmatism, business culture in 
the United States is more reluctant to accept the view of the firm as a socially 
embedded institution, unlike in Continental Europe, where this notion is welcome and 
prevalent despite variations (Sison, 2009: 244) 
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It is possible that for these reasons the concept had to be presented in beneficial terms in the 
US, whereas in the early years of CSR research, it was not explicitly discussed in Europe. CSR 
started gaining importance in American discourse, while in Europe it was implicit in practice, 
and relations between business and society were governed by societal norms, legal 
requirements, welfare state and strong Unions in  many European countries (Albareda et al., 
2008, Cantó-Milà and Lozano, 2009, Midttun et al., 2015, Signori and Rusconi, 2009, 
Waldkirch et al., 2009).  
Although different contexts lead to the emergence of different practices and understandings of 
CSR locally, globally those understandings have ‘family resemblances’ (Mowles, 2017). 
Researching CSR in Ukraine (Chapter 3), we did not explain what we meant by CSR, and as a 
result were sometimes surprised, but the respondents knew what we were talking about in 
general. And it was understandable to us why some of the practices discussed by the Ukrainian 
participants, e.g. paying taxes, were considered CSR in the Ukrainian context – it was about 
voluntary contributions of business to society13.   
During the 1970s and 1980s two debates were taking place on the fringes of CSR discourse - 
the moral personhood of an organisation and the necessity of CSR. The former was short-lived, 
and as Velasquez (2003: 531) laments, ‘many feel that the issue has been resolved in favour of 
the view that corporate organizations are morally responsible for their actions’. The latter has 
been ongoing for over 50 years, having its most vocal and controversial advocate in Milton 
Friedman. Since his famous (some may say infamous) article ‘The Social Responsibility of 
Business is to Increase its Profits’ (Friedman, 1970), there have not been many critics of the 
need for CSR. Admittedly, there is a thread of theory critiquing the concept of CSR (e.g. Van 
Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008, Freeman and Liedtka, 1991). Another thread, also led by 
Critical Management Theorists, is sceptical ‘about the motivations and effects of corporate 
action’ (Kuhn and Deetz, 2008: 173). Even fewer follow Milton Friedman and take a stand 
against corporations assuming social responsibility (Karnani, 2011, Henderson, 2009). In the 
dominant CSR discourse the idea that the corporation (and other organisations) can and should 
assume CSR is promoted. As one prominent academic put it: 
CSR is infiltrating into corporate consciousness and corporate culture, finds expression 
in the workplace, sparks stakeholder involvement, molds company strategy, enriches 
                                                          
13 Taxation is compulsory in Ukraine, corruption and tax avoidance are rife DANILOVA, M. & SATTER, R. 
2014. How Ukraine's Tax Cheats Stole Billions from the Country's Coffers. The Guardian..   
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the quality of community life, broadens business vision, and seeks to humanize 
economic enterprise wherever it is found (Frederick, 2008: 528) 
This highlighting of a highly idealised and unrealistic view of CSR is largely ignored in the 
dominant discourse. After all, it is not easy to object to such a lofty idea. CSR became accepted 
as desirable, and even magical, ‘as a panacea that will solve the global poverty gap, social 
exclusion and environmental degradation’ (van Marrewijk, 2003: 96).  
There have been some attempts to demystify the idealised perception of CSR. Doane (2005), 
echoing Freeman and Liedtka  (1991), is concerned that as long as CSR is presented as the 
‘friendly face of capitalism’, while operating within the traditional free-market framework, the 
expectations of CSR are naïve. She debunks the ‘myth of CSR’, as a collection of unrealistic 
and unachievable claims: ‘CSR can hardly be expected to deliver when the stock market 
provides disincentives for doing so’ (Doane, 2005: 26).  
Entine (2003: 352) also warns that ‘[s]ocial investment advocates rely on sketchy, highly 
selective research and pseudo-objective ratings’, yet the draw of Social Responsibility is 
irresistible. The numbers of Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds and their volume are 
increasing (Sparkes, 2002 cited Mill, 2006, Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2009). These findings are 
puzzling in light of studies demonstrating that SR stocks perform worse than the controlled 
sample (Becchetti and Ciciretti, 2009). I have not found any studies examining the motives for 
such financially-irrational behaviour. Jansson and Biel (2014, 2011) found that institutional 
investors believe that SRI funds deliver better long-term results. One has to ask: what is this 
belief based on? Why are institutional investors and fund managers, supposedly rational 
economic agents, holding beliefs which are contrary to the presented evidence? In my view this 
has little to do with the ethical stance of the fund managers, as the authors examined beliefs 
about performance. One possible explanation is that the aura of CSR is strong enough to 
overcome the financial rationality of funds managers and investors alike. 
In the last two decades the focus of CSR research has shifted from theorising CSR to empirically 
investigating national and industry-level CSR (see Carroll, 2008), and there has a continuous 
quest to establish the link between CSR and performance (e.g. Corporate Financial Performance 
(CFP), and other types of performances that are associated with it: reputation, legitimacy, 
customer and employee loyalty, and competitive advantage). As alluded to earlier, the fact that 
the researchers seek to establish those links points to the belief that CSR may lead to such 
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outcomes, which in itself is a manifestation of CSR idealisation. The enormous attention given 
to CSR research around the globe, from Algeria (Gana-Oueslati and Labaronne, 2011) to 
Zimbabwe (Nyahunzvi, 2013); and to investigating various industries, from advertising 
(Hyllegard et al., 2012) to water management (Chaklader and Gautam, 2014); demonstrates the 
prevalence and eminence of CSR  as a research topic.  
The volume of CSR research and coverage of CSR issues in the news media has been on the 
rise (Lee and Carroll, 2011) . CSR reporting has been increasing as well (Lydenberg and 
Sinclair, 2009).  Based on this attention, one could be lulled into believing that CSR is currently 
at the top of the management agenda. But Steger  (2008) soberly urges us not to mistake 
reporting for performance. He, having worked in both camps, academia and industry, claims 
that the rate of accepting CSR is very slow and ‘the impacts of such efforts currently remain 
significantly below the academic expectations’ (ibid: 563).  
Pruzan (2001, 2008) asserts that organisations have been adopting, and are currently focusing 
on operationalising CSR. This seems to be contradictory to Steger’s claim. However, the still 
very generalised and ambiguous definitions of CSR result in the possibility of both claims being 
true. Steger refers to CSR as ‘breakthrough innovation and new business models’, which have 
not been forthcoming (Steger, 2008); Pruzan understands operationalising CSR as ‘how to 
integrate it [CSR] into the corporation’s vocabulary, policies, stakeholder communications, and 
reporting systems’, which he finds is currently the state of corporate affairs (Pruzan, 2008: 552-
553). The two authors’ views converge in relation to the grand scale and idealisation of CSR. 
Steger suggests that CSR will result in ‘innovation and new business models’; Pruzan proposes 
that the CSR agenda ‘will be characterized by organizational existential inquiry as to corporate 
identity, success, and responsibility’ (emphasis in original).  
It is impossible to cover the vast body of CSR research produced in the last 20 years in detail. 
For the purpose of this dissertation I will focus on one aspect – what is being considered as 
CSR, what is included in and what is excluded from CSR research. CSR is still being referred 
to in very general terms. Those terms allow many aspects to be incorporated under the CSR 
umbrella: from employee volunteering (Sheel and Vohra, 2016), to corporate philanthropy 
(Hadani and Coombes, 2015), to the reduction of environmental impact (Eweje and Sakaki, 
2015). In the majority of studies CSR is unquestionably referred to as desirable. What is missing 
from those studies is the discussion of how people (not organisations) operationalise CSR; what 
people are actually doing when they say they engage in CSR activities. It is of little wonder, 
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therefore, that I could not comprehend my daily interactions, which have usually been less 
grandiose than corporate community programs (Rehbein and Schuler, 2015) or gender equality 
strategies (Larrieta-Rubín de Celis et al., 2015), as engaging in CSR.  
Cult value of CSR 
The above literature review traced the process of idealisation of CSR. To understand the 
enduring appeal of CSR, I will draw on the work of George Herbert Mead. In The Philosophy 
of the Act (1938) Mead presents the idea of social objects which are different from physical 
objects. Physical objects exist as things in nature, and they exist independently of the meaning 
we attach to them. Social objects can only be made sense of in terms of social interactions. They 
can be understood as a large number of people having a tendency to act in a certain way in a 
certain situation (ibid). The market is one example given by Mead. In order for the market to 
function all involved must take a similar attitude. All participants know, in general terms, what 
is expected of them and what they expect from the others. Perhaps a contemporary example of 
shopping as a social object could demonstrate this point. Having moved to Israel from Ukraine, 
on my first venture abroad from Israel, I went into a shop in Manhattan. Upon entering the shop 
I was asked ‘to check my bag’, meaning I had to leave it in the shop storage box. Coming from 
a country where every public space had airport-style security, I did not think twice to open my 
bag to show its contents to the security guard, expecting he wanted to check its contents. He 
was surprised and told me to close my bag and to ‘check it’. I was puzzled how he could expect 
to ‘check it’ without opening it. We both spoke English, but this situation required the 
intervention of an Israeli-American friend to explain to each of us what the other was saying. 
Without the shared tendency to act upon entering a shop, the notion of ‘shop security’ became 
meaningless. Incidentally, at the time, the late 1980s, my Soviet relatives would not have 
understood the idea of ‘shop security’ – there had been no reports of acts of terrorism in the 
USSR at the time, nor was there anything in the shops to be stolen.   
CSR can be understood as a social object. Highly generalised, and continuously changing, its 
mention, nonetheless, evokes in us a certain reaction that is common to those who are involved 
in CSR.  We have come to refer to voluntary acts on behalf of the organisation that have some 
value outside of that organisation as CSR.  No one will argue that my volunteering in the local 
school is an act of CSR. However, my participating in the local steering group whose aim is to 
bring local business and community together (CVS St Albans, 2014) is a part of the university’s 
CSR portfolio.  
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The enactments of social objects in every-day life do not follow precise prescriptions. We have 
some expectations of how to act and how others might act. As social objects are a tendency to 
act by a large number of people, rather than a ‘recipe to act’, they are taken up in many 
interactions, by people with various and often incompatible intentions, which inevitably leads 
to conflicts. This understanding of CSR is useful to both practitioners and academics, as it 
renders conflict an inherent feature of enacting CSR, rather than a negative by-product of poor 
communication or a sign of failing in assuming CSR. This understanding helps me realise that 
such disagreements are inevitable, thus reducing my anxiety when they occur.  
Mead (1923: 229) draws attention to highly idealised social objects and the way we unwittingly 
and unquestioningly accept and enact them: 
there is a structure in our experience beyond what we ordinarily term our consciousness; 
that this structure of idea determines to a degree not generally recognised the very 
manner of our perception as well as that of our thinking, and that structure itself is 
generally not in the focus of attention and passes unnoticed in our thought and 
perceiving. 
By ‘structure’ I believe Mead means the values that we hold so strongly that we do not usually 
pay attention to the way they buttress our thinking and acting. We cannot ‘do justice to [those 
values] in their whole import, and yet when they are once envisaged they appear too precious 
to be ignored, so that in our action we do homage to them’ (ibid: 239). He refers to those social 
objects as ‘cult values’. Mead does not use the term ‘cult’ pejoratively, but rather to demonstrate 
the strength and endurance of those values. They can be ‘good or bad or both’ (Stacey, 2011: 
376). Mead’s examples include Christendom, democracy and patriotism. Being idealised, they 
are rarely realised in everyday life, but we tend to believe they are achievable in the future, 
which is free of obstacles. They are aspirations, rather than reflections of behaviour. We tend 
to forget that they are unattainable in their pure theoretical conceptualisation. We must 
‘translate’ them into our contextualised living present. Flemming and Jones (2013) note that 
there is very little resemblance between the idea of democracy and the ‘joke that is 
parliamentary democracy’. Quality improvement in healthcare (Brown, 2007), and leadership 
(Griffin and Stacey, 2005) are also examples of cult values – idealised aspirational values, 
whose meaning is being radically transformed from the theorised version to operationalisation 
in organisations. Similarly ‘social responsibility’, currently one of the university’s graduate 
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attributes, is an aspirational value that must be, and is interpreted by each of us in our everyday 
interactions.                                                                                                                                         
The way CSR is addressed in the dominant CSR literature resonates with Mead’s discussion of 
‘cult values’. CSR is viewed as desirable, and even magical, ’as the panacea that will solve the 
global poverty gap, social exclusion and environmental degradation’ (van Marrewijk, 2003: 96) 
– a reified ‘something’ the  organizations must aspire to. The myth of CSR as a progressive and 
transformative way of ‘socializing the firm’ (Fleming and Jones, 2013: 6) is perpetuated in the 
mainstream management literature. Freeman and Liedtka  (1991) point out that current CSR 
rhetoric is based on acceptance of  capitalism (I would argue a cult value in itself) as ‘an 
immutable system’ (ibid, 1991: 93). Yet, some authors go as far as to suggest that ‘CSR and 
stakeholder theory… must also find some way of instilling habits that run contrary to those 
defined by the nature and logic of capitalism itself’(Reiter, 2016). The extent of the idealisation 
of CSR is illustrated by Van Oosterhout and Heugens’s (2008: 206) critique  of the extensive 
application of the concept of CSR in empirical research, ‘in spite of it being highly ambiguous 
what CSR is’. The continuous quest to establish the link between CSR and organisational 
performance indicates the underlying assumption that such a link may exist.  
 
Cult values provide us with aspiration and a sense of belonging, and are sustained in social 
interactions (Mead, 1923; 1934). Social institutions are required to perpetuate the cult values 
(ibid). CSR could not have become so prominent had it not been for the social institutions, like 
the British Academy of Management CSR Special Interest Group, CSR-dedicated academic 
journals, university courses on CSR, the UN Global Compact, PRME, who perpetuate the ideal 
of CSR by creating social situations which reinforce our individual values as shared values, to 
evoke our sense of belonging on a basis of holding and idealising the same value. In the latest 
call for papers for the PRME 10th Anniversary Special Issue International Journal of 
Management Education, the phrasing describing what type of papers was sought left little doubt 
that the special issue is intended to perpetuate that positive image of PRME.  
The special issue will be published in 2017 (PRME's 10th Anniversary) in time for the 
Global Forum, so the call is twofold: Papers looking at what has been achieved in the 
last decade and papers looking towards the SDG14 agenda for PRME. (Parkes, 2016, 
emphasis added). 
                                                          
14 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) are 12 goals by United Nations Development Programme in 2012 
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Idealised social objects/cult values are highly generalised and must be functionalised and 
enacted in ordinary everyday interactions. ‘Social responsibility’ is one of the six ‘graduate 
attributes’ introduced by the current Vice-Chancellor. This word combination is stencilled on 
the walls across the university alongside ‘creativity’, ‘respect’ and other idealisations. As I 
struggled to ‘embed’ responsibility in the curriculum, I turned to colleagues in other schools 
and in the Learning and Teaching Institute (LTI) to learn how others addressed this attribute. It 
became clear that others found this highly generalised attribute difficult to particularise. When 
I asked for ‘examples of best practice’, I was told that the LTI is still (three years after the 
introduction of graduate attributes) compiling the document. I was also told that every school 
took a different approach. Within the business school each colleague interpreted this idea 
differently. In compiling the PRME progress report in the summer of 2013, I emailed all 
colleagues asking if and how they embedded the PRME principles in their modules. Only 24 
colleagues (out of nearly 200) responded identifying 27 modules (out of over 200 modules 
delivered in the business school). The interpretations ranged from fundraising for charities, to 
volunteering, to embedding a practical project in a module, to an evaluation of a case study on 
euthanasia.   Reading those module guides it became clear that I was reading 24 understandings 
of the meaning of responsibility. 
Dissenting voices 
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the critique of CSR in the academic community is minimal. 
The most vocal opponents are also the most unlikely allies in critiquing CSR.  Neo-liberal 
economists (e.g. Henderson, 2009, Lal, 2006) critique the current doctrine of CSR, seeing it as 
overarching and indiscriminate in its application to all organisations: ‘not only CSR is radical 
in what it prescribes for businesses, but it admits of no exceptions’ (Henderson, 2009: 12). The 
critics also believe that acting upon such doctrine is harmful to world economies. The 
underlying assumption of their critique is that the current doctrine of CSR is incompatible with 
the basic capitalist idea, that efficient markets will address social and environmental needs 
(Karnani, 2011).  
Critical Management scholars draw our attention to the contested nature of CSR, and their main 
critique is that contemporary CSR is firmly embedded in capitalist ideology (Freeman and 
Liedtka, 1991, Banerjee, 2008, Shamir, 2008, Devinney, 2009, Fleming and Jones, 2013). 
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The new ethos of global responsibility is thus able to put capitalism to work as the most 
efficient instrument of the common good. The basic ideological dispositive of 
capitalism…is separated from its concrete socio-economic conditions,…leaving those 
very capitalist relations intact (Zizek, 2009: 35 cited in Fleming and Jones, 2013: 31).  
The two streams of scholars disagree about whether the current CSR discourse is too capitalist 
or undermining capitalism. They do agree on two points: firstly, the highly idealised approach 
to CSR. ‘Responsibilization’ and  the processes of market ‘moralization’ (Shamir, 2008), the 
‘myth of CSR’ (Doane, 2005), the ‘grand illusion’(Karnani, 2011) and the ‘new opiate of the 
masses’ (Fleming and Jones, 2013) are some of the extreme terms used to describe CSR. 
Secondly, the critics agree that ‘there is now a general consensus, both within the business 
world and outside it, that businesses today should embrace and put into effect “corporate social 
responsibility”’ (Henderson, 2009 : 11). 
While CSR is mainly discussed in general terms, the details of practising CSR are absent, and 
the daily mundane activities are being ignored by the academic discourse. My difficulty in 
perceiving my daily work as CSR seems to reflect that. Yet, in private conversations I’ve held 
during conferences and workshops, I’ve noticed that my colleagues from other universities have 
been recognising that our interpretations of CSR arise in such everyday conversations, in 
mundane activities, rather than in grand gestures.  
But when I began thinking about this, I had not given those activities sufficient attention. For 
example, after attending a workshop on ‘embedding social responsibility in HE’ in 2012, I 
wrote this entry in my diary:   
I noticed … that several times (as in more than once or twice) the importance of ‘sitting 
down and having tea’ was mentioned. It felt as if this was mentioned in order to elevate 
the value of this activity, to legitimise it, implying that the participants do not (or 
maybe, defensively, they do) perceive this as an inferior activity. 
In suggesting that the participants were attempting to attach greater value to ‘sitting down and 
having tea’, I had fallen into the trap of diminishing these daily activities. In looking for why 
those activities were mentioned, and attributing to the others’ intentions to legitimise tea-
drinking, I was de-legitimising it. The influence of the grand narrative of CSR on my thinking 
was so strong that I ignored my own experience of practising CSR in daily interactions with 
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others, very often while having a ‘cuppa’. It is perhaps due to this thinking that I initially found 
it difficult to classify Rachel’s not-so-grand act of notifying estates (Chapter 4) as CSR.     
Describing CSR as an activity that has nearly mythical powers resonates with Alvesson and 
Sveningsson’s (2003) discussion of another highly idealised construct – leadership. In the 
following excerpt I deliberately replace the original term ‘leadership’ with ‘CSR’.  
Most of the CSR literature emphasizes that CSR is very significant and something 
quite special. There is a lot of mystique around CSR as it appears in academic texts 
and the mass media, as well as in conversations among practitioners. The signifier 
CSR frequently leads people to associate with acts and accomplishments beyond the 
petty and mundane. CSR creates results. Contemporary writing usually frames CSR in 
visionary and heroic terms …It does so in a way that is positive for most participants 
(adapted from Alvesson and Sveningsson, 2003: 1435-1436).  
The passage is as powerful for the CSR discourse as the original is for the leadership discourse. 
The authors suggest that we need to rethink leadership, taking ordinary, trivial acts, such as 
‘listening, chatting and being cheerful’ (ibid: 1436) seriously. I suggest we need to treat our 
conceptualisation of CSR in the same manner.  
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Re-telling CSR 
I suspect that another reason for my difficulty in accepting my work as meaningful CSR practice 
was the way CSR practice was accounted for in official reports (e.g. case studies, company 
accounts, practitioners’ as well as academic writings15) - smooth, planned and seamlessly 
executed, and mostly unchallenged. These descriptions did not resonate with my patchy, at 
times opportunistic, often Sisyphean practice. In my diary entry quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter I mentioned how my practice was being developed by acting in the moment, not 
knowing what the outcomes would be. Scott (2012) focuses on the aspect that is very rarely 
addressed in literature – historic accounts are written in retrospect, post-factum, specifically for 
the purpose of highlighting a specific past event. As such, the outcomes are known, so the 
details that do not contribute to that outcome, or that seem less important to the author, are 
excluded. And many of the ‘random’ or opportunistic behaviours are, in those accounts, 
endowed with a meaning that fits with the outcome. Scott argues that: 
[it] is hardly surprising that historians and social scientists should typically give short 
shrift to the confusion, flux, and tumultuous contingency experienced by the historical 
actors, let alone the ordinary by-standers, whose actions they are examining. 
One perfectly obvious reason for the deceptively neat order of these accounts is 
precisely because they are ‘history’. The events in question simply turned out one way 
rather than another, obscuring the fact that the participants likely had no idea how they 
would turn out and that, under slightly different circumstances , things might have 
turned out very differently (ibid: 134).  
This particularly resonates with the responsibility or ethics stories. In light of the idealised 
narrative of CSR, highlighting the heroics and obscuring the confusion seems almost necessary. 
The more coherent the CSR story is, the more appealing and reassuring the CSR prospect. A 
coherent story also requires a logical sequence of events, presentation of relevant information 
and evidence to support the claims. Pinto (2001) suggests that telling a coherent story is similar 
to a prosecutor building a case in court ‘by assembling items of testimony and physical evidence 
which, if accepted and interpreted as she wants us to interpret them, will point to the guilt of 
the accused’ (ibid: 71). Like in a prosecutor’s case, in the case of CSR only information that is 
                                                          
15 I separate practitioners’ and academic papers, as most academic writings, with very few exceptions (e.g. 
Steger, 2008), are not written by practitioners about their practice. 
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relevant to the case (according to the presenter) is offered. It is no surprise then that CSR 
practice is presented in an uncomplicated way. The events are post-rationalised to fit the 
responsible story. To emphasise, I do not suggest that the writers intentionally mislead the 
reader. I suggest that we omit some seemingly irrelevant details in order for the story to make 
sense to us. For example, the story of the American pharmaceutical giant Johnson & Johnson 
(J&J) in dealing with the Tylenol poisoning crisis16 is celebrated as a beacon in crisis 
management and ethical behaviour. Newspapers reported it as a rapid and effective response to 
a crisis (Rehak, 2002). The writers would make us believe that there was no hesitation in making 
the right decision, and that the executives knew what the right decision was (Trevino and 
Nelson, 2014), and that ‘every public relations decision was based on sound, socially 
responsible principles’ (Lawrence G. Foster, Corporate Vice President for PR at J&J quoted in 
Stateman, 2008: 7).  Business ethics textbooks still present it as an example of J&J’s ‘proactive 
Credo’ in action (Robinson and Dowson, 2012: 68). I myself have told the story numerous times 
in teaching business ethics. A few critics (e.g. O'Dwyer, 2013, Bartz, 2012) highlight the details 
that make the Tylenol story less heroic, and Dezenhall (2004) points out that the story represents 
‘a rare confluence of events’. These details are not concealed, but also not highlighted in the 
mainstream literature. The reason I (unwittingly) perpetuated this myth was to demonstrate a 
case of responsible behaviour, to prove that behaving ethically does pay off – in short, to present 
a business case for CSR. I do not presume to know the authors’ reasons for this. Mena et. al. 
(2016) suggest that ‘collective forgetfulness … prevents cognitive overload and helps 
communities make peace with their past’. Perhaps it is easier to present acting responsibly as 
directly linked to rewards (customer loyalty in the case of J&J).  
Although it is important to understand the reasons for this ‘collective forgetfulness’ of 
irresponsibility, my intention in this chapter is not to speculate about the motives, but to 
highlight the endurance of this heroic narrative. 
 
Working in HEA leads to our thinking being influenced, to a certain degree, by institutional 
talk. We learn to present our work as a ‘success story’ (see Chapter 8). Working in institutions 
enables and constrains us to deliver one-dimensional accounts of our work. Including failures 
and weaknesses in our reporting to senior managers would be a career limiting decision. To 
remain in the game (Elias 1978), we must know and play by its rules.  ‘To work for institutions, 
                                                          
16 In 1982 seven people died of what later was revealed as cyanide-laced Tylenol (OTC pain-relief) capsules. 
Several days after being alerted to the cases the managers recalled all Tylenol capsules in the US. The 
poisoning was not linked to the J&J supply chain. The perpetrator has not been apprehended.  
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as practitioners do, can require that you develop a habit of mission talk, what we can call “happy 
talk”, a way of telling a happy story of the institution’ (Ahmed 2012: 10) 
Closely related to my work is the case of the ‘Inspirational Guide for the Implementation of 
PRME: Placing Sustainability at the Heart of Management Education’ (Escudero et al., 2012). 
The Guide is a collection of 63 case studies from 25 countries. As this is an ‘inspirational guide’ 
it is a tale of ‘progress in implementing PRME’ (ibid: 2), and it ‘highlights the important 
changes already taking place across management education today, and the role of PRME in 
effecting such change’ (ibid: 3). As a result, the Guide presents 63 success stories, which 
frustrated, rather than inspired, me as a practitioner. Examples of ‘management commitment’, 
colleagues’ ‘buy-in’ and students’ enthusiasm left me desperate - there must have been 
something wrong with what I was doing  My experience of ‘PRME implementation’ was that 
of difficulty, lack of interest (at best) and resistance (at worst). At a PRME summit in Bled in 
2013, during formal workshops and informal conversation with colleagues from other 
institutions, and with some of the contributors to the Guide, I heard the ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
stories. Those resonated more with my experience. The common theme of those discussions 
was the difficulty of engaging people. But the Guide only captured the outcomes, so the details 
of the processes of achieving those outcomes were lost, and so the seamless narrative of 
implementing PRME principles was created. When the ‘call for contributions’ for the UK 
version of the Guide was announced, it was important to me to submit a case study. In order for 
it to be published, I chose two ‘inspiring’ cases (Filosof, 2014). The cases are factually correct. 
What I omitted was the discontent of the students on realising the projects were mandatory, the 
second-guessing by the colleagues, the difficulties students faced when writing them up and the 
challenges of marking those reflections. But I doubt that a less-than-inspiring case would still 
have been published.  
Scott (2012) uses the analogy of a televised basketball game to explain how historic accounts 
impact our understanding of events. The camera hovers above the events, distancing the viewer 
from those events, with the editor choosing which episodes to replay in slow motion. 
Combined, the bird’s-eye perspective and slow motion make the players’ moves seem 
deceptively easy to viewers, who might fantasize mastering such moves themselves. 
Alas, no actual player experiences the actual game from a helicopter or in slow 
motion. And when, rarely, the camera is placed at floor level and close to the action in 
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real time, one finally appreciates the blinding speed and complexity of the game as 
players experience it; the brief fantasy is instantly dispelled (ibid: 136, my emphasis).    
Scott draws our attention to inevitable simplification of the experience when it is described by 
the outsider. However, I maintain that not even the camera ‘placed at floor level’, or a researcher 
recording a ‘subject’s’ experience, can fully appreciate the nuanced and complex nature of the 
event as experienced by the ‘player’. By paying attention to my experience, I have begun 
noticing the way I understand the practice of CSR.  
Being a ‘player’ I can present a version of events, accounting for motives and understandings 
at the time of those events taking place. The story of the Open Day events (Chapter 4) 
demonstrates my struggle to make sense of what my social responsibilities are, of how being 
‘in charge’ of the school’s social responsibility left me blind to my personal responsibilities. 
Focusing on my actions, draws attention to what I was including in CSR and what I was leaving 
out. By trying to address the questions ‘what does CSR mean to me?’ and ‘how do I practice 
CSR?’ from my own practice and interactions, I aim to tell a rich, nuanced, meaning-full story 
of CSR practice, a story that might resonate with other practitioners.    
Summary 
In this chapter I’ve traced the processes of idealisation of the social object of CSR. The 
overwhelmingly positive CSR narrative could not be sustained had it not been useful. The 
cult value of CSR holds the promise of a better future if only we adopt CSR. However, the 
notion of CSR is highly generalised, and must be functionalised in local interactions. 
Although it is often experienced as being externally imposed, it is being sustained and 
perpetuated only by our acting into it in working locally with each other. 
Local interactions are not an abstract notion, but everyday activities of people with different 
histories, and often incompatible aspirations, which inevitably leads to conflict. Conflict is an 
integral part of any practice, and practice of CSR is no exception. But the heroic narrative of 
CSR allows for no discord, so the struggles that I’ve experienced in practising CSR and in 
thinking about CSR   affected my perceiving my practice as ‘incorrect’ and of myself as a 
‘fraud’.  Reflecting on my own thinking about CSR as a grand aspirational ideal, influenced my 
thinking about my practice as not being worthy of CSR title. Not taking my experience 
seriously, I kept propagating the idealised narrative of CSR in my teaching and discussions with 
others.  
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Another feature of the grand CSR narrative is omitting the details of everyday practice. Aspiring 
to be part of the CSR community, engaging with numerous CSR writings, and participating in 
CSR institutions, I inadvertently became indoctrinated in CSR orthodoxy.  Therefore, when I 
was thinking about my practice, which inevitably consisted of less-than-grand everyday 
interactions, I was unable to perceive those ‘minor’ interactions as CSR. Paying attention to our 
participating in what sometimes seems like mundane activities, we can begin recognising 
patterns of interactions in which we are active participants, rather than passive recipients.  
Mead (1923) argued that to study cult values one needs to study local interactions, rather than 
focusing on visionary goals. Mainstream CSR discourse, however, encourages generalisations. 
In this dissertation I focus on local interactions, paying attention to the immediate and 
particular, aiming to understand aspects of my practice that are often obscured by the grand 
heroic narrative of CSR. 
In the next chapter I will explore my evolving understanding of PRME as responsibility 
activities. Reflecting on the changing understanding of engaging with PRME, I will explore 
revealing and concealing as inseparable processes of our daily interactions.  
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Chapter 6 – Changing narrative of PRME implementation: making sense of practice 
All the variety, all the charm, all the beauty of life is made up of light and shadow (Leo 
Tolstoy, Anna Karenina)  
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4 I reproduced a presentation slide for the Community Engagement Forum (Figure 
1). It is not surprising that the United Nations Principles of Responsible Management Education 
(PRME) is the first item. It became part of the Social Enterprise Unit remit, because the six 
principles (PRME, 2013) provide a  generalised framework for embedding responsibility in HE, 
which fits with my understanding of what can and should be included in the Unit’s activities.  
Although I formally hold two separate roles – director of SEU and PRME champion – most of 
the work I do can be ascribed to either. In both roles, the way I understand them, I am 
responsible for ensuring responsibility is embedded in our practice. Since signing up, PRME 
has become a convenient tool for me to approach conversations about our social or community 
engagement. The UN authority legitimises my work, gives it more gravitas, and opens some 
doors. As the Unit’s director, I’d been trying to speak to the university senior managers for 
several years. It never went further than a polite reply to my e-mail, which was a de-facto brush 
off. In my recent e-mail to the Deputy VC I asked to present our work at the deans’ meeting 
and mentioned our being signatories to PRME. A regular ‘thank you’ e-mail followed, yet two 
months later I was invited to that meeting. Of course, this might have been a coincidence, but 
the fact that I felt more confident with myself in approaching the topic again, framing it in 
PRME terms, demonstrates the impact of PRME on my interactions with others.  
In the previous chapter I discussed the evolving narrative of CSR, which can be understood as 
a cult value – an idealised vision of what is achievable in an obstacle-free future. In this chapter 
I continue thinking about the evolving nature of this heroic narrative. I reflect on the way I talk 
about PRME – a CSR-related initiative introduced at HBS - and the way I address difficulties 
in embedding this initiative in different situations. Reflecting on my experience of discussing 
PRME may provide insights into similar experience of others.  
Being a representative of a PRME signatory, I have also become part of a PRME community, 
attending conferences, being invited to contribute to their publications, and sent a newsletter. I 
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feel comfortable around others who are interested in PRME and what it represents. Although it 
represents different things to different people, the emerging theme in our conversations is how 
we go about making sense of our role as the PRME champions in our organisations. Being a 
member of that community, and representing it in my workplace, I often discuss the signing for 
PRME, engagement with PRME and what it means to me. Initially I was surprised at how my 
story about signing for and embedding PRME kept changing, the aspects that were once 
pertinent later became marginal; and what I ignored at the time, became central in a later 
iteration. I am no longer surprised at those deviations, but try to pay attention to them, as the 
way we talk influences and is being influenced by our practice. In this chapter I pay particular 
attention to the processes of revealing and concealing in the way we discuss our practice, as a 
way of making sense of my practice and of my self.  
Talking about PRME: what am I trying to present to others? 
The level of detail in my description of our signing for PRME differs in different contexts. In 
the Inspiration Guide chapter (Filosof, 2014) I presented the most succinct and the most 
detached version, toeing the party line – we signed in 2011. This is the version I presented at 
the Deans’ meeting. A somewhat more detailed version – it took us over two years to sign – is 
usually presented when discussing PRME with colleagues from other universities, in less 
formal discussions. The least guarded version I’ve presented to ‘outsiders’ so far, was the very 
detailed narrative in my Doctoral Report. My PhD group have been involved in the story as it 
has evolved, helping me make sense of the events as they were happening. But until my second 
progression report, I had never allowed anyone outside the business school to learn about my 
frustrations, difficulties, doubts, and cynicism about signing for PRME. In 2014 I was 
interviewed by Jonathan Louw for his research on PRME. While reading the transcript I was 
surprised to see how much the story I told him was similar to my progression narrative. It was 
almost rehearsed, less raw, more sanitised. It is interesting, because while writing I had the 
opportunity to ‘polish’ the story, an opportunity that was absent when interviewed. There was 
no opportunity to delete and rewrite; what had been said could not be unsaid. Yet, the 
transcribed version was detached, processed. 
Reading it I could almost see myself talking to Jonathan, wanting to share my story, but 
retracing my steps, as I felt I was exposing too much. After my describing the reluctance of the 
managers to sign for PRME, he tried to probe why. I did not say what I thought at the time, 
‘because it was not high on their priority list’. Instead I told how PRME principles coincided 
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with what we had been doing anyway (which I have never questioned, but it still needs probing), 
and how PRME was just a way to formalise our activities. This two-steps-forward-one-step-
back conversation continued 17 
JL How would you describe the journey of discovery, or..or implementation? 
P2   Sisyphean would probably be the word because people are doing their jobs and with 
all the QAA and all the regulations, we have a lot of regulations from the university’s 
QPR’s [UPRs (JF)]. And again me trying to tell them how to do their job, there is a 
lot of resentment going on.  
JL   This is the other Module Leaders or Programme Managers or whatever? 
P2   Yes.  So the management are saying all the right things, go ahead and do it but the 
everyday implementation seems to be near impossible. Those who are already doing 
it are like why do you want to tell me how to do my job, I already do it? And those 
who are not are like well why do I need to change things? I’m not the most popular 
person, but it’s fine.  
JL   You’re used to being unpopular then are you?  
P2   No I’m not being unpopular, it’s just I don’t bring joy to people anymore you know. 
       ... I bring them more work.  
 JL    And because it feels like work, do you think the lack of joy is because they are in 
some way resistant to what it is you are trying to say or just because it means more 
administrative.. 
P2   I think it’s the latter.  
By admitting the Sisyphean nature of my practice, I felt I implicated my colleagues. So I went 
on to ‘acquit’ them – they are overworked, and I bring more work. They are accomplished 
professionals and I was coming to tell them how to do their job. 
                                                          
17 I introduce these transcripts verbatim, as forwarded by the interviewers. In the interview with Jonathan 
Louw my responses are were anonymised as P2. 
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At the UN PRME Global Forum in New York and the UK and Ireland Chapter conference in 
Glasgow in 2015, the theme of difficulty in engaging colleagues was recurring. It was evident 
in formal and informal discussions. Yet, I could not find any reference to that difficulty in 
writing. And certainly there is no mentioning of lecturers refusing to incorporate the topic of 
responsibility into their teaching. The report presented at the Global Forum (PRME, 2015) 
highlights the importance of ‘PRME-related faculty development’. I understood this as 
implying that the lack of engagement is a result of a lack of skills and competencies, rather than 
lack of interest. This was not my impression from table discussions and coffee-time 
conversations I had with colleagues. But in formal presentations this felt taboo, and I wondered 
why. If we all faced this difficulty, why do we not talk about it openly? I did not have a chance 
to probe this with other participants, as we were moving swiftly from one session to another. 
Trying to understand why I avoided this discussion may shed light on some of the dynamics of 
avoiding this very pertinent challenge I face as a CSR practitioner. 
When ‘defending’ my colleagues’ resistance to PRME in the interview, there was some truth 
in stating that the issue was administrative burden. I do believe that some colleagues saw me as 
a bearer of yet another management-imposed initiative, and some resented being introduced to 
more issues to consider in their practice. But there was more – I believed that some colleagues 
were just not interested in CSR. Yet, being aware that everything I said was recorded, how 
could I say that I actually believed there were academics for whom CSR was an insignificant 
appendage to business and management studies. The memory of being told several years ago 
by a programme tutor that the CSR module was irrelevant to the MSc International Business 
programme had not faded away. But I chose not to disclose it, accepting the social norm that 
dirty laundry must never be washed in public.  
In the interview with Charlotte Warin nine months after being interviewed by Jonathan, I 
acknowledged that the process of signing for and engaging colleagues with PRME was lengthy, 
but there was no more referring to it as ‘Sisyphean’. The management was supportive of the 
initiative 
cw - so have you always had managerial support do you think on this area 
jf-  to an extent you know the idea is yes we always have this support, so,...we are talking 
in terms of money, so that’s the biggest evidence of support that you can see so otherwise 
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you would just you know it would just be lip service but I don’t remember any initiative 
that was proposed in that respect that wasn’t supported, so er yeah I would say yes 
Here, as well, the disclosure was only partial. My annoyance and desperation that led to the 
signing up for PRME, my feeling of being on my own in trying to get PRME accepted by the 
colleagues, all this remained unsaid. I had workload allowance for SEU and PRME, and I had 
a small budget, so saying I was supported was not inaccurate, but it was definitely not the whole 
picture.    
Keeping my thoughts to myself was not just about protecting the image of my workplace. I was 
also protecting myself from facing the potentially painful explanation for my managers’ and 
colleagues’ indifference. It is easier to believe that the lack of interest in PRME, and in CSR by 
proxy, is related to extra work, to being busy and protecting their professional identity, rather 
than accepting that a major aspect of my work and my identity is irrelevant to many people in 
my workplace.  
In my Doctoral Review I wrote about setting up a series of conversations after signing for 
PRME. At the time of setting those up and of subsequently writing about it, I managed to shield 
my feelings of disappointment with low attendance by anticipating it. What I was not expecting 
was the dean’s comments in one of the conversations.  
[The dean] also mentioned that at the conferences he attended lately the theme of 
responsibility seems to be overused; ‘people get fed up with hearing the same people 
giving the same talk on the same topic’ were his words. His comment shook me slightly, 
as it could be perceived as a threat to my position, if the subject I’m championing is no 
longer considered to be topical.  
Acknowledging rejection of CSR was tantamount to acknowledging my insignificance to HBS. 
So when pressed to reveal the difficulties with the adoption of PRME, I clammed up.  
JL   So being more specific, can you tell me a story about something that’s happened which 
is broadly connected to the PRME agenda, where things haven’t gone well for one 
reason or the other and what happened? 
P2   I can’t think of things that didn’t go well, it’s just the time it takes, maybe I’m just 
impatient.  
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Teaching, researching and practising CSR is a significant part of my identity. Rejecting CSR 
was not just academic disagreement; it was rejecting me, my relevance.  As long as it is my 
impatience, what I perceive as the lack of engagement with what I do, it does not mean 
indifference to or rejection of what is core to my professional identity, and can thus be tolerated. 
I will discuss identity in the next chapter. Here I would like to draw attention to the complex 
web of feelings, motives and emotions that are inseparable from our practice. The way we talk 
about our practice is also inseparable from those emotions. 
The way I discuss engagement with PRME differs according to audience, but also according to 
many other factors – whether it is in writing or oral, chance conversation or scheduled interview, 
the way I feel about that engagement at the time of the discussion, the purpose of and the 
audience for the discussion. Those factors influence what I reveal and what I conceal about 
PRME. It would be wrong to say ‘what I choose’ to reveal and conceal, as often it is not an 
intended decision, and only in reflecting on the discussions do I realise the disclosed and 
withheld aspect of my narratives.  
Yet, to me, who the audience is seems to be one of the most important influences on what I 
choose to expose. Very loosely I can classify the discussions into private and public 
conversations. I am more cautious of what I convey publicly. In the interviews with other 
researchers I was careful to protect the image of the business school – more so in the later 
interview with Charlotte, but to a certain degree in the earlier one with Jonathan. In creating 
slides in response to the request for showcasing our projects, in the presentation to the deans of 
schools, in my chapter for the Inspirational Guide – I carefully crafted the story of success and 
achievements. In discussions with colleagues from other institutions at various conferences, I 
would open up, very often in response to someone else acknowledging the difficulty of PRME 
engagement. In my conversations with my PhD group and in my writing, I would concentrate 
on the difficulties, dismissing the achievements. In talking to my husband I aired the 
exasperation of dealing with frustrating colleagues.  
Initially I found the rudimentary distinction between public and private talk useful in trying to 
understand the differences in my conversations. Since the definitions of ‘private’ and ‘public’ 
are fluid, it is important to explain what I mean by them. The public/private division is 
extensively debated in sociology, law and public policy, yet there is no single definition for it 
(Armstrong and Squires, 2002; Marginson, 2007). According to Buss (1997), international law 
claims to set clear and objective boundaries between the two realms, but the boundaries of the 
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‘great divide’ have been constantly redrawn since the 19th century (Boyd, 1997).  Political 
scientists tend to adopt one of the two – the classical or the liberal – approaches to analyse the 
private and the public (Armstrong and Squires, 2002). Historians note that the concepts of 
‘private’ and ‘public’ are constantly shifting according to context (Klein, 1995; Davidoff, 
2003). Feminist researchers challenge the private/public divide, drawing attention to gender 
inequality created by the separation between the public and the private spheres in the orthodox 
discourse. Although approaches to understanding the nature of public and private domains vary, 
the common feature for all those approaches is that the private and the public are separate, and 
that different conversations are held in different spheres. The references to ‘boundaries’ and 
‘spheres/realms’ highlight a systems approach, which is based on a spatial understanding of 
public and private debate.   
For Stacey (2011), public/private is not a physical (street or home) or structural space (public 
or private ownership),  but a way to describe forms of everyday conversations, public being 
vocal with others, and private being silent with ourselves. Following Stacey I understand the 
two as relating to the type of discussion one is able to have: by public I mean formal 
conversations, and by private I refer to informal talks and my internal conversations.  
This public-private distinction is useful when I’m trying to make sense of the formal discourse 
within the PRME community, a community I feel a part of, a community with its conferences, 
publications, institutions and discourse. That discourse is overwhelmingly congratulatory, 
encouraging, cheerleader-like, and it resonates with what Scott (1990) refers to as ‘public 
transcript’. For Scott the public transcripts are ‘a kind of self-hypnosis… to buck up their 
courage, improve their cohesion, display their power and convince themselves anew of their 
high moral purpose’ (ibid: 67). The glorified CSR discourse (Chapter 5) is an example of a 
‘private transcript’. Scott examines the discourses of dominant and subordinate groups in 
various societies. He concludes that the public transcript is a way to maintain the established 
social order, and the hidden transcripts challenge it. Although the PRME/CSR community is 
not a ‘ruling elite’, it is part of the wider ‘establishment’, set up by the UN. There is an accepted 
public transcript that emphasises the importance of embedding responsibility in higher 
education, that is not openly challenged by the members of this community, nor by invited 
guests. In keeping with the crude public-private continuum, I could say that the more public the 
discourse, the more the difficulty is downplayed and the achievements are highlighted. 
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Although I refer to the ‘PRME community’, it is not an independent physical entity, but a social 
object, a tendency of a large number of people to act in a similar way in similar situations 
(Mead, 1938). Like any organisation, PRME is ‘the ongoing patterning of conversations’ 
(Stacey, 2012: 365). Therefore, when talking about the ‘community’ discourse, I am talking 
about the themes that arise in many conversations of interdependent people who, for various 
reasons, identify themselves with PRME. The discourse is sustained in many individual 
conversations. Each one of us, in our discussions, potentially contributes to and challenges those 
themes. And our contributions to this particular discourse are contingent on numerous other 
discourses in which we all participate. Several themes have arisen since the establishment of 
UN PRME that can be conceptualised as a ‘public transcript’. One of these themes is the 
importance of embedding responsibility and sustainability in HE curricula. However, as each 
practitioner has to interpret those principles in her/his daily work, and those interpretations 
differ from one practitioner to another, rather than talking about the public discourse of the 
group, I can only talk about my understanding of, my interpretation and my participation in that 
discourse.    
So what is the purpose of my presenting the affirmative description of my practice? Who am I 
trying to convince? I believe it is both for the benefit of communicating my achievements to 
others, and of convincing myself of the importance of these achievements. Paradoxically, 
recognition by others both contributes to my sense of success and at the same time enhances 
my feeling of dissatisfaction, of being able yet again to ‘pull it off’, and of needing to do more 
to make the appearances of achievements ‘real’ to me. In Chapter 3 I suggested that I may 
‘suffer’ from ‘impostor syndrome’. I believe this is a simplistic explanation for more complex 
processes of maintaining identity. By wanting to fit in with the PRME/CSR community I choose 
to participate in the discourse in the way I think will allow me to continue identifying with it. 
Contributing to the ‘public transcript’, avoiding disclosing too much controversial information, 
such as reluctance of my colleagues, my own feeling of being marginal, difficulty in mustering 
enthusiasm from the managers -  to outsiders, I feel secure in my participating in this group.  
So public-private for me is linked to the extent of exposing or hiding my thoughts. Recently I 
have become more sensitive to what seems to me to be attempts to redact a less than favourable 
story of PRME, in my conversations and in the accounts of others.  During the latest conferences 
it was encouraging to hear the ‘employers’’ perspective about the importance of introducing 
the principles of responsibility in our teaching. One after another, representatives from an 
investment bank, a major consumer goods company, an energy company and a commercial 
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bank reiterated the importance of teaching the skills of responsibility and sustainability, with 
no one questioning what those ‘skills’ might be. My initial enthusiasm waned quickly, when 
they admitted that ‘social responsibility’ or ‘sustainability’ was not part of any recruitment 
requirement. I realised that they too, as I do, tailor the message to the audience. I do not 
disbelieve that they all agree that the employees should be responsible. But I also believe this 
is not a priority. The same applies to the students. A student representative revealed that in a 
recent global survey 80% of the graduates said they would not work for a company whose 
values they disagreed with. And I thought ‘Really? How exactly do graduates assess the 
employer’s values? With 46 applicants on average applying for each graduate position (Anon, 
2015), I wondered if any of the big banks would have a great difficulty in recruitment that year, 
despite 58% of the UK public distrusting the bankers (YouGov-Cambridge, 2013). This student 
survey result seemed as hollow as the notion of ethical consumerism (Carrington et al., 2014)18. 
Yet, the story was too good not to be told. 
The following week, at another conference a representative from a very large bank, which had 
been rescued by the government during the latest financial crisis, was talking about their 
commitment to responsibility and sustainability. One of the ‘achievements’ he chose to focus 
on was the commitment of the board to have 30% female representations among senior 
executives by 2020. My ears pricked up. Will this be considered an achievement? I questioned 
the speaker and was given a very unsatisfactory answer, which I continued to challenge. At the 
break many other participants came up to me thanking me for bringing up the question and 
saying how pleased they were with my comments. Reflecting on the two incidents, I cannot 
help thinking about the similarities and the differences. The main difference that draws my 
attention is my decision whether to question what seemed to me as an uncritical lip-service to 
the responsibility narrative, and the absence of questioning by the others. Numerous reasons 
come to mind – the much bigger crowd at the former, it was easier to be seen as sceptical of the 
representative of the huge bank, than of the delegate from a student union, my interest in the 
topic (I am much more passionate about underrepresentation of women in senior roles, than I 
am about surveys among students). Perhaps the timing of the conferences was important as 
well, and being self-silenced for the first conference, I decided to speak up at the second. By 
                                                          
18 Studies found that people are less ethical than they claim to be (Banaji et al., 2003). As consumers we 
tend to claim to be prepared to pay extra for ‘responsible products’.  But in front of the store shelf we still 
tend to choose based on price (Auger et al., 2003).   
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reflecting on why I avoided asking the question at the earlier conference, and going ahead with 
grilling the speaker at the latter, I expect to have gained some insights into experience of others.   
Becoming aware of the themes that are kept obscured in the arguments of others, I am becoming 
more aware of the apparent signs of self-censoring in my presentations. I cannot avoid the 
question about whether I really believe others are unaware of things I leave unsaid. I have no 
doubt that my suspicious reception of the two presentations was shared by my peers, as 
evidenced by post-presentation conversations. And I‘m certain that when being introduced to a 
trouble-free picture of the work of the SEU, colleagues and managers at the University, peers 
at the conferences, and readers of my chapter have some doubts about this unproblematic 
narrative. Yet, I’ve never been questioned about the things that remain unsaid. The way I self-
censored my questions, others have censored theirs, avoiding publicly confronting my 
presentations. By avoiding public confrontation I mean the lack of questioning of the validity 
of the overwhelmingly cheerful tone of my narrative. Other aspects, such as methodology, have 
been questioned unreservedly. This demonstrates once again the issues that are allowed and 
precluded from being challenged openly. I am not privy to the private conversations that follow 
my presentations, but taking part in many post-presentation private conversations, I am certain 
that what is publicly unopposed, is privately critiqued.  
The crude distinction between public and private conversations echoes Scott’s (1990) 
distinction between public and hidden transcripts. My initial excitement about his work was 
compounded by the fact that the distinction is somewhat blurred, not sharp, as it is in the 
mainstream organisational literature. Those transcripts are not perceived as attributed to two 
different groups of people, but both the public and the hidden transcripts ‘embodied in the same 
individual’ (ibid: 44). I could identify with Scott’s discussion of the dangers of abandoning the 
public transcript. I myself felt the need to maintain the upbeat public attitude to maintain my 
own legitimacy, to validate my role, to protect the budget. By admitting my doubts about PRME 
and my ‘championing’ of it could potentially lead to managers questioning the need for 
remaining PRME signatories. This could be tantamount to committing professional suicide.     
Yet, on further reading of Scott and rereading my narratives, I find some limitations of these 
concepts in making sense of my experiences. Scott understands the two transcripts as presented 
at different times and at ‘different sites’ (ibid). His moving the discussion between the ‘group’ 
and the ‘individual’, without explaining how the two are linked, gives the impression that the 
individuals may embody both transcripts, but the group somehow ‘decides’ when and where 
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the public or the hidden transcripts are presented. Yet, there is no account of the impact of the 
individual on sustaining and changing the transcripts. I recognise how, for example, in writing 
my chapter in the Inspirational Guide I was very much aware of the cheery tone the editors 
expected from me, and how that awareness impacted the chapter. I am also aware that by 
presenting this chapter in various forums I have been contributing to maintaining that tone of 
idealisation of CSR.  
Another limitation of Scott’s work is his choice of ‘transcript’ terminology, which implies 
intention, awareness and control, as if one is always capable of making a decision between what 
to make public and what to keep private. The revealing/concealing question is also addressed 
in the academic literature in relation to information in organisations and in discussing research 
methodology.  In accounting (Lys et al., 2015) and marketing (Prabhu and Stewart, 2001), 
‘signalling’ is used to address the information disclosed in the official firms’ literature in order 
to demonstrate a specific issue to stakeholders. Steinel et al.  (2010) and Pincus and Bixenstine 
(1977) discuss the implications of revealing or concealing on decision making, while Ison et al. 
(2013) examine the revealing and concealing in social learning. The ethics of revealing sensitive 
information is explored in relation to whistleblowing (Andrade, 2015), while other scholars 
(e.g. Micelotta and Raynard, 2011) explore the revealing or concealing information as a 
strategic decision. Management consultants (Bierck, 2000, Krattenmaker, 2000) dish out advice 
about what information to share with the public and when to do so. The common thread in these 
varied literature strands is the way revealing and concealing is conceptualised. The underlying 
assumption is that we are in control.  
Research methodology explores the ethical dimensions of disclosure and concealment (Murphy 
and Dingwall, 2001). Considerations of protecting the identity of the research participants and 
sensitive information are given especially in ethnographic and autoethnographic research. Ellis 
(2007, 2004) draws attention to the need to consider how our personal exposure affects others: 
‘I tell [my students] that they don’t own their story. That their story is also other people’s 
stories’ (2007: 25). This strand of literature is also underpinned by the assumption that the 
researcher can choose what to expose and what to keep deliberately concealed, and it is the 
author who decides on ‘negotiated disclosure, choices made about writing strategy’ (Rappert, 
2010: 577). 
Often, even when we attempt to anonymise our research, we cannot conceal the identity of the 
participants. Earlier I mentioned the bank representative. The workplace is salient to my 
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narrative, it emphasises the point I was trying to make – the lip service an organisation, which 
is being saved by public funds, pays to responsibility. However, any participant at that 
conference can identify the speaker, and even those who were not present, can do so by 
obtaining the agenda of the conference. Researchers reflecting on their own practice (e.g. DMan 
programme at the UH) grapple with revealing and concealing, since their work relates to their 
own work place and often it is impossible to anonymise places and people. Some work is 
especially sensitive due to the unique nature of the organisation researched  (e.g. Miller, 2003), 
or a the role of the researcher in the organisation (e.g. Flinn, 2011, Monaghan, 2010), yet the 
power relations of those researchers in their organisations is germane to their work.  Freadman 
(2004: 128) warns that ‘self-revelations always involve revelation about others’. To avoid this 
exposure I could omit the work affiliation of the speaker, or even the conference details, but 
those omissions diminish the relevance of the narrative. Striking a balance between preserving 
anonymity of participants and confidentiality of the sensitive information, and integrity of 
research is difficult. Concealing all identifying information may result in ‘a stilted jumble that 
hides as it discloses’ (Rappert, 2010: 581). 
But even when others are sufficiently protected in our narratives there remains a matter of what 
we think we are allowed to disclose. What we say is impacted by our considered decisions, but 
also dictated by custom and our need to belong. Very often those are not deliberate choices. We 
are not always aware of what we reveal or conceal in our narratives. Our thoughts, beliefs and 
values, as well as our embracing and rejecting of the dominant discourse, arise in the numerous 
interactions with many others in our environments, and in silent conversations with ourselves. 
Only in sharing our narratives with others do we recognise what we may have tried to conceal. 
Iser (2002: 293) notes that the reader (or the listener) is an active participant in research, 
completing the unspoken, making meaning together with the researcher ‘What is said only 
appears to take on significance as a reference to what is not said’. By talking to my PhD group 
and by putting my narratives in writing and reading them, I recognised some reasons for my 
self-censorship. Challenging the dominant discourse, in silent conversations with myself or by 
speaking up against convention publicly, I risked being marginalised and excluded. But our 
awareness of the motives for our actions evolves as we iterate our narratives, and ascribing 
intentional choice to our decisions retrospectively is analogous to going back in time.  
Another limitation of Scott’s work is the use of the term ‘transcript’ which also implies a static, 
unchanging text. In my experience I am often surprised by what I say, by how much I reveal 
and conceal. The two interviews, for example, demonstrate what Scott might call ‘public 
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transcript’. I revealed the difficulties of engaging colleagues to Jonathan Louw, revealed the 
management support to Charlotte Warin, and concealed my doubts about my ability to ‘embed’ 
PRME. These were not premeditated texts delivered on two different occasions. These were 
my opinions at the time I voiced them, and upon reading the two interview transcripts I was 
surprised at the similarities and the differences between the two. 
Although Scott’s ideas shed some light on my experiences, the distinction between public and 
hidden (private) does not explain the revealing and concealing in my private conversations, 
especially in my diary, which I could keep undisclosed if I wished. By abandoning the dualism 
of public/private, concealing/revealing, and accepting the dialectical nature of those 
experiences, I am able to understand my behaviour better. Rather than seeking answers at either 
end of the private-public or revealing-concealing continuum, I am embracing the paradox of 
‘both at the same time’.  
By paradox I mean the contradictions in the way we think about the world in general and about 
our professional practice in particular. Researchers from the Complexity and Management 
Centre at UH argue that contemporary management literature tries to eliminate paradox, 
resolving it to dualisms. Yet, the contradictions in our thinking are not resolvable, and being 
aware of them, rather than trying to eradicate them, might be a more useful way of thinking 
about our practice. Therefore, recognising the revealing and concealing dialectic allows me to 
understand my practice, and the practice of others better, to recognise that the public and the 
private are always present in our interactions.     
There is no totally public or absolutely private discussion. In the very public presentations or 
discussions, there is always the private, the individual motives, intentions and understandings. 
We may wish to conceal some of those private emotions from public presentations, but we 
cannot expunge them; the two are inseparable, and assuming one can strip the public discussion 
of the private influences is self-deceiving. By revealing and highlighting what we want to make 
public, we at the same time attempt to keep other aspects concealed, and by doing so we 
inadvertently reveal them. Even the fact that I reproduced the slide (Figure 1) in this work 
reveals my need to have my work externally validated. In my book chapter on PRME 
engagement, by leaving a gaping absence of acknowledging the difficulties, I reveal their 
existence. Whatever we make public inadvertently reveals our private beliefs, our allegiances, 
our aspirations, our needs and our anxieties.  
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And even our most private discussions, the ones we hold with ourselves, are not devoid of 
audience. Mead (1934) points out that as humans we have a unique ability of taking the attitude 
of others. In our numerous interactions with others, we learn how others (initially a specific 
other, and later the other as a general representation of a specific group) react to us. In time we 
learn to anticipate the reaction of the ‘generalised other’, developing a capacity to take the 
attitude of the entire group (Stacey, 2012). The conversations I hold with myself in my mind 
are the interplay between myself – ‘I’, and the attitude of the generalised other – ‘me’. The 
meaning I make of a situation I am thinking about arises in the I-me conversations. In those 
conversations, ‘me’ is the audience to myself, I. Those most private conversations are 
constantly changing. Similar to the iteration of written narratives that change as new insights 
are being developed, silent conversations with myself are always changing, different aspects 
emerge at different times, and others become less relevant; my perception is constantly 
changing.    
In conversing with ourselves we also do not reveal all. Rappert (2010) suggests that what we 
know and subsequently reveal is limited due to ‘bounded rationality’. I suggest that our 
awareness is limited not just because of our capacity to deal with information, but also because 
the meaning of the information is constantly evolving. I do not reveal all not necessarily because 
I intend to conceal details. Sometimes they are not mentioned because I try to avoid dealing 
with them, and often because I am not aware of them. Awareness presupposes existence. But 
our thoughts, emotions and beliefs do not exist independently of our interactions. They evolve, 
diminish, and sometimes disappear, in our interactions. Therefore, they are not fully knowable, 
and we cannot be fully aware of them. In order to fully reveal or conceal, even in conversations 
with oneself, one must have unbounded awareness, which is impossible. Full disclosure or total 
concealment is simply unachievable.  
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Summary  
By iterating the PRME narrative I have gained insights into how I, a practitioner, talk about my 
engagement with CSR. In the spirit of critical approach to my practice, I have tried to be open 
with myself and with my reader about my aspirations and doubts, about my hopes and 
disappointments. By taking the risk of ‘showing perceived warts and bruises as well as the 
accolades and success’ (Ellis, 2007: 17), I have highlighted my experiences of talking about 
CSR.  
In the previous chapter I explored the overly optimistic narrative of CSR. In this chapter I 
focused on my experiences of discussing PRME (as one interpretation of CSR in HE) in 
conversations with myself and others. Several insights emerged from reflecting on those 
conversations. 
First, although I remain critical of the overly cheerful discussion of CSR in the academic and 
professional literature, I have explored the processes in which self-censoring of less flattering 
aspects of our practice arise.  
Second, I discussed the difficulties of exposing the challenges of practising CSR in various 
forums. Reflecting on those difficulties I began understanding difficulties others might face in 
exposing their own discouraging experiences. 
Third, reflecting on the processes of revealing and concealing in my conversations, I began 
paying attention to the nuances of revealing and concealing in the discussions of others.  
I do not claim that my experience is identical to the experiences of others. What I highlight is 
the similarity in our experiences of choosing to expose our thoughts publically. The reasons for 
the decision to do, or rather not to do, so might be different, but those decisions, taken locally, 
contribute to the emerging meaning of PRME. Similarly to the global evolvement of CSR in 
local micro-interactions (Chapter 5), PRME global patterns of relating emerge locally. 
Although UN PRME is experienced as an external force, it only arises in the interactions of 
many interdependent actors, as people can only ever act locally. 
 
In this chapter I focused on how the current CSR narrative has been sustained by participants 
in those conversations, and reflected on the emergence of CSR discourse.  
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In the following chapters I will continue paying attention to what is revealed and what is 
concealed in CSR literature, in relating various discourses to my practice. In the next chapter I 
will focus on my experience of setting up a CSR-related unit, which allowed me an insight into 
the processes and purpose of planning and vision. 
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Chapter 7 - The experience of setting up the Social Enterprise Unit (SEU)  
It does go to show how these big decisions are just drifted into in a rather messy way (Alexander 
McCall Smith, The Sunday Philosophy Club) 
Introduction 
A significant proportion of my work, both in terms of my workload and in terms of the attention 
devoted to it, is my role of Director of the Social Enterprise Unit (SEU). In Chapter 4 I alluded 
to the way I have come to identify the work of the Unit with my practice of CSR, which at times 
was detrimental to my understanding of other interactions as contributing to CSR. In this 
chapter I discuss the initial stages of developing the Unit, as I reflected on them five years after 
its announcement. The latter part of the chapter addresses my further thinking about that period. 
My story  
The Unit was established in 2009. I applied for the role of director, as soon as it was advertised. 
When I read the job description it felt as if it was written for me. The job description focused 
on promoting engagement with charities. Since the role was newly created, I thought it would 
be possible to create new opportunities for engaging with CSR, as I understood it at the time. 
Not prescribing to a specific definition of CSR, I understood it broadly as discretionary 
activities on behalf of the organisations having benefit (including reducing harm) beyond those 
organisations. Getting the role seemed like a great opportunity to finally become involved in 
practising CSR, which became central to my PhD. In preliminary discussions with the Head of 
Department, it was also suggested that it may lead to promotion to the next pay grade. I was 
determined to get it. At the interview I was asked to describe my ‘vision’ for the Unit. I managed 
to link it to the role description, but I think what got me the role was the enthusiasm I conveyed 
for ‘assisting the charities to become more enterprising’. But the moment I was told that the 
role was mine, I became nervous – what was I supposed to do? I was excited about the 
opportunity to develop something new, to put my imprint on the Unit. But this prospect was 
also frightening. I had no guidance; there was no predecessor to explain the role. How was I to 
be successful with no criteria for success?  
Coming from a strategic management group, it might have been expected of me to proceed 
‘strategically’ – define the vision and the mission of the Unit, and create a business plan. But I 
was also a PhD student, at the early stages of exploring complexity perspectives. So I decided 
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to take a ‘conversational approach’, and my first action was talking to others. I expected these 
conversations to lead to some sort of firm idea about how to progress, or at least the next steps. 
Reading these lines with the benefit of hindsight, knowing (to an extent) both how these 
conversations developed and having developed further my understanding of complexity, this 
thinking seems naïve and mechanistic. But at the time, at that stage of my research, I understood 
plans and emergence as incompatible. What I failed to appreciate was that the decision not to 
have a plan, the decision to have conversations with colleagues about the Unit, was also a type 
of plan.  
Following the advice of the Head of Department, I arranged a meeting with Lisa Crown, CEO 
of the local Centre for Voluntary Services (CVS), who was on the advisory board of HBS. It 
became apparent that she was instrumental in the decision to create the unit. It was also 
suggested that I met with Stewart, who was about to become the VC Regional Engagement, 
and with Allan, Director of the new Centre for Sustainable Living (CSL). It was interesting to 
learn that both had new roles that had been created recently, whose meanings had just begun 
emerging.  
Lisa was sceptical. She had met with others from HBS, trying to get any kind of cooperation 
with us and got nowhere, so she agreed to meet, but informed me that until she sees some work 
done, she would remain doubtful about this initiative. Leaving the meeting, I felt energised, 
wanting to prove that I was different, I was going to prove her wrong. This feeling fuelled my 
motivation for several years, until I heard ‘well done’ from Lisa.    
Stewart was in the process of moving offices, since the faculty he had led was in the last stages 
of dismantling. He was very pleasant, and we chatted about his last job. He also talked a little 
about the new CSL, and generally seemed very welcoming. What we did not discuss is the 
nature of his job, what this ‘community engagement’ was that the Unit was supposed to be 
‘affiliated’ with, or indeed the nature of this ‘affiliation’. I would never know why he seemed 
so relaxed. Was it because at that time he was secure in his job, having the new CSL under his 
management, and learning about SEU, which would be affiliated with his role, ‘beefing up’ his 
role, thus increasing its (and his) legitimacy? Was it his natural behaviour? Or was my anxiety 
about the new role more apparent against his (what seemed to me) relaxed approach to his new 
position? 
  120 
 
It took longer to meet with the Director of CSL. He was very busy shaping his newly formed 
centre. He was curious about the Unit and seemed pleased when I assured him of my 
commitment to affiliating the Unit with the Centre. He told me he was not sure what the Centre 
was supposed to do, who else was going to be associated with it, or how the SEU was supposed 
to be linked to his centre, but it seemed that he was strongly inclined towards the 
engineering/environmental aspects of sustainable living and was happy to leave everything else 
to other units (as long as the units were affiliated with the centre). He was very nervous talking 
about his targets, which were expressed in monetary terms, and was uncertain how to approach 
that.  It seemed to me that both managers of the newly established units were happy that the 
SEU was created, as it seemed to reaffirm their own roles. 
It is interesting to note that I was not alone in my uncertainty about the new role. Both managers, 
although more senior and more experienced than me, were also confused and unsure about the 
new roles they were appointed to. They, as did I, started by talking to others in order to figure 
out what they wanted to do and what they were supposed to be doing. In uncertainty, in order 
to make sense of what we are expected to do, we turned to the most obvious – talking with 
others, figuring together the meaning of our roles. This important aspect of talking to others, 
making sense of leading and managing in conversation with others, is highlighted by critical 
management scholars (e.g. Cunliffe, 2008, Hosking, 2011, Cunliffe and Eriksen, 2011) and by 
the proponents of complex responsive processes (e.g. Griffin, 2002, Shaw, 2002, Burr and 
Larsen, 2010, Norman et al., 2014).  Those authors understand conversations as central to 
emergence of meaning. All of us - Lisa, Stewart, Allan and I - were uncertain about how to 
proceed, yet we moved on, constantly interpreting and reinterpreting the meaning of our roles 
in conversations with each other and with others. As discussed in Chapter 2, meaning does not 
reside in the sender or the receiver of the message, nor has it an independent standing. Meaning 
arises in the ongoing conversation, it is always social. Yet, the traditional management literature 
portrays the leader as the singular person (or a group of people) who is responsible for giving 
meaning to the organisations (Stacey and Mowles, 2016).     
We began by focusing on the aspects of our roles we were most interested in and passionate 
about, and also on the areas we felt more familiar with.  Stewart and Allan took the 
environmental route, I decided to focus on the social aspect of CSR. It also became apparent 
that each of us was eager to be affiliated with others. The uncertainty of a new role was 
frightening to me; working with others, creating networks was a way of dealing with those 
anxieties. Perhaps being part of a larger network, expecting strength in numbers, gave us the 
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sense of security and legitimacy. Belonging to a group may be motivated by the need to reduce 
uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2006). Yet, some argue that leaders (and sometimes managers) are 
required to provide their followers with tools to succeed in uncertainty (e.g. Cook, 2016, Horney 
et al., 2010). Others claim that the transformational leader knows how to lead the organisation 
in uncertainty (Tyssen et al., 2014), and is an objective designer of the organisation and its 
activities (Worren, 2013). On the other hand, understanding that the manager is never a 
detached choreographer who is able to put his or her feelings and history aside, but is an 
embodied participant in ongoing conversations with others (e.g. Stacey and Griffin, 2005) is 
more congruent with my experience. As embodied participants we are unable to step out of our 
experience, which always involves uncertainty.  
To gauge the views of HBS staff, I invited colleagues to a meeting with no formal agenda, 
asking them to join me to discuss how they thought we should proceed and to share ideas about 
the Unit. Many came out of curiosity. Some had agendas to promote, expecting the Unit to 
advance those agendas. Some were more vocal than others. Silvio, for example, insisted on 
taking the environmental position and on ‘greening’ the Unit. His position reminded me of 
Allan’s discussion and his ‘green’ agenda.     
I started those conversations, aiming to discuss the possible development of the Unit. Although 
I had some ideas of what I wanted to do, in order to gauge whether those ideas were viable, I 
had to sound them out, to hear what others thought. At the time I believed I was open-minded 
about what we could do, I had ideas about what I did not want to do. In my mind, I dismissed 
any ‘green’ idea. I had not considered it as important as the social agenda. So I was not as open, 
and as agenda-less, as I wanted to believe. I was only open to hearing the views that I thought 
could help me promote my ideas. I should not be surprised, then, when many colleagues remain 
less enthusiastic about some aspects of my work, if it does not promote their interests.  
Although I wanted to be ‘systematic’ in my approach, at least this is how I perceived it – first 
talk to people, then act  - my attempts were ‘interrupted’ by people who did not know nor cared 
about my efforts of orderly development. Meeting and talking to those ’intruders’ had a 
significant impact on the way I was thinking about the role of the Unit. Jasmin contacted me 
several days after my appointment. She heard the dean talking about the intentions of creating 
the Unit at a function, had contacted him and was directed to me. We met the following week. 
She was excited about the ‘business school wanting to help charities’. She was talking about 
her charity, Cancer Hair Care, with infectious enthusiasm and passion. She was working on 
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several projects at once and felt she needed help to take them forward. Her story fascinated me, 
I wanted to help. So I asked her what she would like us to do. As she was talking about the need 
to develop a strategy for each of the projects, I immediately thought of the strategic management 
module, on which the students are required to evaluate the strategy of a given company, based 
on a case study, and make recommendation. I thought that on this module we could use Cancer 
Hair Care as a ‘live’ case study. Further discussion exposed this suggestion as inappropriate, 
but we both agreed that matching charities’ needs with a specific module was appropriate for 
the Unit to undertake. This activity has been central to the Unit’s activity since. 
The above paragraph betrays my then deeply-rooted beliefs about managing. Although I 
claimed interest in complexity and complex responsive processes, I still discussed talking and 
acting as separate. Claiming significance of conversations and beginning my engagement in 
the Unit with conversations, I perceived them as a precursor to the ‘real’ action, rather than 
action in itself.  
Others failed to get me interested and I could not find a way to fit with what I considered to be 
the purpose of the Unit. Anna came to seek assistance in promoting her charity. She needed 
assistance with volunteers who would engage in fundraising for her charity. Although I had not 
intended to include volunteer recruitment in the Unit’s activities, only while talking through the 
request with her was I able to make sense of why it was not a feasible activity to undertake. 
Feelings and personal history played a significant role in what I was doing, which projects were 
promoted and which were put on the back-burner, thus shaping the activities. These, in turn, 
became part of the Unit’s portfolio and shaped my approach to later requests. I relied on 
friendships with colleagues in developing some projects.  Paying more attention and putting 
more effort into projects that I thought I could develop more easily, relying on colleagues whose 
interests were closely aligned with the proposed project, enabled some of the ideas to turn into 
clearly defined projects quicker.  
The ideas for developing the Unit and the ways of going about the role have not been a 
sequential step-by-step progression, but an iterative and evolving process. The linear way of 
writing about the events may give an impression of linear processes, but the development has 
been neither linear nor orderly. As discussed above, clients started coming to see me long before 
I finished the ‘conversations round’ with colleagues. My conversations with them impacted the 
subsequent discussions with colleagues, and at the same time my conversations with colleagues 
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impacted my thinking about possible avenues for the development of the Unit and allowed me 
to figure out how one client could benefit from the Unit and to justify to myself why another 
could not. The meaning of the Unit has been arising in continuous conversations with many 
others.  
My narrative draws attention to the very messy nature of creating the Unit. By ‘messy’ I do not 
intend to attach a negative value judgement to my experience, I do not mean ‘bad’. I mean 
‘messy’ as opposite to ‘orderly’ or ‘neat’. ‘Calling things a “mess” should not be seen as 
something unpleasant or negative, but as a part of the open and creative becoming of life, 
inexhaustible and unfinalizable’ Steyaert (2004: 11). The process I describe points to the 
emergence of meaning in intertwining multiple intentions and individual preferences of many 
interdependent players.  
Almost eight years after the Unit was established, I still find myself continuing to define and 
redefine its parameters, what to get involved in and what to reject. Revisiting the details of the 
initial stages of setting up the Unit, I am reminded how hectic and chaotic it felt at the time to 
speak to different people with differing agendas, to try figuring out my own agenda and 
attempting to make sense of the purpose of my work. I also am aware that the decisions made 
and projects undertaken emerged in these interactions. My intentions, ambitions and 
understanding of the purpose of the Unit have been intertwined with those of others whom I 
met and talked to. Some were more influential than others; some ideas have been developed 
further, while others were short-lived. Yet, even the decision to exclude some aspects, such as 
the ‘green agenda’, were part of the ongoing process of making sense of an emerging remit for 
the Unit. These were not individual, independent decisions; they were conceived and delivered 
in the course of my working with others, as responsive processes of interacting with others. 
Some decisions were deliberate and planned, and some were made ‘on the spur of the moment’. 
In the following section I demonstrate how the mainstream CSR literature (Parker, 2014) is 
largely embedded in the managerialist discourse and is confusing to the CSR practitioner, as it 
describes the process of establishing CSR activities as discrete, orderly and residing with an 
individual or a group of managers. This is contrary to my experience of being enabled and 
constrained by others in making choices regarding the Unit. As this narrative focuses on the 
creation of the SEU, I will draw comparisons with the entrepreneurial literature. 
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Making sense of the literature addressing CSR adoption in an organisation   
Playing a major part in the creation of a unit that in my understanding was meant to address 
business school’s CSR, allowed me a privileged position to examine the development of CSR 
in this organisation. CSR is often described as poorly defined (Carroll, 2008, Garriga and Mele, 
2004, Votaw, 1973, Baden and Harwood, 2012). Nevertheless, there is a general consensus 
about what can be included in and what should be excluded from this concept. Although 
Carroll’s (1991) pyramid, including legal responsibility, is still a highly cited definition, most 
authors agree that CSR is voluntary, not just legally mandated organisations’ actions (Aguilera 
et al., 2007, Van Oosterhout and Heugens, 2008), aimed at improving social and environmental 
conditions (Scherer et al., 2014, Mackey et al., 2008). Despite the term including the word 
‘Corporate’, CSR refers to various organisations, not just corporations or business firms, but  
‘other types of institution apart from business in the narrow sense’ (Maclagan, 2008: 371). 
Empirical research into CSR is prolific. The discussion is often kept at national (Yu-Shu et al., 
2014, Omazic and Banovac, 2012, Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010, Jamali and Neville, 2011) 
or industry level (Soana, 2011, Dobele et al., 2014, Scholtens, 2011). Great attention has been 
devoted to discussions of CSR at an organisational  level (Crane et al., 2008b). The ‘unit of 
analysis’ differs, but the focus remains the same: what is done, and how it is linked to other 
factors, for example -  financial performance, reputation and staff retention.  
Still limited, but a growing body of research is devoted to examining the motivation for 
adopting CSR. Authors tend to focus on the organisations’ motives (e.g. Crotty, 2016, Shnayder 
et al., 2016, Shao-Chi and Heng-Yu, 2015, Chernev and Blair, 2015, Arend, 2014, Ervin et al., 
2013), including a minority of researchers focusing on Higher Education Institutions (Atakan 
and Eker, 2007). ‘Motives for adopting CSR’ was initially the emphasis of the Ukrainian project 
Greg and I undertook in 2011 (Chapter 3). But exploring that stream of literature in depth, as 
well as the results of our primary research, left me disappointed. The discussion in literature 
(e.g. Galbreath, 2010, McWilliams et al., 2006, McWilliams et al., 2016, Hosoda and Suzuki, 
2015) is often of a process that is intentional, planned, linear and systematic. Our interviews 
with those responsible for CSR in their organisations echoed this approach. From the incredibly 
rehearsed responses of the head of corporate communications of a self-service wholesaler, to 
the very honest replies of the PR manager of a local bank, a picture emerged of a ‘strategic’ 
approach to CSR. Some, very honestly, addressed difficulties and challenges – focusing on 
those faced by their organisation. But I could not find in my literature review, nor in my 
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Ukrainian research conference papers, any discussion of the everyday mundane acts of starting 
a socially-related activity. Anything that was related to my experience of establishing the Unit, 
as discussed in the above narrative, was excluded.  Crane et al (2008b) claim that individual 
actors are central to the CSR debate, but the literature does not address individual experiences 
or personal narratives of engaging with CSR activities. 
As well as the everyday, the very personal is missing from the CSR literature too, as is the role 
of opportunity and temporality. Organisational and strategic management literature is largely 
context and time neutral (Fulk and Boyd, 1991, Moreland and Levine, 2012, Brinkerhoff, 
2015). Similarly CSR and related ideas are discussed as decontextualised activities (Moon et 
al., 2005, Schwartz and Tilling, 2009).  But all the events discussed in the narrative happened 
because of the interactions of certain people at certain points in time. It is possible that had any 
other applicant been successful in his or her application to become director of the SEU, the Unit 
today would have been different.  The current CSR literature, firmly embedded in the dominant 
management discourse, does not resonate with my experience of establishing a CSR-focused 
unit in an organisation. Nor does the literature address the interpersonal, interrelated, social 
nature of my experience.  
Given the start-up nature of the SEU, I looked into entrepreneurship literature to seek 
congruence with my experience. There are many similarities between CSR and 
entrepreneurship literature. Firstly, both CSR and entrepreneurship are usually perceived as 
planned. Secondly, both literature threads tend to disregard the individual experience of 
practice. And lastly, both strands perceive the object of discussion as unquestionably positive.  
Earlier authors addressing CSR included the debate regarding the importance of CSR. However, 
since the 1980s, this debate has been resolved in favour of CSR as a desirable phenomenon 
(e.g. Smith, 2003, Vidaver-Cohen and Altman, 2000). Crane et al. (2008a: 12) )  recognise that 
‘one of the key features of CSR has always been its contested nature’, but very few critiqued 
the concept or its application (e.g. Kuhn and Deetz, 2008, Husted and De Jesus Salazar, 2006). 
In Chapter 4 I discuss in depth the overwhelmingly positive approach to CSR. A more recent 
entrepreneurship literature similarly views entrepreneurship ‘as something positive and 
desirable in societies’ (Rehn and Taalas, 2004: 235).  
 
Planning, emergence and chance events 
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One similarity between the two literature strands is that both CSR and entrepreneurship are 
perceived as planned activities (e.g. Maon et al., 2009). This planned and structured nature of 
CSR remains unchallenged (Ackerman, 1973, Bowman and Haire, 1975, Burke and Logsdon, 
1996, Frederick, 1986, McWilliams et al., 2006, Schwartz and Saiia, 2012, Waddock, 2008). 
Similarly, Bewayo (2010) reminds readers that preparing a business plan is seen as essential for 
starting a new venture. He also claims that only a small fraction of ventures begin with the 
business plan. Those entrepreneurs that do prepare a plan often do so because of the funders’ 
requirements. Perhaps because the Unit did not rely on external financing, I had not felt 
compelled to prepare a detailed plan. As stated earlier, not having a plan was a plan in itself. 
But, on the one hand, having ‘allowed’ myself not to be restricted by a written document, 
diminished my anxiety, freed me to pay attention to my participation in the conversation and 
stopped me from stressing about the ‘next step’.  On the other hand, not having a clear 
‘strategy’, feeling free to do what I thought was best (the emphasis is on feeling, rather than 
being free), without the safety net of a plan, was overwhelmingly restraining. 
Although I assert that there was no detailed plan, I cannot claim that the emergence of the Unit 
was totally unintentional. The decision to have the Unit was intended by the senior managers 
in the business school. I intended to have conversations; I had certain expectations of those 
conversations; I chose to respond to some clients (that’s how I refer to the charity 
representatives that were seeking our assistance) and not to others. Starting with the 
conversation rather than with a written document was, paradoxically, my ‘intended strategy’. 
The purpose of the Unit and its activities arose in the intertwining of the intentions of all 
involved. At the time I ‘planned’ emergence, being influenced by my interest in complexity 
sciences, but also unable to fully grasp the nature of emergence. This attempt to ‘fit’ complexity 
into the mainstream organisational literature, is evident in books that suggest ways to turn 
complexity to one’s advantage (Kelly and Allison, 1999, Morieux and Tolliman, 2014), to 
tackle complexity (Probst and Bassi, 2014), or to simplify complexity  (Gerver, 2016, Segall, 
2016). Others suggest that a company ‘should renew itself to avoid the risk of drifting away 
over the edge of chaos’ (Fisser and Browaeys, 2010: 66), and discuss the edge of chaos in 
spatial terms of an ‘abyss’ (Frederick, 1998: 381). Although I began understanding that 
complexity cannot be ‘tamed’, like the authors above are suggesting, I was eager to ‘utilise’ my 
newly acquired insights. I tried to ‘encourage’ complexity.  
Additionally, at the time, I understood planning and emergence as incompatible. This was 
heavily influenced by my understanding of planning as a rigid blueprint for the future 
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(MacNamee, 1998). However, if plans are understood as expressions of our intentions, 
expectations and wishes, it is inevitable that my living present (Stacey, 2007b) was 
encompassing both my experiences, learning, and understanding of the past – including my 
perceptions of planning and strategy, my understanding of what might be expected from the 
head of a university unit, but also my growing interest in complexity; and my expectations of 
and desires for the future – succeeding in the role, anticipating the contribution of the role to 
my PhD -  all at the same time.  
The tendency to discuss planning as an essential role of the manager in the literature (Stroh et 
al., 2003) is closely linked to overlooking chance in the mainstream management and CSR 
literature. Although the inability to predict the future is obvious and no one will argue to the 
contrary, the massive body of literature devoted to planning, and indeed the academic discipline 
of strategy, suggests, albeit implicitly, that any success stems from careful planning (Mintzberg, 
1990) and, consequently, any failure is a result of ineffective planning and/or incorrect 
implementation of plans (e.g. Pinto, 2013). Lakein’s famous phrase ‘failing to plan is planning 
to fail’ has become widespread and permeated popular and academic writings. The search in 
Business Source Complete database (on May 13, 2014) reveals that it appears in 132 papers, 
32 of them scholarly (peer-reviewed) journals. This approach is echoed in the CSR literature:  
Strategy scholars argue that responding to environmental stimuli requires a formal, 
system [sic] strategic planning effort to guide the initiatives and activities required to 
adapt to the environment, including those related to CSR. This paper contributes to the 
literature in confirming that formal strategic planning is positively linked to CSR 
(Galbreath, 2010: 520).  
Mintzberg (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, Mintzberg et al., 1998, Mintzberg, 1990) introduced 
the idea of ‘emergent strategies’ to the mainstream organisational literature. The authors 
acknowledge that a perfect deliberate strategy probably does not exist: ‘Emergent patterns are 
rather common in organizations, or, more to the point, almost all strategies seem to be in some 
part at least, emergent’ (Mintzberg, 1979: 582).  This opens the door for acknowledging and 
recognising the unexpected. It can be argued that this perspective takes into account the aspect 
of chance or opportunity that is missing from other schools of thought. However, according to 
Mintzbeg (1985: 258) ‘[f]or a strategy to be perfectly emergent, there must be order …in the 
absence of intention about it’ or ‘emergent’ strategies, patterns realized despite or in the 
absence of intentions’ (Mintzberg, 1979: 582 my emphasis). I understand Mintzberg’s use of 
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‘emergent’ and ‘emerging’ as something that is externally imposed, with no contribution from 
the participants, the planners, and the diagram from the article introducing the term (Figure 2) 
only reinforces this understanding. 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of strategies. (Source: Mintzberg and Waters, 1985)   
Mintzberg’s definition of ‘emergence’ does not resonate with my experience of emergence, as 
lack of intentions and deliberateness. My experience points to the intentions that are always in 
interplay with the intentions of others, so what is emerging is deliberate and unintended at the 
same time. This is different from ‘some seem more deliberate to me, others more emergent, but 
in general they appear to represent a blending of the two’ (ibid, my emphasis).   
My growing interest in the complexity sciences had begun to contribute to my understanding 
of planning as an expression of needs and intentions, and as a way of coping with uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, years of training, learning and practice firmly embedded in the managerialist 
paradigm resulted in emotional dissonance. The stress of not having a formal strategy, and 
teaching a CSR module that approached the subject in a systematic way, was at times 
overwhelming. Recognising that  having a written document would not mean that the practice 
would follow it, and at the same time worrying that what I was doing was lacking structure and 
therefore lacking meaning, caused me many a sleepless night. Reconciling the newly found 
insights from complexity sciences with habitual managerial thinking was provoking anxiety.  
The previous section highlights the underlying assumption in the management literature, that 
better planning will result in desired outcomes. Even the recognition that we cannot plan 
everything is accounted for by the introduction of external factors. Careful planning is designed 
to eliminate chance from strategy. Planning is inseparable from anxiety – when we plan we 
think about the future and this leads to anxiety (MacLeod and Cropley, 1996), and at the same 
time one of the ways to deal with that anxiety is to create plans.   
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This assumption is closely linked to the lack of attention paid to chance occurrences in the 
management literature. Smith and Rubenstein (2011: 54) claim (ironically) that the emergence  
of  responsible gambling practices was ‘more happenstance than the result of prudent planning’. 
A study by Lemley and Sampat  (2012: 817) suggests ‘that the most important decisions made 
by the patent office are significantly affected by the happenstance of which examiner gets an 
application’. Discussing the impact of governance on the 2007-9 financial crisis, Prager (2013: 
12) claims that ‘[l]uck rather than skill determined outcomes’. These references to chance or 
serendipity are sporadic and do not go beyond the simple statement of facts (as perceived by 
the authors) to explore the social nature of these events. When Quinn and Roberts mention that 
traditional dominance of checks in the U.S. payment system ‘resulted from historical 
happenstances’ (ibid, 2008: 1) they do not discuss the historical events that led to the mentioned 
phenomenon, but allude to the luck factor in this outcome. In other words, the chance 
occurrence as an important factor in any event is ignored. 
Happenstance as a factor in the outcomes is addressed in the popular management literature. 
Get Lucky: How to Put Serendipity to Work for You & Your Business and Heart, Smarts, Guts 
& Luck: What It Takes to Be an Entrepreneur & Build a Great Business are just two of the titles 
that tend to provide a prescription for harnessing luck. This is not what I mean by ‘chance’. 
What I mean is acting into the unpredictability and the unknowability of the future. 
Understanding that we are interdependent with others means accepting that we always play a 
part in what is emerging but that part is never a solo. It is clear that any event I reflect on in the 
above narrative has an element of unexpectability and unpredictability: from my being 
appointed to the role, to my meeting various clients, to my actions and emotional reactions. 
This phenomenon is addressed, to some extent, in the career counselling literature:  
The closely related phenomena of happenstance (Miller, 1983; Mitchell, Levin, & 
Krumboltz, 1999), serendipity (Betsworth & Hansen, 1996; Krumboltz,1998; Watts, 1996; 
Williams et al., 1998), and chance events (Bandura, 1982; Cabral & Salomone, 1990; Scott 
& Hatalla, 1990) in career patterns have been well documented and discussed.(Guindon 
and Hanna, 2002: 122) 
Some career counselling scholars also question the validity of the ‘traditional person-
environment fit models of career choice, wondering whether they fail to capture adequately the 
complexities, uncertainties, and dynamic aspects of modern work’ (Bright and Pryor, 2005: 
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292). Similarly, I felt that traditional CSR models failed to capture my experience. The ‘Chaos 
Theory of Careers’ draws on insights from Chaos Theory (Gleick, 1988) to incorporate 
complexity and unpredictability into career counselling. Bright and Pryor (2005) cite work of 
Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) – complex responsive processes scholars-  as providing useful 
insights into human behaviour in organisations.  
Referring to ‘happenstance’ or ‘chance events’, I mean chance in the sense of not being 
premeditated. There were no blueprints to pre-determine every action each of us was to take. 
They were not chance in the sense of fate or a ‘Hand of God’ (Guindon and Hanna, 2002). 
Drawing on the insights from complexity sciences and on Elias (Elias, 1939 [2000] ) and Mead 
(1934) I understand the emergence of the Unit as the ongoing processes of interaction of people. 
I was appointed as director of the SEU, as if the Unit existed. But the Unit and its meaning 
arose in the intertwining of many individual intentions. 
The everyday and the personal 
Entrepreneurship studies, similar to the studies of CSR, tend to ignore the individual aspect of 
entrepreneurship. Although entrepreneurship is recognised as ‘a practice-oriented endeavour’  
(Berglund, 2007: 75), research into (social) entrepreneurship ‘favours large studies’ (ibid), and 
‘is focusing [on] its entrepreneurial management, surprisingly ignoring the social dimension’ 
(Barinaga, 2012: 243).  Reviewing the entrepreneurial management literature, she points out 
that ‘these studies often de-contextualize the initiatives studied and the individuals leading 
them’ (ibid: 246).  We are reminded that  
mundane and ostensibly trivial activities are routinely bypassed in the social sciences, as 
their very nature of seeming self-evident and natural hides them from us. That … citizens 
had friends and acquaintances, and that they arranged to help each other out does not seem 
like enough of a finding to warrant serious study. As a result of this implicit assumption, 
warns Brekhus (2000), we are in fact turning a blind eye to that which is most common, 
and thus most central in social systems (Rehn and Taalas, 2004: 242). 
There seems to be a developing trend ‘towards a narrative and discursive turn that focuses on 
everyday, prosaic practices of entrepreneurship’ (Engstrom, 2012: 42) . The proponents of this 
‘turn’ (e.g. Steyaert, 2004) emphasise the importance of a narrative approach to researching 
entrepreneurship. The pointing out of the deficiency in personal, socially situated experience 
has not produced a major trend of sharing personal experiences. Very few tell a story of personal 
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involvement with starting a new venture (e.g. Lacho and Kiefer, 2012). Even fewer (e.g. 
Engstrom, 2012) narrate their own experience in the first person. Those that do expose the 
unintentional, the unpredictable and serendipity in starting up a venture. Their narrative 
resonated with me because they reflected on the micro-experiences, paying attention to the 
everyday, mundane behaviour. This is what is largely missing from CSR as well as from the 
entrepreneurship literature.  
In an edited volume entitled Professionals’ Perspectives of Corporate Social Responsibility’ 
Idowu and Filho  (2009) claim to provide an ‘insight into how professionals are attempting to 
absorb the ethos of corporate social responsibility into their daily professional activities’ 
(Idowu, 2009: 3). Twenty two chapters are dedicated to various accounts of CSR. However, 
none addresses a practitioner’s personal experience. There are perspectives from lawyers and 
company secretaries, bankers and engineers, investors and educators, but all from a 
managerialist perspective, addressing aggregate data from surveying, reviewing and 
interviewing representatives from those professions, rather than a perspective from a lawyer or 
a banker or an educator. Even a chapter entitled ‘A Hotelier’s Perspective of CSR’, claiming 
‘an insight from within the industry’ (Luck and Bowcott, 2009: 289) and stating that ‘it 
discusses the perspective of a key internal employee about how a specific company has been 
engaging in CSR within the UK and internationally’ (ibid) discusses CSR engagement, but from 
a very detached, organizational perspective. The promise of the key internal employees’ 
perspective does not materialize, we do not learn how the decisions were made, who talked to 
whom, andemployees’ thoughts and actions remain obscure. And the result is another ‘case 
study’ of  CSR in a specific hotel chain.     
The need to address the individual practitioner’s experience, the personal nature of practice, has 
been recognised explicitly and implicitly in the CSR and entrepreneurship literature. This need 
has started to be addressed, albeit sparingly, in the entrepreneurship literature; however, the 
CSR literature remains deficient in this aspect.  
My narrative and the ensuing discussion have focused on the anxiety and struggle with thinking 
about developing the Unit, which I was appointed to lead. As I am writing these words, I realise 
that even my title has been uncomfortable for me. To be a director presumes the ability to 
provide direction. This chapter points out the struggle with living up to that requirement. There 
are other themes that arise from the narrative. Using words such as ‘I planned’, ‘I aimed’, ‘I 
intended’, while talking about not knowing what to do, calls attention to the paradox of knowing 
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and not knowing at the same time. Another paradox that is evident in my narrative is that of 
excitement and terror. Lastly, the separation of thinking, talking and acting, which was not 
addressed in this chapter, has been playing a major role in the development in my thinking. 
The following narrative was written two years after the previous one. A seemingly minor event 
triggered my thinking about the emergent nature of the SEU and provoked me to continue 
making sense of the setting up of the Unit. 
Ongoing thinking about the early days of the SEU   
During the latest PRME Global Forum the delegates were invited to take part in an envisioning 
exercise. The facilitator asked us to close our eyes and imagine the future as we would like it 
to be. I am usually very sceptical of such group activities. But not wanting to upset the 
facilitator, I followed the instructions, duly closed my eyes and ...thought about the past, about 
the setting up of the Social Enterprise Unit. Thinking about the early stages of setting up the 
Unit, I realised that the initial slide presenting the Unit could be understood as a type of 
envisioning exercise. The slide (Figure 3) was created a few months after I started my role, to 
introduce the Unit to others. But at the time, all those ‘activities’ did not exist. It was not a 
summary of the past activities, but an aspiration for the future. By documenting this ‘vision’, 
by putting it on paper, I was expressing what at the time of writing I thought was possible to 
achieve in the future. By including the ideas stated on the slide, I excluded other potential 
considerations. The slide was a declaration of intent, yet all the ideas would have to be subjected 
to interpretation and particularisation.   
In the following months the slide was presented as the official introduction to the Unit. Thinking 
about that time and how I was solely entrusted19 with creating the ‘vision for the Unit’ (which 
was approved without questioning by the dean and the pro-vice chancellor), makes me wonder 
about the processes of creating vision statements in other organisations.  
 
                                                          
19 By saying that I was solely entrusted with creating the vision, I do not mean I was independent in setting 
that vision. In reflecting on the previous narrative I emphasise the interrelatedness with others in making 
sense of the unit. Here I emphasise the way the task of creating vision was delegated to a single individual 
by the managers. 
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Figure 3. SEU presentation slide from June 2009. 
As is the case with many other management concepts, there is no single accepted definition of 
vision. But the importance of a vision statement has been unequivocally accepted by 
management writers (Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Quigley, 1994b, Thornberry, 1997, Rotemberg 
and Saloner, 2000, Levin, 2000, Kantabutra, 2008, van der Helm, 2009). Some authors suggest 
that a lack of vision is one of the main reasons for organisational failure (Kotter, 1985) and that 
it is ‘often THE essential quality of a leader’ (Manaase, 1985 cited in Christiansen, 2011: 150). 
The literature is abundant with characteristics of ‘correct’ vision, but the processes of crafting 
vision statements has not been explored (Christiansen, 2010). Nanus (1982) noted that the 
professionals had difficulty in describing how they created their organisational vision. If asked 
how I had arrived at my vision for the Unit I would find it very difficult to describe. The ‘vision’, 
as it was presented on the slide, but also as I had become accustomed to thinking about the Unit,  
evolved in messy processes of responsive interactions with my PhD group, colleagues, 
managers, representatives from charities and other organisations, students, graduates, and in 
silent conversations with myself. 
Given the huge emphasis that is placed on vision in the traditional management literature, both 
popular (e.g. Collins and Porras, 1994) and academic, one may find the everyday activities of 
talking to people, often in informal settings (Kotter, 1985), as too mundane to be perceived as 
crafting a vision. The same writers that emphasise the importance of leaders do not discuss the 
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processes of ‘envisioning’, despite the titles of their work (see Quigley, 1994a, van der Helm, 
2009).  This is not surprising. Defining vision as 
a picture of the future. Something not yet real, but imagined. What organisation could 
and should look like. Part analytical and part emotional (Thornberry, 1997: 28) 
and that articulating a ‘strong’ vision results in optimistic, motivating, and energised followers 
taking on difficult challenges (Berson et al., 2001). This presents a highly idealised idea of what 
leaders must and can do. Putting such great emphasis on a single statement elevates the activity 
of envisioning from a daily activity into the exclusive realm of ‘inspirational visionary leaders’ 
(ibid). It is no wonder, then, that ‘managers spend over a year trying to evolve this vision’ 
(Thornberry, 1997: 28).  
Often there is a requirement that vison is shared by followers, ‘encompass[ing] everyone related 
to the organisation’ (Bogler and Nir, 2004: 137), and ‘proclaimed by all organisational 
members’ (Kantabutra, 2008: 130). Given the abundance of idealised representations of vision, 
how can a leader arrive at a statement that would represent a picture of the future that makes 
sense to all?  How can one present ‘a thing of imagination’ (Bell and Harrison, 1995: 5), in a 
way that is clear and acceptable to all in an organisation?  In order for the vision to make sense 
to ‘all organisational members’ it needs to be presented in very generalised, abstract, thus 
unclear, terms.   
The lofty purpose of vision discussed above, may confuse a practitioner as to the purpose of 
vision in organisations. In my experience the role of vision provides a focus for continuous 
conversations about working together. In the previous narrative I discussed in detail the making 
sense of what I was supposed to do as director of the Unit. These processes of figuring out with 
others can be considered ‘the envisioning’ of future actions. Crafting a vision is creating a 
narrative of the future as perceived in the present. The experience of putting together in the 
present a slide as a way of presenting how I expected to work in the future, what I intended to 
focus on, fits with Quigley’s description of vision as ‘a road map to the future’ (Quigley, 1994: 
37). I do not suggest that my experience of composing the slide, of creating a vision for the 
Unit, is identical to the experiences of others. I draw attention to the experience of ‘envisioning’ 
being a highly contextualised exercise in expressing intentions, in imagining what might 
happen. No amount of protracted painstaking deliberations will make it happen. In no way can 
a general statement of intention guide individuals on ‘how … to act and interact to attain what 
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they regard as desirable’ (ibid).  A vison statement, even after consultations and discussions, 
can never be interpreted identically, or accepted, by all. It will be enacted in an organisation, 
will become a social object, in multiple local interactions in which it will be continuously 
reiterated and reinterpreted.  
The slide is an expression of what I interpreted as appropriate CSR practices at HBS. I decided 
that environmental issues should not be included in the remit of the Unit. It was so obvious to 
me that I never thought it needed expanding. However, my later reflection on the choices I 
make about revealing and concealing alerted me to the importance of explaining this choice. I 
must confess that I am not an avid environmentalist and have never been. As a child in the 
Soviet Union, my classmates and I participated in collecting paper and scrap metal, and at 
weekends we went planting trees on the river banks, but we never thought of these activities in 
environmental terms. We enjoyed the extracurricular activities, each other’s company, were 
motivated by the competition with other classes in our school and never asked what happened 
to all the materials that were collected. To clarify, I am not anti-environment; I am, however, 
not interested in focusing my work on this issue for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, I believe 
that environmental issues have been extensively addressed in literature and in practice. 
Sustainability has become the new buzzword (Cole, 2015). In my university we have several 
departments dealing with the environment. Employees are encouraged to cycle to work, to car 
share and to use two electric university-owned cars. There are car charging stations on both 
campuses; the latest building on deHavilland campus is environmentally ‘smart’. We receive 
monthly e-mail updates regarding recycling data and energy and water consumption. I am less 
interested in this aspect of social responsibility, and feel it is sufficiently addressed at UH. 
This leads me to the second reason for my reluctance to focus on environmental issues. 
Environmental engagement is relatively easy to measure. And a lot of attention in management 
is being paid to what is measurable, as the infamous McKinsey maxim ‘What we can measure 
we can manage’ (Baker, 2003) exemplifies. During the last PRME summit, the head of one of 
the accrediting agencies said ‘What is not inspected cannot be expected’, alluding to the need 
to include some CSR/PRME metrics into the accreditation requirements. Environmental 
measurements are at the heart of many sustainability indexes (ISO 14000, SA8000, GRI, ILO, 
AA1000).  I will discuss the importance measuring on our practice, and my reluctance to 
succumb to it in Chapter 8.  
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I also created a rationale for those choices. By defining the remit of the Unit, as ‘contributing 
to the local community, while benefitting the students’, I inadvertently put boundaries around 
the work of the Unit. I understand today that having some ideas of what to be included in and 
excluded from the Unit was essential to keep working, as having a ‘do as you want’ attitude 
would have had a paralysing effect on me, the Unit and its funding, I would not have know how 
to proceed. The remit was never put in writing, but keeping it in mind allowed me to have more 
focused conversations with potential beneficiaries, with colleagues and with senior managers 
at the university. It also allowed me to make decisions about taking on or rejecting projects. 
The list on the slide was stating my preferences. It was constraining my practice – those are the 
areas I was going to focus on, other areas were excluded; at the same time it enabled me to 
make decisions, and to justify them. 
Later, when I went on to offer the use of our facilities to the local Third Sector organisations 
free of charge, I managed to reconcile that decision with the initial idea of ‘benefitting the 
students’, by reinterpreting that general statement to include ‘as long as it is not harming the  
students’. It is evident that I kept on working and adapting the rules I set to be able to get on 
with my work. I still believe that providing facilities is morally right; I have not compromised 
myself ethically, not in my understanding. But I did keep adapting the rules as the meaning of 
the Unit kept evolving. 
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Summary 
In this chapter I drew attention to the interdependence of many participants in setting up the 
Social Enterprise Unit. Working with many others, participating in numerous local interactions, 
I was enabled and constrained by them in deciding on appropriate actions. The decisions of 
what is appropriate and what is not, the ideas of what should be included and excluded from 
the activities of the Unit, arose in the processes of interdependence and power relating. Making 
those choices was not guided by a blueprint, but involved ethical decision-making, continual 
adapting of the rules, and evaluative choices that have been made in our interactions. Our 
intentions for the future and our reinterpretations of the past intertwined, and the meaning of 
the Unit has been emerging.  
In the next chapter I will discuss the experience of contributing to the very processes I have 
been so critical about – quantification of social engagement.   
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Chapter 8 - Making sense of my contribution to CSR reporting 
Хотелось как лучше а вышло как всегда (Russian folk wisdom) 
Introduction 
The Russian saying above can be loosely translated as: wanted the best but it turned out as 
before. It is used in retrospect to describe the actions of idealistic political candidates that seem 
to become part of the establishment after being elected, or the avant-garde projects that got 
bogged down in minor details. This saying kept coming to mind while I was rereading the 
narrative that introduced the SEU reporting, written in 2012. At the time I felt it was important 
but could not explain its significance to CSR. Coming back to it, I am surprised at my inability 
to make the link to my thesis; after all this is a story about my contribution to  the practice of, 
and the narrative about CSR at UH. 
One of the motives for my interest in researching CSR was my discontent with the fact that 
Friedman’s (1970) article was heavily criticized in the CSR literature for emphasising profit 
over responsibility (e.g. Mulligan, 1986, Gallagher, 2005, Schwartz and Saiia, 2012), while a 
significant strand of CSR writings aimed to provide a ‘business case for CSR’ (e.g. Vogel, 
2005, McWilliams et al., 2006, Carroll and Shabana, 2010, Meyer, 2015, Lee and Jung, 2016).  
Prior to undertaking the role of SEU director, my view of CSR practitioners was quite cynical. 
This view was reinforced by meeting several CSR executives while conducting my Ukrainian 
research (Chapter 3). I saw them as missionaries at the service of business, providing a fig leaf 
for the exposed corporations. I was naïvely idealistic, hoping to demonstrate that there was 
another way – engaging in responsible activities because those activities had intrinsic value and 
not simply being a means to the university’s ends.  
Friedman’s article (1970) has been heavily criticised as anti-CSR (e.g. Gallagher, 2005). In my 
reading of Friedman I do not share the view that he as rejecting CSR. I understood his article 
as having two major points. Firstly, his assertion that only people can have responsibilities, 
resonated with my understanding of moral agency. Secondly, I understood his reference to the 
use of the 'cloak of social responsibility’ as rejecting the contemporary rhetoric of CSR.  He 
objected to describing those actions and behaviours that promote organisations’ self-interests 
(Friedman, 1970: 124), rather than criticising the undertaking of actions that are often classed 
as ‘social responsibilities’. I too felt uneasy about what I saw as self-serving actions being 
disguised as addressing the social responsibilities of organisations. In this chapter I explore how 
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I contributed to the exact phenomenon I had been so indignant about – using responsibility 
rhetoric to promote the university’s self-interest. Today I do not see the two – CSR and self-
interest – as necessarily opposing values, but understand that self-interest and responsibility 
arise in the same processes and often coincide. To trace this evolving change in my attitude, I 
begin with a review of what stimulated my interest in researching CSR – the CSR literature and 
the literature on measuring CSR - and my uneasiness with the rationalisation of CSR. I proceed 
to reflect on the period of five years of engaging in one aspect of the standardisation of my 
practice, which is followed by my sense-making of those developments.  
Managerialising Higher Education 
Before I proceed to discuss the processes of managerialising CSR, it is important to highlight 
that the discussion that follows, which is primarily based on the literature emphasising business 
organisations, also applies to the Higher Education Institutions (HEI), as universities have been 
undergoing similar processes. Elsewhere in this thesis I argued for the appropriateness of 
applying CSR terminology to universities. In this section I argue that HEIs ‘are becoming 
increasingly corporatized’ (Banerjee, 2008: 56). A growing number of authors (Barry et al., 
2001, Anderson, 2008, Parker, 2014, Ayers, 2014, Martin, 2016) have begun focusing on 
managerialism in Higher Education. They address aspects such as performance management 
(Sousa et al., 2010), demand on senior academics to undertake administrative roles (Parker, 
2008), increasing marketisation of HE (Ntshoe, 2004), and the audit culture of universities (By 
et al., 2008, Bosco, 2011).  
This comes as no surprise for me. In the nine years since I started working at UH the 
bureaucracy has increased immensely, and is now bordering on ridiculous (for example, 
currently, to order a pen, we must submit a form, which has to be signed by a department 
manager). The only promotion route from lecturer to principal lecturer is through taking on an 
administrative role, rather than through demonstrating teaching excellence or through research. 
Increasingly students are being referred to as ‘customers’. The new strategy consultation rounds 
focused on whether we should be known as ‘international business-facing university’ or an 
‘internationally renowned business-facing university’ – the business-facing agenda was not up 
for discussion. We have a business development department comprising fourteen people 
(compared to thirteen permanent staff in the academic strategic management group). The 
purpose of business development is ‘to support businesses, public sector organisations and 
charities in tackling strategic problems, carrying out research…’ and to ‘play a supportive role 
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to academics and professionals in the development and growth of commercial activity…’ (UH, 
2014). These are only few examples of the managerialist discourse at UH.  
Liz Morrish, a researcher at Nottingham Trent University, collects examples of managerial 
communication and has ‘a large collection of horrors from several institutions’ (Morrish, 2014). 
Her analysis of all UK universities’ mission statements points to ‘neo-liberal anxieties: sector 
leading; benchmark; performance indicator, sustainable excellence (sustex); business (meaning 
a university); company spin-outs; customer focus; talent management…’(ibid). UH, with the 
mission statement ‘An innovative and enterprising university, challenging individuals and 
organisations to excel’ (UH, 2014), seems to suffer from similar anxieties.  
Recently the social responsibilities of universities began to be discussed in the literature (e.g. 
Othman and Othman, 2014, Wigmore-Álvarez and Ruiz-Lozano, 2012), which also highlights 
appropriating CSR as a management tool. Brown and Cloke (2009: 479) argue that: 
rather than seeing universities as public institutions under attack from the 
encroachment of marketization and the private sector, we would do better to view our 
own institutions as corporations in their own right. Whilst UK Universities may not be 
accountable to shareholders or driven only by the profit motive, they are increasingly 
operating as if those were their chief considerations.  
In recent years it has been my experience that managerialisation of the HE sector has become 
more prominent. In the section below I elaborate on the argument adopted in the mainstream 
management literature for a managerialist approach to CSR. 
CSR as a management tool 
While conducting a literature review several questions started to trouble me. In Chapter 4 I 
addressed the question of CSR being discussed as a generalised idea, with no discussion of how 
CSR is particularised by practitioners.  Additional concern arising from this generalised 
approach has been the instrumentalisation of CSR and its subjugation to managerial rationale.  
Since the term Social Responsibilities was coined by Bowen in his 1953 book Social 
Responsibilities of the Businessman (SRB), the concept of Social Responsibility (SR) and later 
CSR has been developed as a managerial(ist) idea. By managerial(ist) I mean an idea that is 
being promoted to and adopted by the managers in an organisation as a tool or vehicle for 
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advancing the goals of that organisation. One of the more important features of a managerial(ist) 
idea, as I understand it, is that those who espouse it are conceptualising an issue or a problem 
as a thing that exists out there and managers as using the tools from their managerial toolbox to 
fix whatever in their view needs fixing. In the relationships of business (and other types of 
organisations) and society, that tool is CSR. This thinking is firmly embedded in the systems 
views, limitations of which are discussed in Chapter 2. The purpose of this discussion is to 
demonstrate how the concept of CSR has been shaped as a managerial(ist) tool. 
Published in 1953Social Responsibilities of the Businessman was commissioned by the Federal 
Council of the Churches of Christ (Acquier et al., 2011), and was not published as an academic 
monograph, but rather was ‘intended for nonacademic readers’ (ibid: 612). The environment of 
the time, mid-20th-century America was ripe for social responsibility becoming ‘not only 
acceptable in leading business circles, but even fashionable’ (Bowen, 2013/1953: 44).  
Separation between ownership and control in corporations (Berle and Means, [1932] 1968 ), 
growth in the number of business schools (Khurana, 20017), an increasing concern with the 
legitimacy and image of ‘big business’ (Frederick, 2008), and the  post -WII reawakening of 
negative sentiments towards corporations  - were the background for Bowen’s manuscript. The 
book clearly demonstrates that CSR was initially developed as a management idea, and only 
later it was theorised by academics20.  
 
The 1960s saw a proliferation of CSR definitions (e.g. Davis, 1960; Frederick, 1960; Walton; 
1967). One of the most influential contributors to the CSR discourse was Clarence Cyril Walton 
(1967: 18), who claimed that: 
[t]he new concept of social responsibility recognizes the intimacy of the relationships 
between the corporation and society and realizes that such relationships must be kept 
in mind by top managers as the corporation and the related groups pursue their 
respective goals. 
I understand this quote as drawing managers’ attention to the possible negative impact of  
ignoring or avoiding addressing societal issues, especially those caused by the corporation, and 
the need to harness ‘the new concept of social responsibility’ as a means to mitigate those 
                                                          
20 Similar to the evolution of  many other management ideas, and the emergence of  the academic field of 
management in general, as discussed by Khurana (2017) 
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effects in pursuing corporate goals. Walton goes on to concede that sometimes it may not be 
possible to measure the direct economic benefits of accepting social responsibilities (thus 
implying that a direct link usually does exist). 
Keith Davis, who ‘should be considered as a the runner up to Howard Bowen as the “Father of 
CSR” designation’ (Carroll, 2008: 27), suggests that one of the reasons businessmen (on behalf 
of corporations) put social responsibility ‘into the business’ kit of tools’ is to avoid losing its 
[the business’] power’ (Davis, 1960: 73). Davis draws on Bowen’s claim that businessmen 
‘would hardly be permitted to continue without some assumption of social responsibility’ 
(Bowen, 1953:4). This approach was further developed by Archie Carroll (Carroll, 1979) and 
later by Donna Wood (Wood, 1991) as Corporate Social Performance theory . For the purpose 
of this discussion, suffice it to say to that one of the main arguments from the proponents of 
this approach for the adoption of CSR, is the dependence (rather than interdependence) of 
business on society. CSR is seen as a tool that allows organisations to maintain their ‘licence to 
operate’, or to uphold their social contract with society (Donaldson , 1982). 
Ackerman (1973; Ackerman and Bauer, 1976) approached organisations’ social responsibilities 
as a response to societal demands, which led to the concept of Corporate Social Responsiveness. 
This approach is consistent with the Corporate Social Performance theories and Bowen’s, 
Davis’s and Walton’s conceptualising of CSR, as a means to the end of organisations’ 
endurance in the social environment. Another significant development in theorising CSR was 
Stakeholder Theory.  Harold Johnson mentioned ‘multiplicity of interests’ as early as 1971, but 
Stakeholder Theory was developed by Ed Freeman in 1982. Many authors (e.g. Mele, 2008, 
Rönnegard and Smith, 2013) promulgate the so-called ‘Friedman-Freeman’ debate, juxtaposing 
Friedman’s economic and Freeman’s stakeholder theories. Freeman, however, clarifies that 
stakeholder theory is not contrary, but complementary to economic theory; it is a strategic 
management theory, providing a manager with an alternative way of increasing profits:  
The primary responsibility of an executive is to create as much value as possible for 
stakeholders because that’s how you create as much value as possible for shareholders’  
(Freeman in Agle et al., 2008: 166)  
Therefore, I maintain that Stakeholder Theory does not depart far from neo-classical economic 
theories, and the main difference is how the maximization of profits is perceived – the latter 
sees profit maximization as a goal, while the former sees it as an outcome. And according to 
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the former, attending to stakeholders (another way of understanding CSR) is a way to look after 
shareholders.   
By the end of the 1990s the concept of CSR had undergone managerialization. The research 
had become focused on the CSR-CFP link in organisations (Moore, 2001, Orlitzky et al., 2003, 
Lankoski, 2008) and on the instrumental benefits of CSR  (Porter and Kramer, 2006, Greening 
and Turban, 2000, Fombrun, 1996, Lai et al., 2010, Godfrey et al., 2009) , thus contributing to 
the development of  ‘business case’ rhetoric in the management literature.   
 
The proliferation of theories and approaches to CSR created confusion and dissonance amongs 
various CSR writers. In Carroll’s study (1994: 14) the participants described the field of CSR 
as ‘an eclectic field with loose boundaries, multiple memberships, and differing 
training/perspective; broadly, rather than focused, multidisciplinary; wide breadth; brings in a 
wider range of literature; and interdisciplinary’. This led to several writers attempting to classify 
the theories and to ‘map the territory’ (Garriga and Mele, 2004).  
Klonoski (1991) identified three types of theories: fundamentalist, moral personhood and social 
institutions. Fundamentalist theories are based on a neo-classical economics claim that 
organisations are artificial entities, whose sole responsibility is to make profit, as espoused by 
Friedman (1970).  Moral personhood theories argue for the moral agency of organisations 
(French, 1977, Goodpaster and Matthews Jr, 1982). Finally there is a group of theories that 
understand organisations as social institutions that should comply with the social contract, as is 
argued by Donaldson (1982).  
Garriga and Melé (2004) propose classifying the CSR theories into four groups: instrumental, 
political (emphasiing the social power of organisations), integrative (emphasizing the 
dependence of business on society), and ethical. Following the 2004 study, Mele (2008) 
discusses four ‘contemporary mainstream theories’: Corporate Social Performance, 
Shareholder Value Theory, Stakeholder Theory, and Corporate Citizenship.  
The three classifications (Klonoski’s, Garriga and Melé’s, and Melé’s) essentially overlap. 
Regardless of the categorisation of each of the theories, most of them adopt an instrumental 
approach. By instrumental I mean using CSR as an instrument for achieving either economic 
or political goals, or a combination of the two. 
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Ethical theories, based on the philosophical traditions of Aristotle (common goods) and moral 
philosophy (universal rights) would be considered non-instrumental. However, there has been 
limited adoption of these approaches in academic circles (Argandona, 2012) and they tend to 
remain the focus of policy documents (e.g. UN Global Compact, 1999).  
The instrumentalising of CSR goes hand in hand with the ‘corporate social responsibility is 
good for business’ slogan promulgated by CEOs, NGOs and government officials (Banerjee, 
2008). This rhetoric is rooted in the capitalist economic discourse (Freeman and Liedtka, 1991). 
I became acutely aware of this when interviewing CSR practitioners in Ukraine (Chapter 3). 
During this research the executives cited the ‘business case’ as their main motive for CSR, even 
when the actions they had taken had no apparent benefit for the company. Ukraine, a relatively 
young market economy, is still emerging after 70 years of Soviet era influence. The socialist 
past is rejected, and capitalism is seen as the future. As one of the research participants stated: 
‘CSR is capitalism’s mechanism to win over socialism’.21 It is conceivable, therefore, that the 
attempt to establish close ties between CSR and financial benefit derive from the need to be 
seen as a legitimate capitalist enterprise. Executives are looking for ways to participate in a 
discourse that is dominant today in the international business community. CSR is one of the 
themes in that discourse. They look for clues in the West, and the CSR discourse in the West is 
deeply embedded in capitalist mentality. CSR strategy must be linked with the business 
strategy, as advocated by the strategy ‘gurus’ (e.g. Porter and Kramer, 2006). A Ukrainian 
executive understands CSR as  
the means for the company to contribute to the community, where we live and work , in 
a way that also has, of course, a benefit for the company. What is said at any CSR 
conference? If you`re not doing this, if it has no way to contribute to your business, it`s 
not CSR, it`s philanthropy’.  
It is also plausible that the interviewees demonstrated a ‘Hawthorne Effect’ in relation to the 
research. Since the research was conducted by a British academic, the interviewees might have 
given the answers they thought the Anglo-Saxon researcher might expect. A way to understand 
the overwhelmingly instrumental approach to CSR, is as executives’ rationalisation of their 
socially-directed activities. Talking to the Ukrainian executives, it became apparent how deeply 
                                                          
21 I doubt he was aware of Bowen’s claim that the ‘assumption of social responsibilities, therefore, is at least 
a partial alternative to socialism’ (1953: 28). The participant, by his own admission, had not read Bowen. 
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the understanding of CSR as a management tool has become entrenched in the practitioners’ 
mentality.  
In the summary above I explained my claim that most of the contemporary CSR theories have 
instrumental, i.e. managerial(ist), underpinning. It is also my claim that this managerial(ist) 
approach to CSR is closely linked to the demand for systemising CSR in general, and for 
reporting on CSR activities specifically.  
 
Measuring CSR  
In the early ‘70s, following the emergence of the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility in the 
‘60s, the demand for social reporting started to be heard. The response was delivered by the 
corporations and the attempt by academics to address this demand shortly followed (Sethi, 
1972). Since then, the demand for and attempts to measure CSR have been on the increase. The 
Business Source Complete database accessed on June 29, 2014 returned 1,151 items for the 
combination of ‘CSR’ and ‘metrics’ keywords. However, despite the abundance of CSR 
indexes, from Dow Jones Sustainability to ISO14001, management tools, from triple bottom 
line to Social Return on Investment; and the academics’ attempt to provide a comprehensive 
framework (Székely and Knirsch, 2005, O'Connor and Spangenberg, 2008, Gjølberg, 2009, 
Bouten et al., 2011), no metric emerged as a front-runner for measuring CSR activities of 
organisations. As Sethi (1972) observes, in order to arrive at an operational measurement tool, 
we must define what social responsibility; or, more precisely, socially responsible action, is; 
we must consider how it can be measured; and we must determine to whom the organisations 
are responsible. And since CSR remains vaguely defined, the ways of measuring keep 
proliferating.  
The discussion above demonstrates that the main CSR theories adopt a systems point of view. 
The outcomes of actions, on this view, can be analysed and predicted, and the organisation 
needs to choose the right actions to achieve a desired outcome (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
These theories, as well as empirical research, aim to demonstrate how CSR impacts financial 
performance, legitimacy, image and attracting employees and other stakeholders (see Khanifar 
et al., 2012, Kyj, 2011, Peloza and Shang, 2011, Hayward, 2006, Maignan and Ferrell, 2004). 
CSR orthodoxy is rooted in a positivist perspective, ‘a paradigm that tries to uncover 
correlations and causal relationships in the social world by using the empirical methods of 
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(natural) science’ (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007: 1096). A further thread, which follows from 
taking a positivist stance, is that CSR is viewed as an independently existing object that is 
created by management, and is subject to manipulation by managers. This brief review of CSR 
theories demonstrates that CSR is used as a stepping stone to creating an effective CSR ‘system’ 
that will assist in achieving one or more of the organisations’ outcomes. It also demonstrates 
how CSR has been conceptualised as a Weberian ‘rational action’,  one that is ‘directed by the 
strategic, instrumental, calculated pursuit of a specific goal’ (Bond and O'Byrne, 2013: 139).  
Dissent from the predominantly instrumental approach to CSR is limited. James C. Scott 
observes:  
A critique of ... hegemonic ideas comes, if it comes at all, not from within, but typically 
from the margins, where intellectual point of departure and operating assumptions ... are 
substantially different (Scott, 1998: 279).  
Critical management studies’ (CMS) central themes of  de-naturalisation of existing order and 
rejection of social relations being thought of in terms of profit maximisation (Grey and 
Willmott, 2005), provide a different point of departure, and offer an alternative way of thinking 
about CSR. 
CMS scholars do not speak in unison. Many address the role CSR rhetoric has in perpetuating 
the capitalist discourse (e.g. Freeman and Liedtka, 1991), questioning the logic of social 
activities and whose interests are served by these actions (e.g. Banerjee, 2008, Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2007). Kuhn and Deetz (2008: 191) claim that ‘many critical theorists are sceptical of 
common CSR interventions and corporations’ claims of virtue’. A CMS-informed approach is 
useful in problematising the uncritical acceptance of CSR as a heroic narrative and in critiquing 
the instrumental approach to CSR.  
By bringing to the fore the question of whose values are addressed by CSR initiatives, CMS 
scholars provide a valuable alternative to the mainstream understanding of CSR. Banerjee, for 
example, highlights that ‘the mainstream literature in management and organisational studies 
has either ignored corporate political activity or narrowly circumscribed its extent’ (Banerjee, 
2010: 265). He points out that the majority of CSR research focuses on the CSR ‘providers’, so 
we actually do not know how CSR initiatives affect society (Banerjee, 2011). Critical 
management writers draw attention to the limitations of CSR strategies, and to the lack of 
discussion of power in the mainstream literature, and suggest that corporations often 
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‘incorporate citizenship activities in order to benefit corporate agendas’  (Nyberg et al., 2013: 
433). Being critical of the appropriation of CSR for the benefit of large corporations, CMS 
scholars, however, share some of the limitations of the dominant CSR discourse. Firstly, both 
address CSR and related concepts from a systems perspective. In addition, both approaches 
tend to discuss CSR in abstract terms, favouring generalisations and avoiding specifics.    
It is clear that the demand for CSR reporting has been increasing. It can be argued that this is a 
natural development – in order to be adopted, every management tool must demonstrate its 
contribution to management goals. And this contribution must be concrete and measurable. 
What remains less clear is how a particular practitioner is to find her way in this wide array of 
measuring options. Theoretically it is possible to select a standard (e.g. ISO 26000 (ISO, 2014) 
or triple bottom line (Savitz and Weber, 2006)) and to apply it to her organisation. However, 
this is only a hypothetical possibility.  Adopting this in a particular practice is anything but 
straightforward. In addition to the vagueness of the measurement schemes, problems ‘often 
arise at the interface of general ideas and local practice’ (Jutterstrom and Norberg, 2013: 166). 
Little attention has been paid to how a practitioner deals with those problems and what issues 
may arise in the particular adoption of general ideas. Related to my research question is the 
question of how this instrumentalisation of CSR is being taken up by a practitioner. In the 
narrative below I explore how and why a particular metric was adopted to assess the 
contribution of the SEU to the university’s strategic plan.  
Experiencing managerialism 
Since being appointed to the role of director of the SEU, I have been left to work and ‘develop 
the role’ (UHBS, 2009) with very little interference from management. Every meeting to report 
on progress was initiated by me. I could interpret this as the management having confidence in 
me, but this would be a very limited interpretation. If I’m being more realistic, this probably 
reflects the priority that is given to the activities of the Unit by management. The existence of 
the Unit is, of course, vital. It demonstrates HBS’ commitment to the community and to social 
responsibility (one of the six graduate attributes). But it also serves an instrumental purpose. 
Every time there is a need to demonstrate entrepreneurial spirit and innovative schemes, I am 
brought out to speak to visitors, or asked to write a paragraph for a press release. The Unit even 
won the Vice-Chancellor’s award for community engagement in 2011. The Unit was the first 
item in the ‘Community Engagement Strategy’ drafted by the Pro-Vice Chancellor Regional 
Engagement. This, in my view, is not contradictory. The establishment of the Unit is important 
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to signal the intent of engaging with the ‘external community’. But, at the same time, since 
these activities are not regulated or monitored by HEFCE or any other external body, the way 
those activities are undertaken requires less strict management supervision. This allows me to 
explore various ways of working; however, less monitoring also means less guidance.  
In this chapter I would like to explore how I experienced being in the midst of the 
standardisation of my activities. 
I met with the Pro-Vice Chancellor shortly after being appointed to the role, since the newly 
created Centre for Sustainable Living, where I was supposed to represent the business school, 
was under his responsibility (Chapter 4). He was very enthusiastic about the Unit, and the ways 
I proposed to develop it. He asked me to keep him updated on developments, but after that 
meeting I did not hear from him for several months. Almost a year later (March 2010), I 
received an e-mail which included a draft Community Engagement Strategy, with the request 
to comment on the Social Enterprise area. I was flattered that the Pro-VC placed the Social 
Enterprise Unit first of the six Key Areas, adopting my wording about the Unit almost verbatim. 
But the next paragraph alarmed me. It stated: 
 Performance Indicators: 
the number of charities being supported each year; 
the total value of fundraising carried out for those charities through the Social Enterprise 
Unit. 22 
I did not think my activity in the previous year could or should be attached to numerical values. 
Measuring outputs by number of charities supported would be reductionist and would not allow 
me to demonstrate various activities we had been undertaking. I met with tens of representatives 
of various organisations; I managed to embed some projects in the modules, organise events, 
fundraising, room use, etc. How can all this work be reduced to just the number of charities and 
value of fundraising? But I also realised that this was the game played and I could either play 
it, albeit trying to modify the rules, or quit. And since I had no intention of quitting, I was going 
to use the rules to my advantage. I had to provide some ‘performance indicators’, and I thought 
those indicators should reflect the entire range of activities, not just relating to charities.  I came 
up with the following proposal:  
                                                          
22 In this narrative all quotes are from internal correspondence between the Pro-VC and myself, unless 
otherwise indicated 
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Dear Stewart, 
I’ve been considering your question about performance indicators and I think I have a 
solution. We still put a ‘social impact’ indicator in the document, but the way to 
measure it is ‘value added’ to the organisation. E.g. if we produce a report – the value 
added would be the cost of buying that report at a going market rate from a 
consultancy. If the students raise money (fundraising) – that would be the value 
added.  Facilities provided for community events – we will show how much that would 
cost if they had to hire the venue, etc. So actually we can start measuring impact in 
money terms, but that way we can measure all output, not just fundraising. 
I’d be happy to hear your thoughts about it. 
In my experience executives do not like to be presented with problems without solutions. So by 
presenting my suggestion as a ‘solution’, I was hoping to put him in a receptive mood. Stewart 
was glad to adopt my suggestion. He needed some indicators. I wanted the hard work of the 
previous year to be acknowledged. This seemed like a win-win compromise, or in the words of 
a Russian proverb, ‘the wolves were fed, and the sheep were intact’. I realise now that I was 
adopting the very logic I was criticising – I was not just creating measures, but had also made 
them narrow and specific, rather than open and flexible. 
This method was utilised in the first year of the Unit’s operation. The figures were very 
impressive, so I was not worried about the nature of the method, its limitations and implications 
of using it. In the following year there was a brief discussion about what figures should be 
presented to the Board and the wording of the report. My alarm bells went off again when I saw 
the following sentence: 
I would be able to tell the Board that you will calculate the figure for last year’s work 
and will then use that as a baseline for setting targets.   
Targets? It seemed that we were forgetting that I was promoting volunteering, trying to find 
module leaders who would be happy to use one of the projects in their module, encouraging 
students to undertake research into the Third Sector. How can these be set targets? But again, I 
said nothing: I did not know what to say. Arguing against setting targets is not the quickest way 
to promotion. I was hoping that ignoring this suggestion would buy me another year of very 
loose supervision and getting on with my work. I put the whole indicator business to the back 
  150 
 
of my mind, hoping that this might be somehow avoided in the future. But in May (2011) the 
request came, with this addition: 
Many apologies for the short notice, but could you possibly send me a brief update on 
what the Social Enterprise Unit has achieved over the past academic year.  If you 
already have a report which you’ve produced for other purposes that would be great – 
I can easily extract what I need.  Ideally [emphasis in original] a few figures such as 
number of projects supported, number of students involved, number of client 
organisations, and total commercial value of the work the Unit has done (as a measure 
of impact). 
I had forgotten about the report, and in my haste I could not – and did not want to – spend too 
much time on this reporting, so my reply was brief: 
SEU supported at least 45 projects/40 client organisations 
Over 250 students involved 
I really struggle to estimate the commercial value of our support to the community, 
but I guesstimate that it is similar to last year's, so if you are pressed for a figure, I'd 
say £80,000. 
To which Stewart replied 
That’s just right for this level of report.  
Great! I had bought myself another year to think about how to produce a report that reflected 
not just the quantity but the quality of work as well. In my haste I had not recognised that I was 
playing the exact game which I was so determined to avoid. 
And when the request arrived the following year (May 2012) 
We could probably make the report a bit shorter this year, but the Governors always like 
to see numerical data, so please don’t be afraid to bore them with such information!  
I felt indignant and gloating at the same time. They actually want a shorter report with just 
numerical data?! But I actually was very happy with myself for predicting such a request. I 
could not stop smiling to myself. The stories that accompanied indicators were no longer 
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needed. From now on, just the numbers, please. What I ignored was that it was I who kept 
responding to these requests with what could be interpreted as enthusiasm. I had never openly 
objected to the requests, never suggested a different way of discussing the contribution of the 
Unit to the local community. It was easier to play the victim (at least thinking I was a victim), 
than to take responsibility for my role in the emerging discourse.  
So I looked at the activities of the previous year, applied the original method, adjusted for 
inflation and arrived at very respectable figures, again. I was somewhat concerned, as the 
figures were lower than the previous year. I was worried about the reduced contribution and 
about blatantly disregarding the request for a shorter report. When I saw Stewart’s name in my 
‘Inbox’ a few days later my heart sank. To my surprise he congratulated all contributors to this 
year’s excellent report, of which the Board ‘was highly complimentary’. The e-mail went on 
praising us and our teams. I was almost lulled into complacence, when my eye caught the name 
of the Unit: 
The Board liked the way in which the financial impact of the Social Enterprise Unit 
had been calculated, and were impressed by the resulting figures.  Perhaps we should 
see if this approach could be applied in other areas of activity.  One Board member 
asked if we knew how much our community engagement costs, and I said that there 
would be figures for each area of activity, but they hadn’t been drawn together.  I think 
we all agreed that this wouldn’t be an exact exercise, given the problems of attaching 
costs to things like voluntary work, or staff who do a range of activities; but I think it 
would be interesting to get a ‘ball park’ figure for next year. 
Did I finally shoot myself in the foot? I was trying to play by the rules, and by doing so I actually 
contributed to the tightening of the rules. The transformation of the indicators from ‘we need 
some way of measuring what we do’ to ‘let’s use this approach in other areas of activities’ was 
smooth and inconspicuous. I am partially responsible for transforming what I saw as the  
‘Unit contributing not only to the charity sector, but to the experience of our students, 
to the community, and creating synergies that will enable us, the UHBS staff, to give 
back to society more than any of us, as individuals, can ever hope to’ (from my 
application for the role)  
into the reductionist management tool it had become. Once the method was established, it was 
easier to apply it to each year’s activities, thus reducing the human stories to a set of figures. 
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My brief and concise reports brought me praise and recognition, and allowed me to continue 
doing my job without having management frequently checking up on me. I have been a willing 
participant in the standardised reporting of my work, and thus to the standardisation of the work 
itself. But I no longer want to play by these rules. I do not know what I will do when the request 
for a report arrives next year. I might resist the temptation of quick and easy enumeration of the 
activities and write a story of what I do. I might be short of time and submit what is requested. 
Whatever I end up doing, I will try doing it with more awareness of my contribution to the 
conversation. 
*************************************************************************** 
The above part of my narrative was written in August 2012. I had become more aware of my 
contribution to the reporting format, and as a result my report in the following year (May 2013) 
had a small addition to the previous year’s format – a ‘Highlights’ section. This was my attempt, 
albeit minor, to address my collusion with the managerial(ist) approach to CSR at the university. 
The section itself did not offer a coherent story, nor did it provide a context to the dry report. 
But I could not un-realise what I had realised the previous year – I had been contributing to the 
university’s CSR narrative, and I could no longer play the victim of the requests, and at the 
same time continue doing nothing to change what I thought was wrong. Writing my story in the 
previous year contributed to the awareness of my participation in creating that narrative, and 
my inclusion of the new section was an attempt to change it, in a slight way.  
I had hoped that this small gesture of defiance would provoke further questions, thus opening 
the discussion on what should be reported in the following year. The ‘following year’ is when 
I am writing this narrative. Two weeks ago the anticipated e-mail arrived 
The report will be in a new format, at the request of the Chairman of the Governors, 
so won’t need much text.  It will relate everything to the 2012 update of the UH 
Strategic Plan and, in particular, the KPIs on page 55 of that plan.  I am hoping that 
you can give me updated figures and/or brief information about the following 
(covering the most recent 12 months for which you have data): 
‘Providing support for third sector organisations equivalent to at least £60k per 
year.’   Because of the new format I won’t have room for much text, so will just need 
to have your estimate of the overall value of the work of the Social Enterprise Unit and 
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perhaps a couple of ‘highlights’ to illustrate its impact on the community – I know it 
will be hard to choose from all the good examples! 
 
My initial reaction after reading this e-mail was ‘I failed’. I felt that my attempt at rebelling 
against reducing the activities of the SEU to a few figures had gone unnoticed. But then I saw 
it was staring me in the face – ‘perhaps a couple of “highlights” to illustrate…’. He even used 
the language I introduced in my report. I managed to modify, albeit slightly, the tone of the 
reporting. So not all is lost.  
I am cautiously optimistic about the chances of expanding the format in the future. Stewart is 
retiring at the end of summer. So I am even more uncertain than usual regarding the future of 
the SEU in general, and the reporting in particular. By paying close attention to my interaction 
in this process, I have come to recognise that I have a role in co-creating the format of reporting, 
and I no longer feel oppressed by it. Whatever report I might produce in the future, I will do 








My understanding of the events 
This narrative condenses five years of practising CSR at the UH. Although the e-mail exchange 
as presented in the narrative seems to create a continuous story, I would like to emphasise that 
each exchange between Stewart and me was one year apart from the previous one. The reporting 
was quite a minor activity for me, and I only paid attention to it when the e-mail arrived in my 
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inbox. I would become annoyed for a few days, but other activities demanded my attention, and 
I did not dwell on my irritation with the reporting. I became really alarmed with the 
standardisation of my work when in 2012 Stewart mentioned that my reporting was singled out 
by the Board. That e-mail, as flattering as I found it, was a watershed point for me. It disturbed 
me to realise that my actions could potentially contribute to the same phenomenon I had been 
objecting to - ‘instrumentalisation’ of CSR.  After rereading the chain of e-mails related to SEU 
reporting, I became even more disturbed, as I had come to recognise that this was not just a 
potential development, it had been happening since my first reply to the initial request for 
reporting. Exploring my participation in this particular case of standardisation of CSR activities 
can shed some light on how processes of CSR rationalisation (and rationalisation of other areas) 
are sustained and propagated in an organisation.    
Being part of the events very early on, without a previously established practice of reporting, 
or indeed without prior inclusion of CSR-related goals in the university’s strategic plan, 
provides me with the unique opportunity to be able to reflect on the early stages of the reporting 
process. When contacted first to provide my views about the university’s community 
engagement strategy I was excited that the Unit’s activities were included. At the time I was 
aiming for a promotion, and wanted to present the work we had been doing in the best possible 
way. To achieve the desired promotion, compliance with the request for reporting seemed 
necessary. Stewart’s suggestion did not seem to do justice to all that work, and my proposal 
seemed to present my work in a better light. As reflected in the narrative, some of my principles 
were forgotten, overtaken by other needs.  As much as I hate writing reports, the annual ritual 
of providing a concise summary of the activities has been a valuable exercise. I was forced to 
think back a year and to remember what had been done throughout that year. Producing a report 
was also an opportunity to showcase my work to the dean, to justify the workload allocated to 
my role. My active participation in and contribution to the shaping of the reporting is 
undeniable. What is also undeniable is that the development, from the suggestion of how to 
measure the activities, to the decision about which narratives to include in the reports, has been 
highly social.  
In the literature CSR is addressed as a system that is manipulated by managers. Following the 
same logic, CSR reporting is also seen as a system that is designed and implemented 
independently of the people who design and implement the reporting. Gjølberg  (2009: 14) 
provides an extensive list of most-known CSR indexes. I draw attention to the way the author 
arrived at the final list.  Gjølberg’s methodology presents criteria for inclusion in the final list. 
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Those are not divinely prescribed - they were set by the author - and chosen based on the 
author’s preferences and understandings. I am not criticising Gjølberg’s methodology, but 
emphasise the social nature of creating the list. By social I mean that the ideas are not created 
in a vacuum. The author is a member of social circles and the ideas arise in interaction with 
people in those circles. But this social nature of CSR metrics is largely ignored in the 
mainstream CSR discourse. The authors do not acknowledge their biases, interests and 
preferences in constructing those measurement frameworks (e.g O’Connor & Spangenberg, 
2008). 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996) discuss the inevitability of a social context for any idea to 
emerge. They criticise reification of ideas, the way ideas are being framed as independent of 
the processes of interaction. However, they focus on how the ideas become ‘embedded’ in 
organisations, rather than on the emergence of  ‘the idea of CSR’. 
Elias (1956) rejected the notion of homo clausus (the closed man), the understanding of the 
person as an isolated thinker creating knowledge, so prevalent in Western thought. He proposed 
a different way of thinking about the evolution of knowledge - by homines aperti (open people) 
individuals that are linked together. ‘[N]o person’s knowledge has its beginning in him or 
herself. Each of us, with all our reflections, perceptions, intuitions and experiences, stands on 
the shoulders of others’ (Mennell, 1992: 192-193 emphasis in original).  The theorising of the 
development of CSR and CSR reporting tend to take the homo clausus approach. My 
experience, as reflected in the narrative, clearly points out the interconnectedness of the players 
– the Chairman and the members of the board of Governors, Stewart, myself, but also our 
interconnectedness with others - our learnings from previous interactions and expectations of 
future ones, as manifested in our attitudes. My attitude was strongly influenced by the 
perception of what I was expected to demonstrate as evidence of my achievement, a perception 
stemming from inability to shed my own managerialist inclinations developed through years of 
working and learning in this tradition. My reluctance to ‘rock the boat’, i.e. resist the request to 
provide figures, fearing the possible negative outcomes, but also the lack of time and energy to 
do so; my desire for promotion and the expectation of what needs to be done to achieve it – all 
these, and many other factors, were intertwined and all had an influence on my contribution to 
the development of the current ways of measuring the activities of the Unit. The idea did not 
‘spring’ in my head; rather, it evolved through processes of interaction and interdependence. 
The narrative highlights how I (a reflective individual) was caught in these processes of mutual 
interdependence: 
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more and more individuals, tend to become dependent on each other for their security 
and the satisfaction of their needs in ways which, for the greater part, surpass the 
comprehension of those involved (Elias, 1956: 232) . 
This quote highlights the inevitability and ubiquity of social constraints. We are always 
dependent on others and they depend on us. But, as Elias points out, we ‘cannot help being 
preoccupied with the urgent, narrow and parochial problems’ (ibid). Being deeply involved in 
the process of standardising and measuring my practice, I was surprised by Stewart’s requests, 
and annoyed with ‘them’ - the Board and Stewart - for being so narrowly oriented. I was also 
annoyed with myself for accepting and accommodating their request. Being preoccupied with 
the annoyance and irritation, I was unable to appreciate my contribution to these processes. It 
is through iterations of and discussions about the narrative that I have come to understand that 
I was not the victim of external forces. Neither was I a villain. I was caught in the game, 
influencing and being influenced by the rules of the game at the same time.       
The standardisation and evaluation of practice have been well documented in the management 
literature. Bond and O’Byrne, in a chapter entitled ‘If It Moves, Measure It: Taylor’s Impact on 
UK Higher Education’ (2013), critically appraise  the application of scientific management 
principles to HE practices. They propose that ‘massification’ of HE in the UK is the main driver 
for this ‘Re-Tayloring’. Although I agree that ‘massification’ of HE is a major problem, I find 
the claim that it is the ‘main driver’, an attempt to isolate a single cause of the problem, highly 
problematic. This ignores the intertwining of many other factors, as reflected in my narrative, 
in which the ‘Re-Tayloring’ of UK HE is emerging.     
Drawing on complex responsive processes, I understand the processes reflected upon in my 
narrative, as a way of making sense of the purpose and the possible evolution of the Unit. It is 
not hard to imagine that similar pressures to the ones I felt were experienced in some form by 
others too as procedures to demonstrate efficiency were being developed. As argued previously 
these processes are social and political. They are social, because no single individual was acting 
independently of the contemporary, future and historical others. Emirbayer and Mische (1998: 
963) argue that the action of the individual can only be understood in the social and temporal 
contexts, as a 
temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its 
habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine 
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alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past 
habits and future projects with the contingencies of the moment).   
These processes are political, in the sense of being concerned with power relations, because 
power ‘is a characteristic of human relationships – of all human relationships’ (Elias, 1978: 74, 
emphasis in original). My experiences of creating the Unit’s ‘Key Performance Indicators’ is 
congruent with Sethi’s (1972)  insight into the social auditing process that acknowledges the 
political nature of any such endeavour. 
Having been a school governor, I can also understand these processes from a board member’s 
perspective. I served as a community governor (similar to non-executive director, having no 
prior vested interest in the school) in a local primary school, and in that role I participated in 
discussions related to the setting of goals and objectives for the school, and setting policies and 
targets for achieving those goals and objectives (nga, 2014). Although it was only a small school 
(fewer than 200 pupils), our discussion could not focus on each student and every activity – it 
was not our role, and we had no time. We had to take a ‘global perspective’. In his book Seeing 
Like a State the anthropologist James C. Scott describes how taking such perspective requires 
simplifications, and those simplifications ‘are observations of only those aspects of social life 
that are of official interest’ (Scott, 1998: 80).  He identifies five main characteristics of those 
simplifications, which are represented as facts. Those facts are utilitarian, documentary, static, 
aggregate and standardised. When I read Scott’s description, I felt he was talking about my 
experience: 
The process by which standardized facts susceptible to aggregation are manufactured 
seems to require at least three steps. The first… is the creation of common units of 
measurement or coding … In the next step, each item or instance falling within a 
category is counted and classified according to the new unit of assessment. Each fact 
must be recuperated and brought back on stage, as it were, dressed in a new 
uniform…One arrives, finally, at synoptic facts that are useful to officials (ibid: 80). 
The farther the ‘official’ is removed from the ‘field’, the more the details are getting blurred, 
until they are finally dispensed with. As an ‘official’, I was a party to ‘inflicting’ 
standardisation. In this process the pupils were classified according to their achievements, their 
belonging to a demographic group, and other impersonal categories. As the goals and objectives 
were aggregated, we were interested in the aggregated reporting. I should not have been 
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surprised, then, when, as the Unit director, I was at the receiving end of such standardization. 
But, as already stated, I was too involved in the immediate actions, to reflect on the parallels 
between the two roles.        
Reflecting on my experience of requesting enumerated reporting, and drawing on the ideas of 
James C. Scott, I have gained insight into how the demand for counting and measuring of social 
activities is arising. Globally renowned indexes I mentioned earlier in a chapter, similarly to 
the more local measurements of social activities, are always created locally, in micro-
interactions. These measurements, which can be understood as themes and patterns of relating 
that have emerged, they too are likely to constrain and enable people who are acting locally. As 
the measurements arise in processes of cooperation and completion, the players constrain and 
enable each other through power relations, and make arguments to persuade each other to take 
one course of action or another. The course (or courses, in case of CSR indexes) of action that 
emerge, may be experiences by individual practitioners as externally imposed, but it can only 
exist if we, in our local interactions, continue to sustain it. 
Summary 
In this chapter I drew attention to my contributing to the patterns of interaction I have been so 
vehemently criticising. I have been an ardent objector to the managerialisation of CSR, 
expressing this view in my teaching and my research; however, when faced with the reporting 
requirements, I ended up sustaining those patterns. Although I profess to hold a much- 
romanticised notion of CSR, my actions have exposed me as a pragmatist. Indeed, I wanted to 
improve the CSR reporting practice, but ended up with ‘the usual’. 
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Chapter 9 – Struggle for CSR, struggle for recognition 
They say you are not you except in terms of relation to other people. If there weren't any other 
people there wouldn't be any you because what you do, which is what you are, only has meaning 
in relation to other people (Robert Penn Warren, All the King's Men) 
Introduction  
The latest HBS strategy update event was announced just as I was about to start writing this 
chapter. Having been asked to contribute to the process just before the appointment of the new 
dean, and having heard during the presentation of the strategy document draft the SEU 
mentioned by name as an important supporting activity, I expected to see the role of the unit 
mentioned in the final strategic plan. Although this latest round of planning was conducted only 
by the Senior Executive Group, I felt I could rely on the new head of our department to promote 
community engagement, as immediately upon accepting the role she said ‘We must make sure 
the SEU will play a central role in the school’. So walking into the large hall where the strategy 
update was to be held, I was apprehensive, not knowing what that role would be, but felt 
confident community engagement would be part of the HBS strategy.  
When I entered into the room I immediately noticed a number of boards that were surrounding 
many rows of chairs. Each board had a chair next to it, a desk in front of it and a big poster 
mounted on it. As I got closer to one of the posters I realised each of them represented a strand 
of strategy in the business school. I skimmed the texts on each poster searching for ‘SEU’ or 
‘community engagement’. Nothing! Not a mention of anything remotely related to my role. I 
could not speak. The visceral reaction registered before I could make sense of my emotional 
response. ‘Disappointment’ does not begin to describe my feeling. Seven years of work –  
organising events, promoting the school, ensuring that community engagement had remained 
on the senior managers’ agenda, convincing colleagues and students that CSR is important – 
all seemed to have disappear.    
I wanted to scream ‘You are so wrong!’ at one of the senior managers, who in the meantime 
took the stage, but I just sat there. As he opened the floor to questions, I decided to ask about 
this lack of community engagement in our strategic plan. His answer was ‘Of course we’ll keep 
working closely with our community’. When I probed further, asking which strand would be 
most appropriate for this, he suggested that I ‘put myself in front of’ the heads of the PG and 
UG strands. Remembering his earlier e-mail that hinted at his intolerance of being challenged 
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in public, I thanked the manager and sat down. But I could not let go. Later I approached him 
and suggested that community engagement has been and will continue contributing to other 
strands as well – employability, commercial, research. I was amazed at the answer that ‘We 
already had 11 strands’. When I said ‘We could have 12’, the answer was a simple ‘No’.   
I could not leave it at that and proposed we had a meeting so I could have an opportunity to 
explain what exactly the SEU does, and how it contributes to the HBS strategy. We parted, but 
I was indignant. All the work of the last seven years, everything I deemed important, was 
dismissed. Or was it just important to me? Am I one of the very few colleagues who thinks that 
engaging with the community is relevant to our work? This offhand dismissal of what I believe 
to be an integral part of our raison d’être, reminded me of other times I had to fight this corner 
–  trying to get the managers to sign for PRME, the previous dean’s comments about him being 
bored with hearing about CSR, the difficulty of engaging colleagues with the topic. I’ve had 
my share of disappointments in this role. But I have also achieved recognition of this work. The 
Unit’s annual report – my annual report! –  was always commended by the Board of Governors 
and presenting our case studies at conferences attracted great interest from colleagues from 
other universities at home and abroad. On numerous occasions I had been asked to present the 
work of the Unit as a distinctive feature of the business school.  
It is ironic that the managerial actions that I dislike and criticise – commending the annual 
report, praising the Unit for a set of ‘innovative acts’ – were so unquestionably accepted by me 
as acts of approval and recognition.  
Had I convinced myself this was a manifestation of the genuine interest in working with the 
community and missed the signs that CSR was just a managerial fad? There has been no 
replacement for the Pro-Vice Chancellor Regional Engagement since Stewart’s retirement. Last 
year I was not asked to submit the report to the Board. Were these some of the early signs of 
declining interest in community engagement? It still appears in the official documents, the 
words ‘social responsibility’ are still stenciled on our walls, but am I witnessing the beginning 
of the decline?  
This perceived indifference reminds me of my scepticism about CSR when I was initially 
introduced to the topic. But through my involvement with the Unit, through interpreting and 
reinterpreting the amorphous notion of ‘community engagement’ in my daily practice, my 
scepticism subsided and I began seeing the benefits, both to us – our students, our teaching, our 
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research, our reputation – and to the community groups with whom we were involved. Yet, 
mentioning the benefits brings my attention back to my initial scepticism about the need to 
demonstrate the benefits of doing what I believe is right. 
After years of engaging with the community, of practising CSR in a business school, I seem to 
be back at the beginning – the need to assert the importance of CSR.   
I recognise that it was not just the exclusion of community engagement that affected me so 
much. Being the director of the Unit, ‘the expert on CSR’ as some colleagues introduced me, 
the one to turn to about anything community related, had become part of my identity. If the 
work of the Unit became insignificant in the School, what significance would I personally have? 
I began to realise that being identified with this role may no longer bring a sense of pride and 
security, but rather become a detriment to my advancement at HBS. This understanding is 
significant for recognising that our personal identity is intertwined with our work, and that my 
promoting CSR may be seen as a challenge to some of my colleagues. Is it possible that I 
perceive lack of interest in community engagement as a threat to my identity? Is it feasible that 
my questioning the dean about the lack of CSR in our strategy is perceived as a challenge to his 
authority, and therefore to his identity as a leader? 
Having reflected on my narratives, I recognise a common thread running through this 
dissertation: struggle. In practising CSR I have grappled with making sense of practising CSR 
and with the need to assert its importance in HBS. I have struggled with reconciling my habitual 
thinking about CSR with an increasing understanding of complexity, and relating this to the 
topic. I have been, and still am, struggling with the need to continue playing the game of CSR 
and the wish to change the rules of that game. This dissertation is not just about practising CSR 
– it is about the challenges of practising CSR. And as I identify with my role and with CSR, 
this dissertation is also about struggle for my identity. 
In this chapter I will explore the struggles of practising CSR, and the way it is addressed in the 
CSR and wider literature. The next part of this chapter will focus on making sense of my 
identifying with CSR and how this impacts practice. 
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Facing CSR challenges 
Struggling with thinking about CSR 
Being exposed to the topic of CSR early in my academic career, I was both excited and sceptical 
about it. The excitement stemmed from my earlier experiences. Raised in the former Soviet 
Union, I’ve grown to develop a very strong sense of responsibility and belonging to the 
community. My experiences of working in the West were of disconnect from the community, 
of emphasis on the bottom line, rather than contribution to society. After 10 years of working 
in advertising agencies, I became disillusioned with the advertising industry, feeling I was 
contributing to unrestrained consumerism, cynically exploiting human weaknesses to sell our 
clients’ products. Early exposure to CSR literature resonated with my belief that there must be 
more to business than just chasing the profit. Yet, after the initial elation at finding business-
related writings that seemingly focused on issues other than the bottom line, and upon more 
critical reading on the topic, I’d become more sceptical about CSR. As Garriga and Mele (2004) 
noted over 10 years ago, CSR theories could be classified into four groups – instrumental, 
political, integrative and ethical. I believe this classification is still relevant. My scepticism 
related to the first group, the instrumental theories, which to me seemed to be ‘more of the 
same’ – an attempt to come up with a device that would contribute to the business case. That 
scepticism was reinforced by the fact that empirical researchers seemed to focus on the CSR – 
profitability23 link. Disappointment with instrumental CSR is evident in my confessing to 
agreeing with Friedman’s position (Chapter 6). It is the belief that CSR can be divorced from 
instrumental reasons that led me to wish to explore CSR in more depth, empirically, to 
understand practitioners’ motives for adopting and the ways of practising CSR.  
This interest in an understanding of practising CSR led me to take advantage of an opportunity 
to study CSR in Ukraine. Devising a pilot study to explore the motive for adopting CSR in a 
former Soviet Republic, I was hoping to be able to advance my pursuit of making sense of CSR 
from a practitioner’s perspective. While interviewing and then reading the transcripts with the 
practitioners, I had a very uneasy feeling of hearing what those interviewees thought I wanted 
to hear. In several cases, the wording of the interviewees’ answers was nearly identical to the 
web pages of their organisations (see Chapter 3). Admittedly, there were also some surprises, 
leading to interesting discoveries, which even resulted in several conference papers (Filosof 
                                                          
23 Here, under the ‘profitability’ umbrella, I include any contribution to profitability, e.g. corporate image, 
attracting better employees, improved productivity, and publicity. 
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and Hollinshead, 2011, Filosof et al., 2012). I felt that even the more self-critical interviews 
were limited in their usefulness for uncovering the intricacies of what practising CSR entailed.  
Later, the experience of being interviewed confirmed that (see Chapter 6). Although I tried to 
be as honest as possible, I realized that the answers did not and could not reflect the full extent 
of my experiencing CSR. 
An additional challenge when reflecting on the understanding of CSR in the mainstream 
literature, is the way the CSR concept is presented in abstract terms. Early seminal works 
suggest what CSR is (e.g. Carroll, 1979) or should be (e.g. Votaw and Sethi, 1969) in general 
terms. These highly generalised discussions of CSR have been an enabling constraint. The 
advantage of such openness and looseness of definitions is in their potential for multiple 
understandings and interpretations. This also enables new ideas to emerge. In the early days of 
the Unit I progressed very hesitantly. Yet, I felt that, to a great degree, I could influence both 
the emergence of the Unit and the rules. The early CSR works were tentative; they were not 
rule-bound. The game of CSR, in Elias’s terms (see Chapter 2), being in its early stage, allowed 
the players to feel that they could influence it. This parallel between my understanding of the 
emergence of CSR locally, in my own practice, and the emergence of the global idea of CSR is 
just one example of self-similarity I discussed in Chapter 2.  
The vagueness of the CSR concept was enabling and constraining at the same time. Thinking 
about specific practices, it was very difficult for me to grasp what can and cannot be considered 
CSR. In the early stages of my research I attempted to find out what the ‘social responsibilities’ 
of organsiations were. I found that both ‘social’ and ‘responsibility’ are not widely addressed 
by the literature. It was suggested that a stakeholder concept could be used to address the 
question of the ‘social’ (Carroll, 1999), but ‘stakeholder’ means different things to different 
people (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001, Orts and Strudler, 2009). Moreover, stakeholders’ 
expectations are highly context-dependent, so the question to whom the organisations are 
responsible, remains moot. As to the question of what ‘responsibility’ is, the authors implicitly 
take a deontological approach (Goodin, 1986) to the meaning of responsibility, i.e. what 
organisation ought to do or refrain from doing.       
I have struggled teaching CSR, as the traditional CSR textbooks (e.g. Crane et al., 2014, Griseri 
and Seppala, 2010) present CSR as an issue that should and can be managed, following systems 
understanding of organisation. On this understanding, a manager can devise a number of 
processes and execute the action plans, and the organisation will achieve the ‘appropriate’ level 
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of CSR. An example of this approach is a paper I came across early in my research (Maon et 
al., 2009), in which the authors propose a framework for designing and implementing CSR. 
This multi-stage framework, based on Lewin’s change model (Lewin, 1951) proposes distinct 
action for managers at each level of an organisation (managerial, organisational and corporate). 
The model provides ‘an initial road map for managers seeking to implement CSR-related 
change’ (Maon et al., 2009: 85). This assumes that the responsibility for CSR-related activities 
is vested with the managers, that those activities are separate and discrete, and that the 
subordinates’ behaviour at every level can be manipulated by the managers. So for example, 
‘getting key people’s commitment’ is the remit of the corporate-level management, while 
‘creating enthusiasm and credibility around CSR‘ is left to the managerial level.  
This thinking is contradictory to my understanding of organisations, which is informed by 
complexity. It is also contradictory to my experience of CSR emergence in my organisation. 
CSR enthusiasts could be found among managers and non-managers (Chapter 4). It could be 
argued that idea of the SEU had been a HBS managers’ response to the Strategic Plan, which 
included community engagement. But the Unit has been emerging in the interactions of many 
players, managers and non-managers (Chapter 7). Managers have had greater power chances, 
so, for example, they issued an edict that all module guides must include a statement of how 
graduate attributes, including social responsibility, are addressed in the module. This did not 
ensure, however, the ‘creation’ of enthusiasm and credibility. Rather than different actions at 
different ‘levels’, the global, in this case UH, understanding of and enthusiasm for CSR have 
been emerging simultaneously, in many local interactions of inclusion and exclusion, 
competition and cooperation.  My experience is echoed by Stacey and Mowles’ (2016) 
understanding of organisations as recognisable global patterns of behaviours arising in local 
interactions. This understanding of organisation demystifies the role of the manager as the 
single individual in charge of CSR, and emphasises the emergent and interdependent nature of 
responsibility.  
The greatest struggle I have encountered in trying to make sense of CSR is the tension between 
my initial need to define CSR in clear and specific terms, and my growing understanding of 
complexity. In chapter 3 I describe this tension as the conflict between positivist thinking and 
interpretivist approaches. Embarking upon this dissertation I felt comfortable not being able to 
define CSR, but expected to be able to provide a sensible definition by the time this work was 
finished. Being unable to provide a clear and concise definition is disappointing. The fact that 
‘we still lack an agreed-upon definition of C(S)R, with the result that the concept often remains 
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“vague and ambiguous” or even “tortured”’ (Rivoli and Waddock, 2011: 87), does not diminish 
the feeling of unease when I am unable to answer the question: ‘how do you define CSR’? This 
discomfort reminds me that I would like to be able to provide such definition. On the other 
hand, studying complexity I have come to understand CSR as a social object, and as such there 
cannot be a clear definition. From a complexity perspective existence of numerous definitions 
is not understood as ‘a weakness of the concept’ (Argandona and Hoivik, 2009) nor that are the 
definitions competing, but are arising as many authors interpret and make sense of the ‘tortured’ 
concept. Global patterns of interaction that we recognise as CSR arise in local interactions. 
Those patterns are both predictable and novel at the same time, because in each local interaction 
we reinterpret anew the generalised meaning of CSR.  
 
The patterns that we’ve come to recognise as CSR are predictable. Despite CSR definitions 
being ‘vague and ambiguous’, we’ve come to expect CSR to be manifested as a voluntary 
activity on behalf of an organisation that has some benefit to society, regardless of the 
organisation’s formal purpose (e.g. retail chain, manufacturer, financial institution or 
university).  Those patterns are both predictable and unpredictable at the same time, as the 
general understanding of CSR is continuously reinterpreted by each practitioner in local 
interactions. HBS’ setting up of a Social Enterprise Unit has been recognised by colleagues, 
academics from other universities and local community representatives as CSR. This 
particularisation of the generalised term CSR was both predictable, as it was recognised as 
falling within the general understanding of CSR. But it was also unpredictable, as it had been a 
context-specific attempt to interpret the meaning of CSR. 
Therefore, CSR is context- and history-dependent. But this explanation is applicable to all 
social objects, and I felt it did not absolve me from the need to address the particular social 
object of CSR. My insistence on defining CSR led me to thinking about potential 
inconsistencies emerging when we rush into defining a highly generalised idea. As mentioned 
above, I understood CSR as voluntary acts on behalf of the university that are undertaken with 
the intention of benefitting others and are beyond the core activities of the university. This does 
not mean simply volunteering, but includes all activities that are not required by law or 
regulation. This working definition allowed me to proceed with my role, to take actions, to join 
or start conversations, with some aim. This definition was my response to the vague and 
changing rules of the game in which I was caught up.    
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This working definition was my response to the ‘logical trap’ discussed by Rivoli and Waddock 
(2011: 89), who argue that:     
If CSR activities are a profitable activity, then they are best described as ‘intelligent 
operation of the business’ rather than as ‘responsible’ behavior. If CSR activities are 
not profitable, then they cannot be undertaken voluntarily in a competitive market, and 
so must be imposed on all competitors using laws or regulations, in which case such 
activities are no longer ‘CSR’.  
 
This ‘trap’ was set by Friedman (1962, 1970), who stated that any activity that makes financial 
sense should not be considered CSR. But why not? Friedman was writing in the early stages of 
development of the CSR construct and his voice was one of many contributing to the emerging 
understanding of CSR. In subsequent decades the attempt to define CSR resulted in myriad 
definitions. Each definition can be seen as a way of interpreting the general idea in a particular 
context. My interpretation differs from that of Friedman in the understanding of what can and 
cannot be considered CSR. I believe that the decision on what to include and what to exclude 
from the broad church of CSR should be based not on the results of the action, but on the 
intentions of the actors.      
Friedman’s interpretation of CSR, based on intentions not outcomes, highlights a potential 
‘trap’ that may arise in dismissing outcomes. My interpretation is based on the understanding 
that we cannot pre-determine the outcome of any action before we take it. It rejects the 
assumption that the meaning (social value) of the act (responsibility, ethics, benefit to society) 
is enfolded within the act itself (CSR activity). Another way of conceptualising meaning is by 
turning to Mead’s conversation of gestures (Mead, 1934). The meaning arises in the ongoing 
interaction of gestures and responses. On this thinking we cannot know before the action the 
meaning our action will take. We can only know what we intend by our action, and even the 
intention itself evolves as it is responded to by others. Following this, any activity we consider 
responsible at the outset may result in being responsible or not, beneficial or harmful – the 
results are not predetermined, and whatever they are should not determine whether the action 
is responsible or not. But if the results are harmful, can we still consider the action responsible 
because we intended it to be beneficial? This defies common sense and my instincts. To avoid 
this ‘trap’, I propose that the interpretation of CSR includes intentions and outcomes. The way 
the practitioner addresses the arising situation is what determines the responsibility.  
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The final ‘trap’ in the attempt to define CSR is the persistent reifying of organisation in the 
mainstream CSR literature. The question ‘what is considered to be responsible behaviour by 
corporations’ (Rivoli and Waddock, 2011: 87) ignores the fact that corporations 24 are legal 
entities, but not human actors. They are not natural but social objects. To paraphrase Friedman 
(1970), organisations do not act, people do. So when we speak of ‘corporate responsibility’, we 
need to specify whose responsibility we are referring to. Defining CSR as ‘acts on behalf of 
organisations’, it is clear that anyone acting on behalf of an organisation can be considered as 
contributing to CSR. This recognises the legal viability of organisations, but does not assign 
organisations moral personhood.   
My role is one of the many areas that contribute to the university’s responsibility. The remit of 
the directorship of the SEU has evolved to positively contribute to community engagement. My 
working definition of CSR and the role’s remit, have been informed by my practice, as I have 
been trying to make sense of what I was supposed to do in my role; at the same time my practice 
has been informed by my evolving thinking about CSR. My thinking has been pragmatic, I have 
negotiated with others what can and cannot be achieved. This interdependence with others 
resulted in enabling constraints that allowed me to define my role.  
Having arrived at a working definition of CSR – voluntary acts on behalf of the organisation, 
which are undertaken with the intention to benefit others, and are beyond the core activities of 
the organisation – which spells out my interpretation of CSR does not mean I have reached 
conflict-free thinking about the concept. In my daily practice I am required to reinterpret this 
definition and to assess whether the actions I am taking make sense from a practical point of 
view. Currently, I am content that there is a consistency between practice and definition. 
However, as future conflicts arise, I will have to re-examine both the definition and practice. 
  
                                                          
24 I have addressed the meaning of corporation in the Introduction. 
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Struggling with practising CSR 
I found it challenging to make sense of CSR through reading and through the experience of 
others, so I embraced the opportunity to reflect on my own experience of practising CSR. 
Encountering resistance that I had not anticipated before starting my role as a director of the 
SEU (Chapter 7), I wanted to know how the challenges of practising CSR are addressed in the 
literature. I did not think I was the only one facing such difficulties in trying to implement 
responsible practices in our curricula and our praxis. Embedding CSR in business schools 
curricula involves changing practices, and ‘transforming management practice will be a 
constant struggle’ (King and Learmonth, 2015: 353).  Yet, references to struggling in adopting 
CSR were even more difficult to find than references to specific CSR practices (see Bondy, 
2008, Joutsenvirta and Vaara, 2015). At the same time, as a PRME champion,  I began attending 
events at which numerous challenges of practising CSR, especially challenges of engaging staff, 
were discussed, but usually in less formal settings. My practising of CSR was fraught with 
challenges, difficulties, daily setbacks and a continuous need to be vigilant of maintaining 
community engagement as an integral part of our practice at HBS. Yet, while my experience 
was echoed by many colleagues from other HEs, this experience was absent from the 
mainstream CSR literature. In my interview with Jonathan Louw I described my practice as 
‘Sisyphean’. When Jonathan presented his research at a conference, the findings moved me to 
such an extent that I could not stop the tears rolling. His work suggests that ‘working on PRME 
can be an isolating and demanding experience, requiring resilience’ (Louw, 2015: 112). Such a 
strong emotion had arisen because until his presentation I had not realised that I was not alone 
in experiencing the role as isolated, emotionally challenging and fraught with self-criticism. ‘In 
the face of self-doubt, isolation, indifference, sometimes hostility, many PRME advocates … 
also voiced or through depictions of their work demonstrated the need for resilience and 
opportunism’ (ibid: 117). But there was no resonance with those experiences in the mainstream 
CSR literature. 
The mainstream CSR literature does not provide insights into the reasons for difficulties in 
practising CSR. Titles like ‘The Practical Guide to Corporate Social Responsibility: Do the 
Right Thing’ (Asbury and Ball, 2016) suggest that there is ‘the right’ thing to be done, so why 
would anyone reject doing that right thing? I have discussed the challenges of getting colleagues 
to engage with the SEU and the difficulties in implementing PRME in previous chapters. I have 
suggested the reasons for my colleagues’ reluctance to cooperate. I have been unable to ask 
directly, in case my questioning their unwillingness to engage with CSR might be 
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misinterpreted as a challenge to them. I drew some insights into this question when I was faced 
with a new initiative introduced by the senior managers.  
A new unit was created, with a remit to assist us (academics) with specific aspects of our job. 
The unit manager contacted me to discuss how I may benefit from their involvement with the 
SEU and to explore possible cooperation. My initial enthusiastic reaction was soon replaced 
with suspicion and mistrust. During our first conversation, it quickly became apparent that we 
have divergent agendas – I was pushing for more community engagement that required some 
resourcing, which I was hoping to get through her; and Leena had income goals, and was hoping 
to enlist the SEU to deliver more commercial activity. She promised to inquire with the Pro-
VC about some funding that was supposed to be ring-fenced for the SEU, and I promised to 
cooperate whenever any suitable project became available. In the following weeks she replied 
to my request for funds with the news that they were no longer available. She proceeded to 
inquire about the commercially valuable projects I had been involved with (which to me seemed 
like an attempt to appropriate them for her unit). During our conversation I felt she was insisting 
on her ideas about the way the Unit should be run.  I resented being given suggestions by 
someone I perceived as less knowledgeable about the topic than I was. I expected further 
engagement with her would not be useful to me. She had no management authority over me 
and she was not located in the same building, so I found it easy to simply avoid any further 
contact.  
There seem to be similarities between the conflict between Leena and me and the conflict 
between me and my colleagues. Thinking about this situation, I wonder whether I was my 
colleagues’ ‘Leena’. I was asking them to engage with something that they might have had no 
interest in. I was also surprised when colleagues I knew to be interested in CSR-related topics 
did not respond to my attempts to engage them in conversations about SEU and PRME. I felt 
Leena was challenging my authority and my identity as the CSR person in the business school. 
She was encroaching on my territory and I defended it by disengaging with her. Is it possible 
my colleagues were defending their territories by disengaging with me? Was I challenging their 
authority as experts and their values in the way I was suggesting we work together? 
Reflecting on the challenges that arose in my interactions with Leena and the way I responded 
to them, allows me to understand the reluctance of colleagues and senior management to 
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‘engage in CSR’ in the way I expected them to25. Although the setting up of the SEU and the 
signing for and embedding of PRME have been supported by the senior managers, their 
interpretation has inevitably been different from mine. My colleagues were also understanding 
CSR differently from me. I experienced those differences as conflict. Although I understand 
that conflict is integral to human interaction, the experience was raw and bruising. This 
difference in interpretations has resulted in frustration and disagreement. But continuous 
conversations about the purpose and possible activities of the Unit with others have also resulted 
in novel and creative interpretations and actions.  
The reluctance of the new dean to ‘elevate’ community engagement to the level of strategic 
importance has had a significant impact on me. It is also important to understand that it evokes 
such strong feelings because my identity has been strongly linked to CSR and community 
engagement, and indifference to those values is easily interpreted as a challenge to my identity. 
Another difficulty in practising CSR is negotiating what should be included and excluded in 
our practice. In Chapter 3 I reflected on the difficulty in deciding what is and what is not CSR. 
These decisions are not permanent and are negotiated in every day working with others. One of 
the main reasons for the difficulty in deciding what interactions can be considered CSR is the 
way CSR is conceptualised in mainstream literature – as a reified object that exists 
independently outside of human interactions, or as a system (Chapter 3). As such CSR, like 
other objects or systems, must have a boundary. Yet I have experienced CSR as continuous 
reinterpretation about what can and should be done to help communities. Limitations, including 
what is meant by ‘community’, have been negotiated and renegotiated in many interactions 
with many others in order to be able to go on working together. But those limitations are not 
boundaries. System boundaries are created in order to separate the system from its environment. 
The purpose of deciding what to exclude and what to include in our activities is to focus our 
discussions and to introduce some restrictions, or rules for interacting. Those restrictions, 
arising in our interactions, are paradoxically constraining and enabling. Without them, if 
anything was possible, we would be unable to make decisions. Those rules of engagement are 
simultaneously limiting and protecting the possibilities of actions we can engage in. Having a 
                                                          
25 I begin using quotation marks to signify I no longer perceive this to accurately reflect my emerging 
understanding of what it means to practice CSR. Nevertheless, I have not found a different way to express 
this activity and will continue using ‘engage in CSR’. 
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job description allowed us to start conversations about how to develop the work of the Unit, 
while also allowing new interpretations to arise.  
In computer simulations the programmer decides on the boundaries of the system. If an 
organisation is understood as a system, then the manager is the one who sets its boundaries. But 
organisations are not systems, nor is CSR.  As we interact with numerous others, we enable and 
constrain each other. What we do and do not do arise in continuously negotiating these enabling 
constraints, and this is not programmed by any of the actors. Our interactions do not produce 
boundaries, only further interactions.  
The initial decision to include only the activities that contributed to students was later revised 
to include other activities that were ‘contributing to the community and not detrimental to 
students’ (Chapter 6). At the start the purpose of the Unit was described as ‘developing its range 
of activities with the charity sector’ (UHBS, 2009). I suggested that the remit should be 
expanded to the wider third sector. The title of ‘Social Enterprise’ always made me uneasy. I 
believed that social enterprises should be a part, but not the focus of the Unit, as might be 
inferred from the title. I also thought this title may give the impression that the Unit provides 
funding for social enterprises, or is focused on developing social entrepreneurs. Yet, having 
Social Enterprise in the title, provided opportunities to engage in projects that would have 
probably not been forwarded to me otherwise. The SEE change programme, for example, is a 
project that has been going on in different guises for several years26. I was asked to attend the 
first meeting related to this programme, since I was the only one in the university whose official 
title included Social Enterprise. Upon my return from the meeting, I met with the relevant (in 
my opinion) manager and recommended that he should apply to participate in it. Several days 
later I received an e-mail asking me to lead the bid for that funding, as that manager was busy 
with other projects. I did, we bid, we won and the project is in its fourth year now. I have been 
involved in it ever since. Since it is about developing social entrepreneurs among the university 
students, staff and alumni, to me this ‘fit’ the remit of the Unit. It also had the benefit of 
contributing nicely to my annual reporting.  
The decisions about what to promote and what to downplay have always been fluid and 
changing. There was no manager (programmer) or group of managers in control of what is 
included and what is excluded in the work we undertook under the title of the SEU. We have 
                                                          
26The SEE change programme is a programme funded by HEFCE to encourage social entrepreneurs in HE. 
The project is delivered by an UnLtd – a social enterprise – and often is referred to as UnLtd.   
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been responding to each other, and to many others, in understanding what it was that we were 
supposed to do.  That is not to say that some people were not more influential than others. The 
emphasis is that even the most influential people in the organisation (e.g. senior managers) are 
dependent on others to interpret their decisions in everyday interactions.  
Understanding CSR as a social object, a way of interacting with a certain purpose, allows us to 
recognise that a clear definition and delineation of what constitutes CSR is impossible. There 
can be no boundaries around CSR, only evolving ideas, arising in many interactions, in working 
together, about what to promote and what to set aside. As any other social object, CSR is a 
generalisation which needs to be particularised in daily interactions. Those interactions 
interweave multiple histories and intentions. Therefore, the meaning of each interaction will be 
continuously renegotiated with others, and not exclusively assigned by a manager, or a group 
of managers, however influential they may be.  
Social understanding of struggle  
Earlier in the chapter I discussed the difficulty of reconciling my experience of struggling with 
the depiction of CSR in the mainstream literature. The discussion with practitioners provided a 
glimpse into similar experiences. As alluded to in the previous section, the discrepancy is based 
mainly on different conceptualisations of CSR. Understanding CSR as a social object or a cult 
value can shed light on the experience of struggle. To reiterate, a social object is a generalised 
tendency to act in similar ways in similar situations (Stacey and Mowles, 2016).  Cult values 
are idealised social objects that are not yet achieved but could be achieved in an obstacle-free 
future (if such a future existed). 
Based on this social understanding of CSR, I propose two explanations for experiencing 
practising CSR as a struggle. The first is based on the analysis of struggle offered by Kaptein  
(2015). He proposes four characteristics of struggle: importance of an object of struggle, object 
of struggle being unachieved, opposition and great effort. A struggle for CSR arises in an 
attempt to particularise a generalised social object. This particularising involves working with 
others and reinterpreting the generalisation anew in every interaction. As a cult value, CSR 
cannot be fully achieved, but it always remains of great importance in our public and private 
interactions. Working with others always involves cooperation and competition, it is never 
obstacle free, and we must always negotiate going on together. Working together to 
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particularise CSR is no different and involves conflict and a great effort. From this perspective 
particularising any social object is a struggle and not conflict free. 
This framework does not explain, however, why the subject of struggle is important to some 
and less important to others. I suggest that the second reason for my experiencing struggle is 
because CSR has become part of my identity and the struggle I experience is struggle for 
recognition. My identity is unique, not better than others’, but unique to me and 
incommensurable with others. And others experience their identities similarly. So when we 
come together in order to have a shared experience we must find common ground, i.e. downplay 
some ambitions and facets and bring forward others. However, we cannot separate the 
entanglement of those ambitions, which leads to conflict, sometimes overt and explicit, 
sometime covert and sometimes both.  
Struggle for recognition – my identity intertwined with my role, with CSR  
My identity has become interlinked with practising CSR, and the impact of my identity on 
practice and at the same time being influenced by practice becomes evident in the way I discuss 
my practice. In this section I reflect on the processes of emergence and change of identity in 
local interactions with others.      
The term ‘identity’ for me encompasses all the answers to the questions ‘who am I?’, ‘how am 
I being?’ and ‘how do I perceive myself?’ (see Cerulo, 1997). For every individual there are 
numerous answers to these questions, the answers will vary according to circumstances. 
Following Hegel’s dialectics (Williams, 1989), I understand that the answer to these questions 
is always in relation to others. I will discuss what I mean by this in the next section. 
My identity is enduring yet dynamic and changing at the same time. By this I mean not just 
professional affiliations or political beliefs, but the evolving significance of certain aspects and 
the diminishing importance of others. My career ambition is continuous, yet I hope my anxiety 
is diminishing. The importance of CSR to my identity has evolved with my practice. The 
changes have occurred due to my increased involvement, and also due to the ways others 
responded to my involvement. Those changes in identity have impacted my practice, while my 
practice has been impacting my identity. 
One of the features of complexity is sensitivity to initial conditions (see Chapter 2). This means 
that no event can be precisely replicated. We cannot trace the beginnings of a specific pattern 
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of interaction to any single event, as each event arises in multiple interactions of multiple 
players. My identifying with CSR did not happen in a single moment; rather it has been evolving 
in many interactions, even prior to my joining the university. 
In Chapter 2 I alluded to my excitement upon seeing the role of director of the SEU advertised. 
I felt the role was perfect for me. There were practical issues of workload that made the role 
attractive. But there was more to it; it felt like a role that I could make my own, that fit well 
with how I wanted to be as a university employee. While writing the expression of interest 
statement (Appendix 3), I was able to articulate why this role seemed right for me. Rereading 
that statement now I am reminded that I had been involved with what I later classified as CSR 
at UH long before taking up this role. So the aspiration to be involved with the community was 
not the only reason for applying for the role. 
Getting this job meant being able to have a formal CSR role, which had become central to my 
research. I also saw the role as an opportunity to be recognised, to be seen as an important 
player in the business school. I was hoping that a role that was unique, the role that was 
supposed to lead to promotion, would contribute to my status. This aspect of my identity – the 
need to be recognised, to be seen as important by my peers, my colleagues and by those in a 
position of influence – has been evident in this dissertation. The need for advancement, for 
promotion – my ambition – has impacted my choices. In Chapter 1 I discuss how I perceived 
speaking up about allegedly illegal practices would have affected my status at work. Ambition 
has been a major influence on how I have been practising CSR. Increasing the prominence of 
CSR at HBS was inseparable from my sense of my own prominence.     
Throughout this dissertation my need to be recognised has been apparent, but not always 
acknowledged.  
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My evolving understanding of identity 
Pratt (2012) distinguishes between identity and self, drawing on the work of Mead (1934). I too 
base my understanding of identity on the Meadian ‘self’; however, I understand Mead’s work 
differently, and I use the terms ‘identity’ and ‘self’ interchangeably. 
Mead’s work is cited as fundamental for ‘identity studies’ (Cerulo, 1997, Stryker and Burke, 
2000). Mead’s idea of identity is inherently social. The self arises in social acts, in conversations 
of gestures between ‘I’ and ‘me’, in which we take the attitude of the generalised other (Mead, 
1934, Mead, 1925). For infants the attitude of the carer represents the generalised other. So 
when a child cries and a mother attends to him, he perceives that every time he cries he will be 
attended to. Growing up, we learn to recognise different and sometimes contradictory responses 
to similar gestures. So crying may be responded to with compassion from the mother, but with 
scorn from friends. We learn to take the attitudes of many generalised others, that are at times 
incompatible and even conflicting. Not crying in public becomes ‘second nature’ (Elias, 1939 
[2000] : 127), and we no longer recognise this behaviour as imposed on us; we perceive it as 
our own, innate feature.   
We learn to take the attitude of generalised others by picking up clues that indicate to us what 
might be acceptable in certain social acts and social objects. Talking to other researchers about 
my role, I did not discuss my practice in depth. I felt this would be disloyal to my colleagues. 
This feeling was perhaps misguided, but I ‘knew’ this is how a loyal employee and colleague 
behaved. Talking about my practice in the PhD group, I feel comfortable discussing the 
difficulties of my work, the uncooperative colleagues, ‘knowing’ that such behaviour would 
not be considered disloyal. This ‘knowledge’ arose in many interactions and is based on 
perceptions and beliefs, not on written rules and codes of behaviour. It is fundamentally social 
as we learn through social acts of interaction with others. It is different from learning about 
natural objects, as objects in nature do not respond in a social way to our gestures. Forgetting 
to water a plant will not make it sad. Neglecting to send a birthday card to a child may cause 
disappointment, crying, withholding affection or a fight. We know this might happen because 
we might react similarly in a similar situation, and because we might have experienced this 
before. We avoid such behaviour by anticipating it, by taking the attitude of the child. We do 
not take the attitude of the flora. Rather than understanding  identity as involving ‘how I see 
myself and how others see me’ (Woodward, 2010: 20), which represents a split between 
individual and society, following Mead (1934), my understanding of identity is how I respond 
to the attitudes of the generalised others.      
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For every individual there are numerous answers to the questions ‘who am I?’ and ‘how am I 
being?’ that will vary according to circumstances. We can think of ourselves in relational terms. 
Remembering recent occasions I was asked to introduce myself, I gave different answers – ‘Jan, 
Avi’s wife’ at a dinner party, ‘Jana Filosof, principal lecturer, and director of the Social 
Enterprise Unit’ at a subject group meeting, ‘Jana Filosof, University of Hertfordshire’ at an 
academic conference. I am a wife because of my husband, I am a lecturer because I teach at a 
University, and this is a recognised profession; because Principal Lecturer has a meaning for 
that group of people.  
We can also answer the questions posed above by describing ourselves using some feature of 
our character. This too can only be understood in relation to others. I tend to describe myself as 
ambitious, strong-willed, impatient and extrovert. Those qualities can only be recognised 
because of others. My identity evolves in my interaction with generalised others.  For example, 
I had not thought of myself as ambitious until one of my co-workers asked me ‘How does it 
feel to be ambitious?’. Only then did I realise that not everyone working in the same place and 
in a similar role is ambitious, and there is a certain attitude towards a certain set of behaviours 
that is recognised by others as ‘ambitious’. Until that conversation I presumed that all my 
colleagues were ambitious.  Growing up I did not think I was impatient; I only recognised this 
quality when it was pointed out to me. I am not suggesting we need to be told by others what 
our characteristics are. I am pointing to the possibility of a certain characteristic as becoming 
integral to one’s identity only if it is recognised by others, and by oneself in that moment, and 
in relation to them.  
We also perceive ourselves in what I call ‘census terms’. I am a middle-class, middle-aged, 
British citizen. But all those ‘features’ are only meaningful in certain social contexts. I am 
middle class only in a society that recognises social classes. I am middle-aged because I am of 
certain age27, I live in a society in which such a definition is recognised, because we attribute 
certain behaviours and attitudes to ‘middle-agedness’.  
Even biometric terms are relevant to our identity because they are socially relevant. Being 
female, 165 cm tall and weighing 67 kg, I am of average height and am slim by British standards 
(Martinson, 2013), but the NHS would classify me as ‘borderline overweight’ (NHS, 2015). 
Each generalised other – ‘average woman’ and ‘NHS’ – affect my identity, yet at different times 
                                                          
27 There is no clear definition of ‘middle age’, which in itself is an example of social object. Our society only 
began recognising ‘middle-age’ in the beginning of 20th century (Siegelman and Rider, 2012). 
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their prominence is shifting. I have always identified myself as white. Being white has social 
consequences because there are social consequences to being non-white. As stated earlier a 
feature affects our identity if it is socially relevant, that is to say if it is recognised by others. I 
also suggest that in order to be relevant to our identity it has to have a recognised otherness. 
Having lymphocytes did not affect my identity, but when my lymphocytes stopped working 
properly, I became identified as a lymphoma patient.  Our identity is always in relation to others, 
‘we become ourselves because there are other selves’ (Mowles, 2015b: 33). 
According to Mead (1925, 1934) identity arises in the enacting of choices ‘I’ make in response 
to the generalised others, or ‘me’, in the ongoing ‘I-me’ conversation of gestures. Identity is a 
social act of emergence, and is ongoing, continuous and evolving, always emerging, never 
constant. On this view, identity is in continuous flux, as the particular answer to the questions 
posted at the beginning of this section is contingent on a specific situation at a specific time and 
conflict and cooperation are inseparable in evolving identities. 
The potentiality of multiple responses to multiple perceived attitudes of multiple generalised 
others gives rise to the responsively acting self.  
If, as a consequence, sociality is in the words of Mead (1932 p.49) ‘the capacity of 
being several things at once,’ then the subject is necessarily multiply positioned. Mead 
would thus see relations of difference as … giving structure to the self. But Mead 
would understand these relations of difference as constituting identity rather than 
fragmenting it (Dunn, 1991: 701 emphasis in original). 
There are no multiple identities or a different identity at a different time, but an identity that is 
fluid and responsive. I understand ‘being several things at once’ as the ability to take the attitude 
of many generalised others and to respond differently in different situations.  
I started this dissertation with a narrative of sustaining irresponsible behaviour, I was aware of 
the ethical challenges posed by those involved in setting the prices. The decision not to report 
it affected my understanding of myself. Prior to this incident, having never faced a similar 
situation before, I thought of myself as a very conscientious ethical person. Had I been 
presented with this situation as a case study, I would have argued for exposing the alleged cartel. 
Having made a choice that was perhaps inconsistent with my previous notions of what was 
ethical, I did not stop considering myself moral. At the time my understanding of what was 
moral had been competing with my understanding of what was important for me. In this conflict 
I made a decision that privileged one aspect of my identity. All human interactions are 
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inevitably ethical, as they involve making evaluative choices about how we interact with the 
other. Often different aspects of identity – attitudes of different generalised others – are 
conflicting, and we make decisions that highlight some and downplay others. In a different 
context I might have responded differently.  
What I emphasise here is that my identity had impacted and had been impacted by that incident, 
but there was no fragmented self. I responded both similarly and differently to the situation that 
had arisen. My behaviour had been consistent in addressing my need to be recognised. It was 
also inconsistent with my proclaimed highly-ethical stance.    
Understanding identity as a tendency to act similarly in response to similar situations means 
there is always the potentiality for simultaneous consistency and change in identity. The ability 
to reflexively recognise that we actually choose how the ‘I’ responds to ‘me’ is what constitutes 
both continuous and at the same time changing self.  
This understanding of self is radically different from the assumption of independent agency and 
stability in the traditional management literature (Waldrop, 1992). Organisational writers, 
including critical management scholars, tend to focus on the ‘construction’ of identity as an 
individual enterprise (Brown, 2015, Kodeih and Greenwood, 2014, Alvesson, 2011, Alvesson 
et al., 2008). My experience of identity is inherently social, arising in interactions with others 
and with my self. There is never one single incident that is the root of specific behaviours. 
Certain needs and behaviours are so deep-rooted that they became ‘second nature’ (Elias [1939] 
2000), or habitus (Bourdieu, 1984). We experience those aspects as an external, permanent, 
uncontrollable force. Reflecting on our interactions we are able to recognise those behaviours 
as certain types of responses to certain types of gestures.     
One enduring aspect of my identity has been the need to be recognised as important. It is 
manifested in the tasks I undertake both in and out of work, in posts I choose, in the way I 
practice. Honneth (1996) perceived struggle for recognition as a basic human quality. I 
understand this to mean that we are born with the capability to recognise ourselves only through 
the recognition of others. Our responses to various gestures of recognition are continuously 
evolving in complex responsive processes of interaction with others and with ourselves. 
 
Reflecting on my practice, I have come to realise that by addressing what I understood as CSR, 
I have  chosen roles that were new at HBS: I asked to develop and lead a CSR module, I insisted 
on signing for PRME, I was the first to apply for the role of director of the SEU. I believed that 
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I could develop those roles, putting my mark on them, which in turn had the potential for me to 
demonstrate diligence, creativity, initiative and industriousness – attributes that I believed were 
valued by both colleagues and managers. When I first started working at the university, I did 
not perceive CSR as critical to my sense of self, to my status. Identifying with CSR emerged in 
responsive interactions with others. I have often complained that the managers used the Unit as 
a way to promote themselves, for example, demonstrating to a distinguished guest that we at 
UH or HBS take social responsibility seriously. And since I was best placed to discuss what we 
did, I was asked to talk to the visiting dignitary. I used to complain that I was brought out as a 
dancing bear for the entertainment of visitors. Yet, the managers’ need to exhibit the Unit could 
be understood as signalling its importance to the organisation’s reputation. Being associated 
with the Unit addressed my need for recognition. Over time, the subject of CSR has become 
tremendously important to me. Teaching, researching and practising CSR, I have grown to 
perceive CSR-related issues as integral to who I am. 
 
I perceive positive mentioning of CSR-related achievements as personal acknowledgements; 
disparaging comments about CSR and exclusion of community-related activities from strategic 
levels are taken as an affront to me. My struggle for CSR is a struggle for recognition, a struggle 
for visibility (Waldrop, 1992). Following Honneth (Honneth and Margalit, 2001, Honneth, 
2002, Honneth, 1996) I mean recognition or visibility in a figurative sense. In this sense 
recognition is a social act, through ‘an expression of specific ways of reacting that are a sign – 
an expression – of taking notice … of someone in a positive sense’ (Honneth and Margalit, 
2001: 114).  Recognition, according to Honneth (ibid), requires public acknowledgement. It is 
not enough that the dean knows the importance of the SEU: I, and others, must be aware of his 
acknowledgement. Not being publicly acknowledged, by not having the subject with which I 
identify valued, is a source of angst. As a human, I am constantly becoming myself in 
interaction with others, anticipating and responding to their judgements, thus responsively 
evolving in mutual recognition (Stacey and Mowles, 2016: 306). Therefore, understanding the 
struggle for CSR at HBS as a struggle for recognition, allows me to make better sense of the 
anxiety I have experienced when facing unfavorable reactions to CSR.  
Life in organisations is unpredictable and continuously evolving.  CSR as a management 
concept is unique, as its purpose is not just to improve productivity or contribute to efficiency, 
and not ‘focusing purely on the external good or profit’ (Blackman et al., 2013: 240). 
Additionally, CSR activities often are not necessarily part of the organisational mainstream 
activities. Moreover, unlike other management ideas (e.g. total quality management, business 
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process reengineering, lean production), there are no rules for implementing it, as den Hond et 
al (2007: 4) argue: 
at the more concrete level of implementing CSR in a specific context, many different 
interpretations of CSR seem to be around. Once it is put into practice, the seemingly 
single-faced concept of CSR breaks down into a concept that is variegated, sundry, 
and fragmented.  
An attempt to introduce and implement CSR is bound to add to organizational unpredictability 
and uncertainty. Practising CSR involves change in perceptions and behaviours (Higgs, 2006). 
This continuous change, and the uncertainty that is an inevitable aspect of change, is anxiety-
provoking. Making the general idea of CSR practical, adds to this anxiety. Our identities arise 
in relationship with others, in our interdependent responses to change. It is inevitable that people 
will perceive change as a challenge to their identity. Elias (1991: 93) recognised that 
If [our identity] ... is called into question, our own security is threatened. What was 
certain becomes uncertain. 
At times, the challenge is so great that it is experienced as a threat to one’s identity and when 
threatened some may respond with resistance. Paradoxically, my need for being recognised is 
also the need to be subversive. By subversive I do not mean insubordinate, but rather 
challenging authority, the mainstream, the ‘business as usual’. Often I respond to gestures I 
understand as opposition by seeking actions that challenge that opposition, rather than avoiding 
confrontation. Dissatisfied with the Unit’s initially stated purpose, I insisted on expanding the 
activities beyond working with charities. To Lisa’s scepticism about my effectiveness (Chapter 
6), I responded with increased enthusiasm to prove her wrong. Reflective narratives as a 
research method in this dissertation can be seen as challenging the methodological mainstream. 
Elias (1991:93) continues his insight into identity  
 
But without throwing oneself for a time into the sea of uncertainty one cannot escape 
the contradictions and inadequacies of deceptive certainty. 
 
I understand Elias’s statement not as suggesting that we can choose to promote or shun 
uncertainty, but as a call to recognise that ‘throwing oneself into the sea of uncertainty’ is 
unavoidable. Throughout my studies I have experienced continuous challenges to my identity, 
especially dealing with anxiety related to perception of not being recognised. Those challenges 
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have arisen in my interactions with others and with myself. I’ve come to understand them as 
enabling constraints – constraints that enable me to recognise my self, become aware of my 
responses to those gestures. By recognising and reflecting on responses I would like to avoid, I 
attempt to respond differently in the future. I have also come to recognise uncertainty not just 
as challenge, but as central in the emergence of identity.   
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Summary 
In this chapter I reflected on struggle and identity, two major themes in my PhD studies, which 
are evident in all my narratives. Reinterpreting CSR in many local interactions is inevitably 
anxiety provoking and thus involves continual emergence of identity, our own and that of 
others, as well as conflict and struggle. I believe that my struggle felt particularly surprising 
because of the context of CSR. Implied claims to moral high ground in academic and 
practitioner literature left me exasperated when I realised that such a noble practice can be 
ignored, contested and even rejected.   
 
The neoliberalist approach that underpins the mainstream organisational literature depicts an 
organisation as a collection of discrete autonomous individuals, who make their choices 
independently of others and can predict the outcomes of those choices (Rustin, 2013). On this 
understanding, conflict and struggle are results of poor choices and must be resolved (e.g. De 
Clercq and Belausteguigoitia, 2017, Rao, 2017, Davis, 2016, Buur and Larsen, 2010).  
 
Understanding organisations as patterns of interaction among many interdependent people, who 
are enabled and constrained by each other, allows understanding conflict differently, as being 
an inevitable aspect of interdependence. In this chapter I have highlighted how our identity 
arises those interactions, in the processes of recognition and challenge. Being interdependent 
with others, the struggle for our identity is inevitable.   
Understanding that conflict, struggle and power relating are aspects of all human relationship, 
we can begin to depathologise conflict, and reconceptualise struggle as an inevitable 
characteristic of every relationship.   
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Chapter 10 - Summary and contribution  
Introduction 
In ‘The Wonderful Wizard of Oz’ by L. Frank Baum, a girl named Dorothy, accompanied by 
her dog Toto, embarks on a journey to Emerald City to ask the Wizard to fulfil her wish of 
returning home to Kansas. Along the way she meets the Scarecrow who wants to get a brain, 
the Tin Woodman who wants a heart, and the Cowardly Lion who wants courage. On their 
adventures the Scarecrow demonstrates impressive intellect to save them from the attack of 
bees, the Tin Woodman proves to have the biggest heart, and the Cowardly Lion fights off the 
entire army of Winkie soldiers to defend his friends. Yet the friends fail to see what is obvious 
to the reader and insist that only the Wizard of Oz can grant them their wishes. Even when they 
realise that the Wizard is an ordinary man, they still seek his help to achieve what they want. 
At the end Dorothy learns that for her even the Wizard cannot provide her with a ‘placebo’ 
remedy that satisfied her friends. The Wizard cannot bring her home. At the end she realises 
that all she had to do to return to Kansas was to click the heels of the shoes she wore the entire 
time. 
This children’s story is very nuanced; it can be read as a tale of friendship, of growing up, of 
deceptive appearances. I find this tale analogous to my exploration of CSR. I started this 
dissertation as a quest for CSR. I was looking for the meaning of CSR in academic literature, 
in professional literature, in the press, in reports, conferences and workshops. And while 
searching for CSR in the experience of others, I was working, interpreting the generalised idea 
of CSR in daily practice with myself and others.  
In this research I demonstrate how CSR emerges in many interactions, in everyday experiences, 
arising in the context of the moment. It is impossible to pinpoint specific interaction that might 
lead to what becomes recognised as CSR. Reflecting on these everyday experiences, I explore 
various aspects of my practice of CSR in an HE institution. My research has been informed by 
the pragmatism of Dewey and Mead, by the process sociology of Elias, and by contemporary 
organisational researchers – colleagues from the Complexity and Management Centre at UH 
(Stacey et al., 2000, Griffin, 2002, Shaw, 2002, Noble, 2004, Mowles, 2015b, Norman et al., 
2015, Crewe, 2015), and researchers from other institutions (Zhu, 2007, Taylor, 2005, Larsen 
and Bogers, 2014, Bates, 2016) –  who have engaged with complexity. In doing so, I have 
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explored CSR as a social object, and demonstrated that particularising this often idealised social 
object always involves power relations, communicative interaction, and ethical choices. 
In the following sections I draw together the main themes arising from my research and   
highlight the main contributions of my work. Taking a complexity-informed approach to 
researching, I recognise that knowledge and practice arise in the same processes of interaction. 
This research contributes to knowledge and practice at the same time, although at times the 
contribution to one might be more relevant than to the other. I highlight my contributions in 
general, emphasising the more relevant impact where appropriate.  
CSR as practice 
A key contribution of this dissertation is in the insight I have gained through reflecting on my 
own practice – the meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility arises in practising corporate 
social responsibility. For example I started this research with the aim of ‘uncovering’ the 
meaning in what others have to say about it. But I did not find the meaning there, waiting to be 
‘uncovered’. I began to focus on my own day-to-day activity, taking what I was doing seriously. 
Iterating reflexive narratives of my practice, I have demonstrated how in my local interactions 
with others and with myself, we are creating an understanding that emerges as meaning and 
identity for the SEU and contributes to CSR for the whole institution. Directly relating the 
subject of research to the work we do has been recognised in other practices in HEA. For 
example Ahmed (2012: 9) reflects on her research ‘diversity work often involves “working out” 
what works giving the workplace’. This reflection resonates with my experience of CSR. In 
choosing our activities and in interpreting them, we define and redefine what we include in, and 
exclude from CSR, particularising locally, and simultaneously influencing a generalised 
understanding of CSR.   
My initial experience of corporate social responsibility was puzzling, anxiety-provoking and 
exciting at the same time. Copious definitions and theoretical perspectives on the topic confused 
me rather than provided clarity. My early objections to certain lines of enquiry (see Chapter 1) 
made my teaching uncomfortable, as I believed I had the responsibility to present perspectives 
with which I disagreed, yet I had no alternatives to suggest. As uncomfortable as I felt about 
the mainstream CSR literature, I kept teaching the subject. Despite my uneasiness about what I 
read, I continued discussing the meaning of responsibility with students.     
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The initial excitement about heading the SEU, which was partly rooted in my hoping for a 
practical understanding of CSR, was quickly replaced by panic: what to do now? (see Chapter 
7). Seeking answers in the CSR literature produced more confusion. Despite growing academic 
interest in researching CSR, there was very little about the actual practice of CSR that I could 
identify with, or draw on, that would assist me in interpreting CSR. Limited discussion of the 
operationalisation of CSR (Pedersen, 2006) left me wondering about what could and what could 
not be considered CSR. But, despite the mounting panic and confusion, I was trying different 
approaches to explore what can be done in the role. I kept on trying various ways of engaging 
with others, and together we kept on engaging with the community.    
Influenced by pragmatism I began paying closer attention to my practice. Pausing to recognise 
my frustration with what I thought to be lack of significant engagement with CSR, I traced the 
development of CSR discourse and its evolution into the overwhelmingly positive and idealised 
construct as it is currently presented in the mainstream literature (Chapter 4).  I realised that 
despite being disapproving of some aspects of CSR literature (e.g. theorising organisations as 
moral agents), I uncritically accepted the heroic narrative of CSR and found myself propagating 
it further in my teaching. I had begun engaging with the literature more critically. I introduced 
critical perspectives into the CSR module, and later I introduced the ideas of responsibility and 
critical evaluation of practice into other modules. Together with students and colleagues, we 
continued thinking about what responsibility meant to us in our practice. 
I also realised that despite criticising the managerialist approach to CSR, in my eagerness to 
establish the significance of my role as director of the SEU (Chapter 8), I contributed to 
establishing managerialist standards for community engagement at UH. Reflecting on my 
anxiety about the significance of my work had a great impact on developing a more critical 
reading of the mainstream CSR literature and a more critical reflection on my practice. Paying 
attention to the ways I had been caught in the processes of maintaining the managerialist 
discourse of community engagement in the UH, I began trying various ways to influence that 
discourse, keeping in mind the need to stay in the game. 
Reflecting on my practising of and thinking about CSR, I have come to realise that I had been 
searching for the meaning of CSR in episteme or ‘scientific knowledge’ that  
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concerns universals and the production of knowledge which is invariable in time and 
space, and which is achieved with the aid of analytical rationality (Flyvbjerg, 2001: 
55-56). 
The initial desire to come up with a definition of CSR and the search for a set of practices that 
could be considered as ‘legitimate’ CSR arose from my long-held beliefs of what constitutes 
the ‘correct’ knowledge. According to those beliefs the only knowledge that had value was the 
knowledge created by scientific methods, that is to say following the tradition of natural 
sciences (Gigerenzer and Marewski, 2015). That type of knowledge (episteme) is generalizable 
and context- and time-independent. I was seeking a rational explanation of CSR as if it were a 
natural phenomenon. I was seeking to provide an explanation for the ‘correct’ CSR.  
I became aware of the limitations of generalised CSR definitions (Carroll, 1991, McWilliams 
and Siegel, 2001, EC, 2011, UK, 2014) for explaining what was going on in my practice. Yet, 
giving up those ideas was not easy, because they provided some sense of control and certainty. 
Throughout this dissertation I have discussed the need to hold on to that certainty, although 
very early on I became aware that what I was holding onto was the appearance of certainty. 
Not having a clear plan of work, not knowing what the end result was going to be, was 
disconcerting. This was also pertinent to my research. Not having a clear picture of what my 
dissertation would look like was anxiety-provoking.  
Nevertheless, following the pragmatist commitment to research that is informed by practice 
(Simpson, 2009), I knew I had to let go of the expectation of finding in the literature definitive 
answers to how to practice CSR. I had to take the proverbial plunge into the uncertainty of 
researching my own practice, to recognise ‘the contradictions and inadequacies of a deceptive 
certainty’ (Elias, 1991: 93). It was not a straightforward nor a quick decision. It arose in many 
conversations with others and with myself. But reflecting on my practice allowed me to pay 
greater attention to my participation in the emergence of various patterns of interactions that 
we came to recognise as ‘community engagement’ and accepted as CSR. In doing so, I relied 
on practical, context-specific wisdom, or phronesis: 
Where rational humans for Plato are moved by the cosmic order, for Aristotle they are 
moved by a sense of a proper order amongst the ends we pursue. This sense cannot be 
articulated in terms of theoretical axioms , but rather, is grasped by phronesis  
(Flyvbjerg, 2001: 57). 
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Making everyday decisions about right and wrong in my particularising with others the 
generalised idea of CSR, we have been relying on our experience and been making decisions 
about how to behave in local interactions. These decisions cannot be reduced to general truths. 
Reflecting on my experience, it became clear that there could not be prescriptions or formulae 
for implementing CSR. Practising CSR involves making decisions about what is ethical in each 
particular situation. It requires phronesis not just episteme. 
In approaching the research of CSR in Ukraine (Chapter 3), my colleagues and I decided not to 
tell the participants what we meant by CSR, but leave it to them to discuss what they understood 
as CSR in their organisations (Filosof et al., 2012). The rationale was to allow the meaning of 
CSR in Ukraine to emerge in the interviews. I was surprised that not even one participant asked 
what we meant by CSR, what definition we employed. They interpreted the meaning of CSR 
in their working with others and came up with varying, often surprising to us, practices. 
Similarly, while I clung to the idea of finding a specific definition of CSR, I kept working with 
others on community engagement, not dwelling on the need to define CSR, always 
reinterpreting the general idea of CSR in practice. Particularizing CSR has involved making 
evaluative choices about what can and cannot be done. In our practice we have been enabled 
and constrained by our interdependence. It is in this interdependence, in working with others, 
which involves cooperation and resistance, that we keep on re-interpreting and re-negotiating 
the meaning of CSR. 
Changing the focus 
A further contribution of this dissertation to CSR discourse is in its focus. A recent study by 
Wang and Gao (2016) identified five major current themes in CSR research: defining CSR, 
CSR context, CSR-related strategy, corporate reputation, and CSR-CFP relationship. In this 
dissertation I have explained the limitation of focusing on the last two themes. I have also 
arguing that CSR-related strategy can be added to these two, as this theme focuses on the type 
of CSR-related strategies that can potentially enhance organisations’ performance. I can 
summarise my critique of this utilitarian approach to CSR, by stating that our interdependence 
means unpredictability of outcomes and that there might be no direct relationship between CSR 
and any outcomes, be they reputational, operational or financial. 
The aim of this dissertation has been to explore how CSR is understood and implemented by a 
practitioner. As the research developed I became aware of the futility of searching for a specific 
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definition of CSR. Rather than trying to define what I have been practising, I focused on aspects 
of my practice that are usually not discussed in the mainstream CSR literature – daily local 
interactions that may or may not emerge as CSR. 
In my research I have explored a practitioner’s perspective on practising CSR. In doing so I 
identified several aspects of CSR that remain under-theorised (van Aaken et al., 2013) in CSR 
literature – power relating, struggle,  and identity (see Chapter 9). As stated previously, in the 
mainstream CSR literature the focus tends to be on the exploration of global patterns of 
interaction, which became recognised as CSR, as a thing that exists outside of the researchers’ 
experience. The writers in this tradition tend to discuss CSR as a set of  actions that exist at 
different levels, e.g. organisational, national or regional, of CSR  (see Gond et al., 2017).  
Several authors pointed to the limited research on the individual practising CSR (see Frynas 
and Yamahaki, 2016); and even when such research is undertaken, the individual is seen as the 
level of analysis (e.g. Athanasopoulou and Selsky, 2015, Hengst and Muethel, 2015). Informed 
by complexity sciences, I understand national, organisational and local CSR not as being 
conducted at different levels, but as self-similar patterns of interaction arising at different scales 
and in different contexts.  
Reflecting on my own narratives also contributes to research methodologies that focus on the 
lived experience of the practitioner. In Chapter 3 I alluded to the growing strand of literature in 
which authors explore their own experience through reflective narratives. These authors tend 
to reflect on their experience of researching, ‘locating the researcher in the research’ (du Preez, 
2008).  
Many management writers (Corlett, 2013, Haynes, 2012, Maclean et al., 2012, Cunliffe and 
Jun, 2005) recognise the need for reflection and reflexivity in organisational research. 
Reflection has been gaining momentum as a research method within management studies in 
recent years (Holton and Grandy, 2016, Stokes and Harris, 2012, Duijn et al., 2010). It has been 
suggested that by engaging reflexively with one’s own practice, the practitioner may develop 
more meaningful insights into his/her area of expertise (Matsuo, 2012, Haynes, 2006a, 2006b). 
However, reflective or reflexive narrative accounts of individual practice in management are 
still rare (Yanow, 2009).   
I extend this approach to reflecting on both research and practice. I argue that the two are 
intertwined, and reflecting on one aspect I inevitably reflect on the other. Reflecting on my 
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experience of practising CSR in communicative interaction with others, I have highlighted the 
paradox of how my subjective experience of CSR is formed objectively. Writing from within 
experience, paying attention to nuances that feel significant and recognising one’s own feelings 
as inseparable from decision-making and acting, has been a method used in the Doctor of 
Management programme at UH. Other doctoral candidates  reflected on their own work (e.g. 
Hicks, 2010). My work extends the growing body of research, which focuses on reflective 
narrative, in extending the reflective narrative to a new context. 
Changing the focus of research offers an additional contribution to practitioners and 
researchers. In this dissertation, I have highlighted experiencing a dissonance between highly 
idealised concepts of CSR (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5), strategy and vision (Chapters 6 and 7), and 
between my lived experience of practising CSR. In Chapter 8 I allude to the parallels between 
my research method and CMS approach. Critically reflecting on the disparity between the 
mainstream literature approach to CSR and my own experience, and problematising and de-
naturalising the idealisation of CSR, I have gained and demonstrated a better understanding of 
the complexity in which idealisations arise. CMS scholars also problematise and challenge 
idealisations. One criticism of CMS is that its proponents tend to be more articulate about ‘what 
they are against [rather] than what they are for’ and provide no ‘immediately actionable 
prescriptions’(Adler et al., 2007: 41). I too critique the heroic narrative of CSR in the 
mainstream literature, and offer no prescriptions for practice. However, in this dissertation I 
demonstrate that the alternative to mainstream idealisations is not CMS negativity, but 
pragmatic reflection on one’s own practice.   
The dissonance I refer to, initially resulted in heightened anxiety and scepticism. Disparity 
between the idealised claims and perceived reality may also lead to cynicism (Bussey, 1992, 
Robinson et al., 1995, Mills and Keil, 2005). I distinguish between scepticism and cynicism. I 
understand scepticism as avoiding making statements about absolute truths and ‘a specific 
ability to give opposed accounts of things’, and cynicism as disbelief in the sincerity of human 
actions and intentions (Dean et al., 1998). On this understanding, scepticism helps developing 
critical understanding of CSR, while cynicism contributes to pessimism, disbelief and 
indiscriminate rejection of the concept, or to branding it as yet another management fad.  I 
recognise that while working on this dissertation my anxiety has diminished. Critically 
reflecting on my own practice, I remain sceptical, challenging both the literature and my own 
assumptions and beliefs, without embracing cynical negativity towards the idea of CSR. And 
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although this work is not an instruction manual for managing CSR, it offers practical to CSR 
practitioners and researchers.    
Taking a practitioner’s perspective is a major, but not the only contribution of my research. By 
changing the focus, I was able to demonstrate the links between local interaction and the global 
patterns we have come to recognise as CSR. It also contributed to a different understanding of 
CSR, an understanding that is resonant with CSR practice.   
Local and global CSR: similar processes, different scales   
A further contribution of my research is in exploring how global patterns we have come to 
recognise as CSR, arise in local interaction. Changing the focus of research, taking a 
practitioner’s perspective, and being informed by the ideas of complexity, I began recognising 
the self-similarities between patterns arising in my local interacting with others and global 
patterns that we understand as CSR.  
By discussing CSR in systems terms, many  authors refer to ‘external pressures’ (e.g. 
Herremans and Nazari, 2016), ‘societal pressures’ (e.g. Hofman et al., 2017), and 
‘organisational culture’  (e.g. Puplampu and Dashwood, 2011) as if they exist as independent 
entities, outside of our experience. Although we may experience them as such, they are not 
external forces, like the forces of nature, but, as we are reminded by Elias (1956), are arising in 
our interdependence. Understanding CSR as an emerging pattern of interaction, means that 
exploring daily practice through my narrative accounts may provide insight into how those 
patterns emerge. Discussing CSR as if being practiced differently at different levels, the 
researchers focus on the manifestation of what is experienced as national, corporate or 
organisational behaviours at the time of specific studies, ignoring historical processes in which 
those patterns of behaviour arise. I am arguing that what has been missing in the CSR literature 
is the understanding of how those patterns of interaction have emerged as CSR.  
In Chapter 4 I began making sense of what can and cannot be considered CSR. A similar 
consideration regarding what to be included in the SEU is also reflected upon in Chapter 7. I 
found it difficult to reconcile my daily undertakings with the idea of CSR I had formed based 
on my readings on the topic. In these chapters I highlight internal conversations with myself 
regarding the appropriateness of referring to some of those interactions as CSR. These 
deliberations bear similarity to the tentative discussion in the early literature on what is included 
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in the CSR concept, in which authors seem to be cautious about the nature of CSR, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
In Chapter 5 I also criticise the overwhelmingly positive image of CSR that has emerged over 
time, and in Chapter 8 I object to the quantification of CSR that is being articulated in various 
forms of reporting. In both chapters I reflect on the processes in which the patterns of CSR 
idealisation and quantification have been arising. In Chapter 6 I examine my own contribution 
to the same processes of CSR glorification I was critiquing. Reflecting on my e-mail exchanges 
with a senior manager regarding reporting on the activity of the SEU (Chapter 8), provided 
insight into the emergence of CSR reporting. These three chapters raise awareness of how 
acting locally, often unreflectedly, in the moment, may contribute to sustaining the same global 
patterns of interaction we so vehemently denounce.  
Particularising the generalised idea of CSR is not a heroic endeavour, it is exercised in mundane 
everyday practices and interactions. This dissertation contributes to CSR discourse by exploring 
how a social object – CSR – arises locally in ordinary interactions. I draw attention to how 
many of the activities we initially dismiss as trivial, are post-rationalised as related to CSR. By 
paying attention to my daily practice, I am able to understand that often giving a title to a social 
object provides a convenient umbrella term under which previously un-labelled practices can 
be gathered. I was gathering previously unlabelled activities in my reporting about SEU work, 
many of which had been enacted prior to its existence (Chapters 6 and 7). I was doing this in 
classifying some of our daily interactions as part of the ‘Green Impact’ initiative (Chapter 5). 
Many others in the UH have also been retrospectively absorbing certain activities under their 
role’s umbrella. Some of those activities have been historically part of their role, but now were 
given a more catchy title. Ordinary recycling has become part of the Environmental Team. 
Different activities had been performed by others, yet seemed to fit under several other themes. 
The SEU has been adopted by both ‘Community Engagement’ and by ‘Centre for Sustainable 
Living’ (Chapter 6). Leena tried to integrate the SEU’s engagements with her unit (Chapter 9). 
My own experience of such retroactive appropriations resonates with the gathering of different, 
often ancient, practices under a new umbrella of CSR in a different context, i.e. Ukraine 
(Chapter 3), or on a different scale, i.e. idealisation of CSR (Chapter 5).  
Reflecting on the narratives of my interactions with others and with myself, I have demonstrated 
how practising CSR is a social act, always involving others (Mead, 1934). In this dissertation I 
have argued that understanding of CSR as a social object – generalised tendencies to act in 
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similar ways in similar situations (Stacey and Mowles, 2016) – is more congruent with my 
experience of practising CSR. This is another key contribution of my research. 
Implications for social understanding of CSR   
Understanding corporate social responsibility as patterns of interaction, rather than a ‘thing’ 
that is independent of our interaction, means that searching for an ultimate definition of CSR is 
counterproductive. The expectation of arriving at such a definition assumes an identical 
understanding of the concept by everyone addressing it. A social understanding of CSR, on the 
other hand, allows for diversity of approaches and interpretations, for novelty and continual 
evolution. This profoundly social understanding evolved over several years of thinking about 
and practising CSR. Recognising that the three aspects of social interaction – communication 
(or conversation of gestures (Mead, 1934)), power relations and ethics (Stacey and Mowles, 
2016) – are inseparable features of CSR, helped me make better sense of my practice.  
Practising CSR involves power relations, as no human interaction is devoid of power. We 
engage with each other in a way that also entails emotions and changing perceptions of the past 
and expectations of the future. Patterns of interactions that I came to understand as CSR are 
stable and changing at the same time. They are stable because there is a general understanding 
of what CSR means – commonly recognised as responsibilities of organisations to society 
(Dillard and Murray, 2013) – and changing , because that understanding is general, and we 
always interpret the idea in the living present (Loewen Walker, 2014). As we keep 
reinterpreting and particularising in daily interactions the generalised idea of CSR, power 
chances of the players continually shift. 
Reflecting on my CSR practice also means paying attention to how I have dealt with 
uncertainty. Although the understanding that the future is unknowable is trite, the mainstream 
management theory emphasises the importance of managers being able to foresee the future 
and to control it (e.g. Grote, 2009). Paying more than lip service to uncertainty and 
unpredictability, bringing them to the fore of our thinking about working in organisations in 
general, and practising CSR specifically,  has several implications for understanding corporate 
social responsibility. 
Firstly, this understanding challenges the idea that we can somehow predict the outcome of our 
actions. CSR cannot be perceived as purely consequentialist ethical choices – as we cannot 
know the consequences of our behaviour a priori. Nor can CSR be understood in deontological 
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ethics terms, as ethics is not static, but continuously evolving in our interactions. As a social 
object, CSR has to be reinterpreted and re-evaluated in our daily interactions. Not being able to 
foresee the outcomes of our actions, means attributing the CSR meaning to an interaction 
retrospectively. This retrospective appropriation of (what is seen as positive) outcomes as 
something recognised by those in authority, is also closely related to our identity. By thinking 
about unpredictability and uncertainty as an inevitable feature of human interdependence, I 
demonstrate the impact the struggle for identity has on the post-factum ascribing of certain 
behaviours as CSR. My identity has become intertwined with my role, and the more community 
engagement becomes acknowledged, the more recognised I feel. Recognition of one’s 
contributions also means separating the recognised from the unrecognised – one can only be 
recognised because others are not. Being interdependent with others means acting into 
uncertainty, and inevitably a struggle for recognition arises.  
Secondly, a social understanding of CSR challenges the idea that CSR actions can be directly 
linked to specific outcomes. For example, understanding CSR as subject to effective causality 
leads to the search for direct links between CSR and CFP (see Cheng et al., 2014, Godfrey et 
al., 2009, Margolis et al., 2007). Drawing on complexity sciences, I have gained some insights 
into why research into CSR-CFP links, based on Newtonian scientific principles, is 
inconclusive (Orlitzky et al., 2003). This line of enquiry leaves practitioners to sift through 
contradictory conclusions, recommendations and practical implications resulting from such 
research. A complexity-informed approach emphasises the limits of thinking about CSR in 
terms of actions that can be analysed and predicted. There is no direct relationship between 
cause and effect; past and current patterns of relationships will not necessarily be replicated in 
the future; and any action, however insignificant it may seem, has the potential for being 
amplified and leading to unintended consequences, desirable or otherwise. So a CSR 
practitioner seeking to implement ‘best practice’ based on previous experience or the 
experience of others is likely to be disappointed. It is impossible to isolate one variable (e.g. 
number of individuals involved in a social project) and calculate its effect on the performance 
(e.g. community engagement) of the organisation. It is also impossible to replicate a successful 
strategy, nor will a strategy that failed once necessarily always fail. This is not to say that 
planning is unnecessary. The process of planning has its purposes, but with the principles of 
complexity in mind, the limited value of plans and forecasts as blueprints for the future is 
recognised. ‘Acting as if the world is measurable, controllable and predictable does not make 
it so’ (Boulton, 2012). Complexity thinking emphasises the importance of a practitioner paying 
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attention to context, and exercising practical judgement. Despite the difficulty of planning and 
the unpredictability, CSR remains important, as referring to this broad concept, to this social 
object, provides a starting point for discussion on how we can go on working together, keeping 
our responsibilities to each other and to our environment in mind.   
Recognising practitioner’s experience 
In my research I avoid prescriptions, concentrating instead on making sense of my practice. 
Throughout this dissertation I have expressed my frustration with not recognising my 
experience in the dominant CSR discourse. Reflecting on the narratives of my experience 
highlights the limitations of prescriptive approaches to practising CSR (e.g. Martinuzzi and 
Krumay, 2013, Yuan et al., 2011). Providing a narrative exploration of my own practice, 
describing CSR as I have experienced it, is a further contribution of this research and which 
would be of particular interest to CSR practitioners. It is likely that there are other practitioners, 
who, like me, cannot identify with the neatly presented accounts of CSR in the orthodox 
literature, nor do they find the linear, formulaic prescriptions for CSR implementation useful. I 
suggest that a complexity-informed understanding of CSR provides those practitioners with a 
reflection that is more congruent with their practice.   
There is great satisfaction in looking back and recognising the contribution we make to the 
community (Anik et al., 2009, Valentine and Fleischman, 2008). The enthusiasm about such 
work is palpable during conferences dedicated to practising responsibility (e.g. PRME, 
Enactus). Working on community engagement is rewarding, and I have experienced immense 
fulfilment taking part in many projects. I feel privileged to be able to have ‘community 
engagement’ as part of my job description. Yet, there are many aspects of practising CSR that 
are often obscured from public discourse. In paying attention to the daily interactions that 
constitute community engagement, I have demonstrated the nuances of the work that are usually 
missing from the final reports.  
I also felt discouraged when things did not go to plan. The sense of exasperation was amplified 
by the orderly accounts of how better results could have been achieved had I only followed the 
necessary steps  (e.g. Bakić et al., 2015). Were some initiatives disregarded because I missed 
one of the main ingredients for ‘implementing  CSR’ (Ehasz and Lan, 2011)? As discussed in 
Chapter 2 these CSR implementation frameworks are based in systems thinking. Rejecting the 
understanding of CSR as a system that can be designed and implemented by managers, who act 
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as external programmers of the bigger system – an organisation – had a therapeutic effect on 
me. There was no system that was victimising me, I was part of the ongoing processes of 
interaction, impacting and being impacted at the same time. This changing understanding also 
significantly affected my practice. For example, throughout this dissertation I demonstrated 
how my critique of the dominant CSR discourse and my sustaining of it emerged at the same 
time. Only by recognising my contribution to these processes was I able to attempt to participate 
differently.   
Exploring interdependence and the emergence of CSR meant understanding that my actions 
have consequences, and at the same time, neither I nor any one individually can control those 
consequences. What arises in our working together is at times intended and at times unintended. 
But the consequences are inevitably unpredictable, because they arise in complex webs of 
interactions. Thinking reflexively about practising CSR has had a significant impact on my 
thinking and practice. I believe that reading my reflections, others will recognise familiar 
themes from their experience.   
Prior to becoming director of the SEU, I assumed that practising CSR would involve promoting 
practices that would be welcomed and well received by my colleagues. I assumed consensus, a 
shared understanding of the importance of our involvement with the community. In iterating 
my narratives, I reflected on CSR practice as an experience fraught with challenges, struggle 
and conflict.  
In this dissertation I explored how a predominantly positive image of CSR presented in the 
academic and trade literature had left me discouraged, deflated and unable to perceive my 
practice as ‘appropriate’ CSR. This positive representation of CSR was one of the main reasons 
for being upset with uncooperative colleagues and managers. Having one’s work openly and 
covertly challenged always negates the greater sense of self.  It was especially difficult to 
understand why a noble idea would be received with a cold shoulder. Reflecting on my practice, 
I have come to understand that interpreting what is it that we are supposed to do together has 
the potential for cooperation and conflict at the same time. Understanding conflict as potential 
in any interaction, demystifies CSR. I no longer understand corporate social responsibility as a 
special type of interaction that only has potential for positive communicative interaction, and I 
am not surprised by the need to fight to keep conversations about community engagement going 
on. No longer thinking of CSR as a topic that should unify colleagues, understanding that 
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particularising even the most enlightened idea can potentially involve struggle, has helped me 
facing disagreement.     
Practising CSR is often lonely, frustrating, and discouraging. CSR is usually not the core 
organisational purpose, and therefore is often not perceived as a ‘strategic’ issue. My experience 
is not singular; I hear about similar feelings from my colleagues at conferences and workshops; 
and it is even beginning to be explored by researchers (e.g. Louw, 2015). By bringing this aspect 
of CSR practice to the fore, I aim to provide CSR practitioners, especially those in the UK 
Higher Education, with a narrative in which they may recognise the themes that arise in their 
experiences. The details of my experience are not generalisable, but the emerging themes would 
be familiar, albeit with different intensity. I hope that my making sense of my experience, which 
involves doubts and struggles, my evolving identity and changing understanding, will help 
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Summary 
My interest in researching CSR stemmed from the need to expand an understanding of what it 
means to practise CSR. Throughout this dissertation I have been reflecting on my experience 
of CSR, and in doing so I have provided an understanding of what it means to practice CSR in 
the context of a UK HEI. I have not provided a decisive definition of CSR, as I recognise that 
CSR can be better understood as practice, evolving in numerous interactions of many 
interdependent players, rather than as a thing, defined in static terms. Reflecting on my own 
practice I have gained insights which contribute further to CSR discourse. In this chapter I 
reflected on the main contributions of my work.  
Firstly, my research demonstrates how the meaning of CSR arises in practising CSR. This 
insight provides a significantly different perspective from the prevailing systems-based 
understanding of CSR found in the traditional CSR literature.   
Secondly, changing the focus of research to examining my experience as a practitioner, I 
addressed a nascent area in the CSR literature. Although many authors argue for the need to 
research the personal experience of a CSR practitioner, this perspective remains 
underdeveloped.  
This dissertation contributes to another strand of literature – research methodology. Similar to 
the calls for researching individual experience in CSR literature, the appeals for more reflexive 
approaches to management research, are not widely answered.  Reflecting on narratives of my 
own practice, I have demonstrated how our objective experience of the world is formed 
subjectively, thus contributing to disposing with the subjective-objective dichotomy in 
management research.  
A further contribution is of particular value to CSR practitioners. I have demonstrated that the 
understanding of CSR as emerging in our practice with others, which involves collaboration 
and conflict, power relations, and ethical choices, is more congruent with the experience of 
CSR practitioners, than what is currently presented in the dominant CSR discourse.   
Finally, this research has a noticeable impact on my practice. In addition to the difference in 
engaging with others in my role as director of the SEU, which have been discussed throughout 
the dissertation, I am aware of the difference that researching has made on my teaching and 
other roles. I have gained the confidence to insist, at times against the advice of my colleagues, 
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on students including reflexive engagement with their own experience on the modules I lead. I 
have seen the difference in students’ engagement with these modules and with their practice. I 
am especially gratified to have been able to articulate the importance of this engagement and to 
persuade more sceptical audiences of its value. A reflective approach has been recognised as 
one of three core principles of our MBA (HBS, 2017). I have been invited as a speaker to UG 
and PG student events to introduce reflection and reflexivity. Reflexivity does not provide an 
answer to all problems we encounter while interacting with others. For me, it is the recognition 
that the ‘otherness’ of those with whom we interact, that has the potential for new ways of 
working as well as for conflict. Engaging with my practice reflexively, I recognise that working 
with others I am inevitably enabled and constrained at the same time. This has been brought 
sharply into focus lately, with several new senior managers joining HBS. Reflecting on the 
initial sense of helplessness when facing the new edicts and seemingly arbitrary decisions, I 
have gradually become aware of the power relations in which we are entangled. And power 
relations are reciprocal. van Krieken (1998: 61) expounds on implications of the Eliasian idea 
of power relations:  
within [a] network of relations binding the more and the less powerful to each other, 
apparently less powerful groups also exercise a ‘boomerang effect’ back on those with 
greater power-chances.  
This does not mean that in the current situation we are able to refuse to cooperate with the 
managers, because of the current type of figuration. However, I suggest that no manager has 
unrestricted power over our work. No one is omnipotent, and no one is totally powerless.  
Reflecting on my experience has been therapeutic. The students often write about a similar 
effect of reflecting on their experience. I do not suggest everyone should reflect to improve his 
or hers emotional wellbeing. As I already mentioned, I prefer not to engage in prescriptions. 
Instead, I mention this because we often take actions aimed at reducing uncertainty-associated 
anxieties, e.g. planning, forecasting, relying on the past as a predictor for the future. For me, 
working on this dissertation has been anxiety-reducing, because by paying attention to my 
participation in present interactions, I have abandoned the need to predict the future, while 
inevitably working with an awareness of it.   
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Final thoughts  
Writing today about the events that took place throughout the years of working on my PhD, 
many of the then unknowns are better known now. Also, what seemed certain in the past has 
become unknown. I cannot avoid projecting these later understandings and the expectations 
from the future onto my writing about the past. This is the nature of the living present. The 
present is not a point in time separating past from future. Thinking today about the events of 
the past, I am inevitably influenced by my expectations of the future, and other experiences, 
past and present. At the same time, my expectations of the future are inevitably influenced by 
my current interpretations of the past events. The way we experience events cannot be clearly 
demarcated into past present and future. Whatever we experience in the present will always be 
affected and at the same time affect our understanding of the past and the future.  
My PhD group members often commented on the pessimistic tone of my writing. I did not 
intend this dissertation to be gloomy. I have reflected on experiences that initially drew my 
attention, stood out for me, made me want to understand them. I identify with David Sedaris 
(Sedaris, 2017), who recalls a conversation with his brother 
‘Why do you choose to remember the negative rather than the positive?’  
‘I don’t. Honestly though, does choice even come into it? Is it my fault that the 
good times fade to nothing while bad burn forever bright?  
‘Memory aside, the negative just makes for a better story. Happiness is harder to 
put into words. It’s also harder to source, much more mysterious than anger or 
sorrow, which come to me whenever I summon them, and remain long after I’ve 
begged them to leave’. 
There is no way to finish this dissertation on a definitive note. The SEU, PRME implementation, 
my identity, and CSR at UH kept evolving after I put the proverbial pen down. For example, 
the admin support to the SEU has been cut, which made me question my place at HBS for the 
first time since I started working here. Maybe my role as director of the SEU in its current form 
is under threat. By the time you read this dissertation, there will be some answers to these 
questions and others will arise. The more unexpected future events are, the more interesting the 
conversation will be, when they are the future past. For now, in the words of Jonathan Tropper 
‘This is where I leave you.’       
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Appendix 1 
Limitations of understanding organisations as complex adaptive systems 
Some organisational writers (e.g. Fleming and Sorenson, 2001, Webb et al., 2006, Haynes, 
2015, Scott and Davis, 2015, Miller and Page, 2007, Byrne and Callaghan, 2014) claim that 
organisations are complex adaptive systems. This idea is rooted in systems thinking whose 
origins are in Kantian logic that sees organisms in nature ‘as if’ systems with formative 
causality. Formative or efficient causality means that the process of interaction between sub-
systems leads to unfolding the purpose of the system that is already enfolded in it. The 
autonomous rational individual was to be understood as subject to a different type of causality 
- rationalist causality. Because of human capacity for reason an individual is free to pursue her 
own rationally chosen course of actions, so there is no enfolded end in human interaction. Kant 
argued that formative causality cannot be applied to human beings. However, systems thinking, 
as developed in the mid-20th century, applied formative causality to human action (Stacey et 
al., 2000), disregarding Kant’s caveat.   
Perceiving organisations as CAS suggests that the organisation exists independently, as a 
whole, outside of human interaction (Griffin, 2002). Proponents of complex responsive 
processes argue that organisations are not things, living or otherwise, but are ‘processes of 
communications and joint action’ (Stacey and Mowles, 2016: 283). As such, human 
organisations are not systems, and there are limits to assuming the behaviour of computer based 
models can be attributed directly to human interaction (Dalal, 2002, cf Griffin, 2002, Shaw, 
2002, Stacey, 2003, Larsen, 2005, Mowles, 2011, Stacey and Mowles, 2016). The authors warn 
against ‘transparently transfer[ring]’ (Webb et al., 2005: 4) insights from complex adaptive 
systems to organisations. 
The first difficulty in understanding human interaction in terms of CAS is the question of 
system boundary. All systems have an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’. Advocates of perceiving human 
organisations as CAS suggest that organisations are special type of systems - open systems with 
permeable boundaries allowing free flow of information between the system and its 
environment (Schneider and Somers, 2006, Ludu, 2016). The separation between inside – the 
organisation, and outside – the environment still exists. This suggests it is possible to engage 
with the organisation by transferring information into it, yet remain on the outside of it. It also 
suggests that information is independent of human interaction, as if it is a physical object that 
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can be moved from one place to another. On this understanding an organisation is a super-entity 
that is above people. Yet we are never ‘outside’ of some organisations or ‘inside’ others. 
‘Belonging’ to an organisation, formal or informal, means participating in ongoing 
conversations in which patterns of behaviour that define those organisations emerge. There is 
no programmer that can stand ‘outside’ the interaction without being affected by it. People 
cannot be perceived as agents in the system and as its programmers at the same time.       
Another limitation in directly taking up insights from complexity sciences in terms of human 
interaction is the question of simple rules, or programme which operates the CAS. There is no 
external programmer in human interaction. While in computer-based simulations coherent 
patterns of behaviour emerge in interdependence of initially programmed agents, there is no 
similar initial programming in human interactions, there is no deliberate outside intervention 
that ‘programs’ detailed rules of human interaction. Later in this chapter I will discuss 
influences on human behaviour, norms and values that act similarly to rules. At this point I 
draw attention to the fact that people have the ability to choose their responses (although their 
choices are constrained by others, and therefore limited) to gestures of others. An agent can 
only interact with other agents according to the pre-programmed instructions; unlike humans, 
bit-strings of code have no free will28. While natural phenomena’s or computer simulations’ 
‘behaviour’ is adaptive, human behaviour is also purposeful. We are capable of being aware of 
our actions and of assessing the consequence of those actions (being capable of self-awareness 
does not necessarily mean that we always exercise that capability. I recognise that many aspects 
of our going about in the world remain unreflected), 
Reflecting on the narrative I recognise that by removing a specific recommendation from the 
report, I silently contributed to what was going on behind the scenes of a seemingly open 
market. I assume that I was not the only one who suspected that what was going on was wrong, 
but for many practical reasons no-one reported it to the authorities. There was no pre-
determined plan that directed each participant to take up a specific role. It was the interactions 
of many people, with various motivations, some by actively making agreements, others by 
silently condoning them, that enabled the cartel to go on. Interacting with each other, we played 
into and contributed to sustaining this pattern of behaviour. There was no blueprint that dictated 
this. My not blowing the whistle was a choice, not a directive. I am not proud of the choice I 
made, and at the time I did not reflect on the morality of that decision. The consequences of 
                                                          
28 By free will I mean ability to make decisions regarding one’s own actions. 
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acting differently were too dire. What is important to consider is that the choices I made were 
not made independently of others. My behaviour was consistent with the accepted behaviour in 
that organisation, and other organisations in that industry. This pattern of interaction was 
possible not because of the deliberate plan. It was only sustained and iterated because we kept 
playing into it. 
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Appendix 2 – Self-similarity and Scaling  
In complexity sciences self-similarity and scaling refer to properties of the system 
(Holland, 2014). The exact self-similarity exists in mathematics. One example is Koch’s 
snowflake curve in which ‘the curve is constructed by repeated use of the same 
construction’ (Holland, 2014: 14).  Starting with an equilateral triangle, and applying a set 
of simple rules:  
1. Divide each side into three equal parts.  
2. Construct an equilateral triangle on each of the middle parts. 
3. Erase all interior lines.  
4. Repeat for each of the new straight line segment 
we arrive at a complex geometrical figure (Figure 4).  
 
  
Figure 4. First four iterations of Koch’s snowflake curve (Ventrella, 2012) 
Regardless of scale, shape of the curve will bear exact self-similarity to the overall curve 
as well as to any other fragment of it (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5. Koch’s snowflake curve (Source: Bourke, 2007) 
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However exact similarity is not found in complex physical systems, such as coastlines, tree 
branching or Romanesco cauliflower, where we observe approximate self-similarity. It simply 
means that if we examine closely (e.g. through a magnifying glass) a small fragment of, let’s 
say a natural snowflake’s outline, it will look similar to its overall outline. Bourke (2007) in 
discussing the following picture, asks ‘is it on the scale of a large piece of rugged terrain 
photographed from an aeroplane, or the side of a mountain, or a patch of dirt on the scale of a 
few meters, or a magnification of the surface of a rough rock?’  
  
He notes that we can conceive it to be any of the above. ‘So one could start at the large 
scale view from the air and apply successive zooms down to a microscopic scale, the 
surface maintains self-similarity across those scales’ (ibid). While exact self-similarity is 
indefinite, natural self-similarity occurs only at a few scales.   
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Appendix 3 - Abstract for 5th International Conference on Global Studies (2012) 
 CSR in Ukraine: cynical utilitarianism or Aristotelian ‘common good’? 
 
Short: 
This paper presents results of a study of CSR in Ukraine. We demonstrate that two divergent 
approaches to CSR are distinct in their motivations, but share similar CSR practices.  
Long: 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been researched extensively in Western Europe 
(Steurer and Konrad, 2009), and to some extent in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Furrer et 
al., 2010). Empirical research in the former USSR, however, has been limited. This paper aims 
to address this deficiency, presenting the results of a study of CSR drivers in Ukraine.  We 
conducted 18 semi-structured interviews with managers, NGO representatives and academics 
in Ukraine.  Our preliminary findings suggest that CSR adopters in Ukraine tend to fall into 
two main categories. Following Garriga and Melé’s (2004) typology, we discern a group that 
takes a predominantly utilitarian approach to defining its social obligations, adopting CSR 
practices in response to actual and perceived external demands. Such organisations tend to be 
newer (post-USSR era) companies, and/or those whose clients and investors are located mainly 
abroad. The second type consists of more locally embedded concerns, whose owners and 
managers adopt a predominately normative approach to CSR, adhering to practices that 
originated in the Soviet period, whilst striving for economic viability in a new era of market 
orientation. Our study casts light on the divergent paths taken by organizations in a distinctive 
transitional setting in order to gain social and economic legitimacy. 
 
References:  
Furrer, O., Egri, C.P., Ralston, D.A., Danis, W.m., Raynaud, E., Naoumova, I., Molteni, M., 
Starkus, A., Darder, F.L.N., Dabic, M. & Furrer-Perrinjaquet, A. (2010) Attitudes toward 
Corporate Responsibilities in Western Europe and in Central and East Europe. Management 
International Reviews (MIR), 50, 379-398. 
Garriga, E. & Melé, D. (2004) Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the 
Territory. Journal of Business Ethics, 53, 51-71. 
Steurer, R. & Konrad, A. (2009) Business-Society Relations in Central-Eastern and Western 
Europe: How Those Who Lead in Sustainability Reporting Bridge the Gap in Corporate (Social) 
Responsibility. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 25, 23-36   
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Appendix 4 – Expression of interest statement for the role of Director of the SEU  
Role:   Director, Social Enterprise Unit 
Applicant: Jana Filosof 
I was raised in the spirit of giving back to the community. As a child in the former Soviet Union my 
friends and I collected unwanted paper products and scrap metal long before the word ‘recycling’ 
became popular. We enjoyed planting trees as river defences in the spring and performing in front of 
the soldiers stationed in our town. My parents volunteered in our kindergarten and school, contributing 
their skills and time, and providing a citizenship example for my sister and me. My mother, at the age 
of 75, still heads the Finance Committee of the local chapter of the Holocaust Survivors Association. 
Altruism, charitable work and giving are a great part of my religious and cultural background. I was 
brought up with a strong ethos of personal contribution as an integral part of good citizenship. I raise 
my children to uphold those principles.  Giving back to the society is not what I do; it is a part of who I 
am. Therefore, I see the prospect of setting up and developing a Social Enterprise Unit as a great 
opportunity to combine my individual interest and skills with the vast pool of skills and knowledge 
existing within the Business School. I envisage this Unit contributing not only to the charity sector, but 
to the experience of our students,  to the community, and creating synergies that will enable us, the 
UHBS staff,  to give back to the society more than any of us, as individuals, can ever hope to.  
What else I can bring to the role: 
Proven record of working with and for charities and other community projects 
 Community Governor for PraeWood School in St.Albans; member of the Teaching and 
Learning committee 
 Volunteering in the 2 local village schools, as a parent helper (Shenley Primary) and as a 
Hebrew teaching assistant and as an assistant to a Finance Officer (Clore Shalom) 
 Long term supporter of Cancer Research UK – organising a jewellery sale, providing an 
exposure for a local artist, who donated part of the profit to the charity; raising awareness 
and funds through participating with my daughters in the Race for Life;   
 Supporter and fund raiser for Norwood (supporting families) and Life (supporting children 
with cancer) charities 
 Working with Organisation for Responsible Business – assisting the ORB with creating 
awareness and promoting Socially Responsible activities in the SMEs. 
 Bidding for the Community Engagement Funds (Dean of Students’ office)  
 Taking part in establishing and developing CSR@UH 
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Research interest in the relevant area 
 Working towards PhD in Corporate Social Responsibility 
 Teaching Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility on UG and PG level both in the UH 
and partner institutions (Helsinki) 
 Supervising several dissertations on the Strategic Issues for Charities 
Leadership skills 
 Team building 
 Development of individuals 
 Task and result oriented 
Personal skills 
 Creativity  
 Communication 
 Self- motivation 
 Team work  
 Networking skills 
 Organisation and prioritising skills 
 Commitment to Personal and Professional Development (PAD 3, Core Skills for Leaders, 
Coaching and Mentoring Forum) and life-long learning 
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